Exclusive: CIA Documents on 9/11

The CIA has released nearly 800 pages of newly declassified documents on Al Qaeda and the September 11 attacks.

The documents were released in response to an INTELWIRE Freedom of Information Act request for material referenced by the 9/11 Commission. Numerous documents were withheld, and those that were released have been heavily redacted. Despite this, it is highly unusual to receive any material from the CIA in response to a FOIA request, and they provide a fascinating look at the state of the agency's understanding of Al Qaeda over the years.

While much of the material has been previously described, by the 9/11 Commission and other sources, seeing the actual documents still has an impact. For instance, the following extracts:






The documents are presented here in two large PDFs. Each individual document is bookmarked within the PDF. Almost everything in the release was previously classified secret or top secret. The CIA also released several items already available on its Web site or in public testimony, which I omitted.

The documents are presented here in no particular order but I grouped material near the top related to warnings about the activities of Khalid Al Mihdhar, one of the hijackers, and material related to 1998 efforts to capture or kill Osama bin Laden together in roughly chronological order.

You are welcome to report from these documents, but you must credit Intelwire.com. If you wish to break out a specific document for a major media outlet, contact me. Smaller outlets, please feel free to grab excerpts using screencaps, but kindly remember to add the credit.

CIA 9/11 Binder 1:

• DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al Qa'ida 
• DCI Task Force Report: Improving Intelligence Warning, 29 May 1992 
• 2003-03-18 Bin Attash in Los Angeles in 2000 
• 2001-05-15 Email,  Suspicious travel, Khaled and Nawaf 
• 2001-05-24 Email,  Khalid Al-Mihdar in Malaysia 
• 2001-08-21 Email, re: Khalid Al Mihdhar 
• 2001-Undated, Email, Khallad 
• 2001-08-21, Email, Re: Khalid Al Mihdhar 
• 1998-05-05 Email, To Michael Scheuer, OBL Rendition 
• 1998-09-02 Talking points RE OBL Rendition 
• 1998-11-18 Memo re: OBL Rendition 
• 1998-11-24 Options for OBL (Rendition) 
• 1998-12-20 Email to Michael Scheuer, re: urgent re: UBL (missile ) 
• 1999-02-10 Talking Points: CIA Operations Against Usama bin Ladin 
• 1999-05-17 Email from Scheuer, your note, UBL ops 
• 2001-05-03 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attach 
• 2001-06-25, Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats 
• 2001-06-30 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Planning High Profile Attacks 
• 2001-06-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent 
• 2001-06-30 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief,  Bin Ladin Threats Are Real 
• 2001-07-02 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues Despite Delay 
• 2001-07-25 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing 
• 2001-08-07 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US 
• 1998-12-04 Memorandum, Usama Bin Laden, From Director CIA 
• Presidential Daily Brief, Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US 
• 1997-01-06 Usama bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability 
• 1997-01-06 Usama bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability  
• 1992-07-17 Improving Intelligence Warning 
• 2001-08-23  DCI Update, Terrorist Threat Review, Islamic Extremist Learns To Fly 
• 12 JUN 20 01 Biographical Information on Usama bin Ladin Associates 
• 2001-06-24 MBC TV Carries Video Report on Bin Ladin, Followers in Training 
• 2002-12-06 Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports Facilitates Al Qa'ida Travel 
• Undated, Bin Ladin Threatening to Attack US Aircraft 
• 2003-06-20 Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al Qa'ida Train on the Run? 
• DCI Counterterrorist Center: Attack on the US Cole, Preliminary Findings, 10 November 2000 
• 2000-10-18 The Threat to US Personnel in Yemen 
• 1999-04-09  Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively
• 1999-11-12 DCI UBL Update 
• 2001-08-12 CIA document, Atta did not travel to Prague 
• Undated, Planning by Usama Bin Laden to Hijack U.S. Airplane, Successful Circumvention of Security Measures in U.S. Airport
• 2001-04-12 Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target  
• 2002-02-27 Identifying Al Qa'ida's Donors and Fundraisers, A Status Report 
• Undated, Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam -- An Update
• 1997-08-25 DCI Talking. Points  Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin 
• 1997-01-08  Memo on OBL Fatwas 
• 1997-06-17 UBL financial support to Gamaat Islamiyya and others 
• 1998-12-24 Timeframe for hijacking operation 
• 1999-01-08 Hijacking Operation 
• Undated, Sudanese [redacted] ties to Gamaat Islamiyya 
• Undated, UBL funding of Gamaat Islamiyya 
• 1998-12-04  Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks
• 1998-09-22 Incorporation of Ayman Al Zawahiri's Al Jihad into UBL's Al Qa'ida 
• Undated, Terrorism: Extremists planning attacks against US interests in Pakistan 
• 2001-03-27 Afghanistan: An Incubator for International  Terrorism
• 2002-11-14 Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations 

CIA 9/11 Binder 2:

• 2001-07-03  DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review
• 2001-02-06 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing 
• 2004-03-11 Name Variants and Aliases of 11 September Hijackers and Associates 
• 2000-06-30 Intelligence Community Threat Advisory: Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks 
• 2001-03-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Afghanistan: Taliban Holding Firm on Bin Ladin For Now 
• 2001-05-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Terroristr Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plan 
• 2001-05-24 Call-In Threat Of High- Explosive Attack
• 1996-12-17 Africa Division Recommendations Regarding Sudan 
• 1999-09-06 UAE Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin's Finances 
• 1999-03-16 Iraqi Delegation  Meets with Bin Ladin 
• 1997-07-14 Activities of Bin Ladin's in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India 
• 2003-07-02 Bin Ladin Finances 
• 1997-02-13 Al Qaeda Links to Hosni Mubarak Assassination Attempt 
• 1997-08-11 Al Qaeda Plan to Establish Anti-Saddam Hussein Unit 
• 1997-01-31 COOPERATION AMONG USAMA BIN LADIN' S ISLAMIC ARMY, IRAN, AND THE NIF (Sudan) 
• 1997-01-31 TERRORISM: ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT  AMONG USAMA BIN LADIN, IRAN, AND THE NIF
• 1997-03-18 UBL's Attempts to Obtain Uranium  
• 1997-04-30 USAMA BIN LADIN'S ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA AND SUDANESE NI F SUPPORT
• 1997-03-05 USAMA BIN LADIN' S LINKS TO A SOUTHERN YEMENI  GROUP
• 1997-01-08 Regarding 1992 UBL Fatwa 
• 1996-12-19 RESPONSIBILITIES AND BACKGROUND OF ISLAMIC ARMY SHURA COUNCIL MEMBERS 
• 2003-03-10 Al Qa'ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths 
• 1996-11-26 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY,  AND BIN LADIN'S MOVE FROM AFGHANISTAN TO SUDAN 
• 1997-04-18 USAMA BIN LA DIN'S HISTORICAL LINKS TO 'ABDALLAH AZZAM
• 2000-11-02 Bin Ladin's Terrorist  Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable 
• 1999-07-29  Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities
• 2001-07-06 Expanding Links Between Alien Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the United States 
• 1999-12-11 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin to Exploit Looser Security During Holidays 
• Afghanistan: Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Ladin
• Terrorist Threat to US Interests in Caucasus 
• 2001-08-24  TERRORISM: SANITIZED VERSION OF THREAT REPORT
• 2000-07-14  DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat  
• 2000-07-07 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat  
• 2000-05-22 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Update 
• 2000-04 -05 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Update
• 2000-03-06 EXDIR Update: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat 
• 2000-04-03 Islamic Extremist Update 
• 2000-02-18 DCI Update: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat 
• 2000-01-07 Update:  Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat
• 1999-12-16 DCI Briefing Millennium Threat 
• DCI Document Request No. 16, Item No. 1: Production of the [redacted] Usama Bin Ladin  Situation Reports
• 1999-10-28  DDCI UBL Update
• 1999-08-03 UBL Update 
• 2002-08-07 Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes To Keep  al-Qa'ida Functioning
• 1997-01-27 UBL Fatwas 
• 1996-12-18 Structure of UBL's Islamic Army 
• 1996-12-19 TERRORISM: ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY'S MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND POLITICAL AND SHARIA COMMITTEE; PROCESS OF APPROVING TERRORIST OPERATIONS
• 1999-01-27 How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network 
• 2003-12-10 Letter to Douglas Feith from Stanley Moskowitz, Director of Congressional Affairs, re: Corrections to Iraq-AQ claims 
• 1999-04-05 Targeting Study of US Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya 
• 1995-12 Sketch of a South Asia-Based Terrorist Training and Logistic Network
• RESPONSE TO DCI DOCUMENT REQUEST NUMBER 52, ITEM 2 (9/11 Commission) 
• 2001:  Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution
• 1994-10 OIG Inspection Report: The Agency's Counterterrorism Effort 

Check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

RECENT WORK

Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam

New America Foundation Panel: Infiltration and surveillance

New America Foundation report: PATCON, a case study on infiltration

FOREIGN POLICY

Exclusive: Why American jihadist Omar Hammami fears Al Shabab will kill him

Patriot Games: FBI Undercover Operations And Timothy McVeigh

A Nation of Spies and Snitches

The Boy Who Cried Lone Wolf

Al Qaeda's Merger: 40 New Americans

Monsters and Children: Politics And How We Talk About Muslims

Anwar Awlaki: Gone But Not Forgotten

The Myth of Anwar Awlaki

Did You Hear The One About U.S. Internment Camps? 

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Al-Qaeda, CIA, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, Hijackers, Osama-Bin-Laden, September-11

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Beatings and Bureaucracy: The Founding Memos of Al Qaeda

A new INTELWIRE e-book provides a candid glimpse at the origins of Al Qaeda in its own words.

"Beatings and Bureaucracy: The Founding Memos of Al Qaeda" offers the full text of 30 different Al Qaeda founding documents, most of which have never been published before, including notes from the meetings at which Al Qaeda was imagined and created, letters to and from Osama bin Laden and other key Al Qaeda figures, and detailed descriptions of conflicts between bin Laden's allies and the followers of his mentor, Abdullah Azzam.

Click here to read on Kindle

If there's enough interest in these documents, additional material will follow.

Several of the documents in this collection were written by American jihadist Mohamed Loay Bayazid, an Al Qaeda founder. For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Abdullah-Azzam, Al-Qaeda, American-Al-Qaeda, Benevolence-International-Foundation, Mohamed-Loay-Bayazid, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Zawahiri Calls For Release of American Jihadist El Sayyid Nosair

The latest audio communique from Al Qaeda's top leader Ayman Al Zawahiri calls for the release of one of the earliest American jihadists to carry out violence on U.S. soil, Egyptian-born American citizen El Sayyid Nosair.

From CNN:

Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has claimed responsibility for the capture in August of a 70-year-old American citizen in Pakistan, according to SITE, a website that monitors terrorist threats.

"Just as the Americans detain all whom they suspect of links to al Qaeda and the Taliban, even remotely, we detained this man who is neck-deep in American aid to Pakistan since the '70s," al-Zawahiri said, according to SITE.

The al Qaeda leader also listed demands that needed to be met before he would release Warren Weinstein. The demands included the ending of airstrikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. He also added that Muslim prisoners including Abu Musab al-Suri, the "Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdul Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, Sayyid Nosair, and the family of Osama bin Laden must also be released.

Nosair was a follower and sometimes rival of the "blind sheikh" Omar Abdel Rahman. Born in Egypt, he immigrated to the United States and became a citizen. In the waning years of the jihad against the Soviet Union, he helped organize training in Jersey City nominally intended to prepare people to fight in Afghanistan. In reality, many of his trainees used their new skills to carry out terrorism on American soil, including the World Trade Center bombing and a thwarted follow-up plot that targeted New York City landmarks and the Lincoln and Holland tunnels.

The training provided by Nosair was supplemented by Ali Mohamed, a follower of Zawahiri who later became closely affiliated with Al Qaeda. Mohamed was, at the time, an active duty sergeant in the U.S. Army. He brought with him military manuals and sensitive materials stolen from Fort Bragg, where he was stationed.

Jihadist violence was not unknown on U.S. soil prior to Nosair. Jamaat Al Fuqra, a mostly American radical group that originated in New York, had firebombed religious facilities used by Hindus, Hare Krishnas and Ahmadiyya Muslims (a sect they believed to be apostate). Members of Al Fuqra murdered a liberal Arizona Muslim imam in early 1990.

But Nosair was the first American jihadist to make national headlines. In November 1990, Nosair shot and killed Meir Kahane, a radical Jewish leader, during a public meeting. Although the shooting was witnessed by dozens, eyewitnesses could not identify Nosair at trial and he was convicted only on a firearms charge. After the World Trade Center bombing, Nosair was convicted of conspiracy alongside Abdel-Rahman for helping orchestrate a terrorist conspiracy before he was arrested and continuing even after his imprisonment, as several members of Rahman's terrorist cell visited Nosair in prison to received for advice and ideas.

Although Nosair was connected to Al Qaeda through Mohamed, there is no indication he was ever formally affiliated with the group. But Osama bin Laden personally donated $20,000 to Nosair's defense fund, illustrating the group's long interest in his case. A recent video by Al Qaeda urging "lone wolf" terrorist attacks in the United States specifically cited Nosair as a role model who should be emulated.

Although most Americans have long forgotten Nosair, Al Qaeda clearly has not, illustrating the importance of understanding the early development of the jihadist movement in the United States.

For more about Nosair, Al Fuqra and other early American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Al-Fuqra, Al-Qaeda, Ali-Mohamed, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Egyptian-Islamic-Jihad, El-Sayyid-Nosair, Omar-Abdel-Rahman, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Larger than Death

We think of iconic figures as being larger than life, but within the world of Al Qaeda and its allies and supporters, fallen warriors take on a larger-than-death quality.

The U.S. has killed Osama bin Laden and Anwar Awalki, and now is the time to study the question: What happens when you decapitate al Qaeda figureheads?

Our strategy has been predicated on the assumption that we're better off with these figures dead than alive, and that's probably true. But it's also testable now. We can watch how the jihadi community processes these deaths and take lessons from what we see, in the weeks and months to come.

Consider the case of Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's mentor, who shepherded the foreign fighter community into the jihad against the Soviets and was involved in the founding of al Qaeda. Azzam was assassinated by a car bomb in 1989. There are only guesses about who was responsible, but suspects include the CIA, the Mossad, Jordanian intelligence and his own allies/rivals, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri.

Azzam's been dead for more than 20 years, but he's still one of the most powerful radicalizing figures in the jihadist pantheon. I would love for the FBI to release a comparative study showing how many U.S.-based terrorists were arrested with Azzam's videos and writings on their computers as opposed to the works of Awlaki. I predict it's at least 50-50, and the advantage might well go to Azzam.

For instance, Roshonara Choudhry, a lone wolf terrorist who stabbed a British MP, cited both Awlaki and Azzam as having pushed her toward violence -- but said Azzam was the one who convinced her to act.

Long after his death, Azzam is revered for his role in the Afghan jihad. His lectures are available online, with English translations, and his books are widely available in English as well. Azzam was an effective and emotional speaker, and an educated scholar who ranks among the most important thinkers within the jihadist movement.

It's clear that Azzam's death did not detract from his power. On the one hand, the fact that he died may have prevented him from creating other, even more important works. On the other hand, his death prevented him from making mistakes and taking actions (such as joining al Qaeda terrorism) that might have diminished his stature.

Osama bin Laden and Anwar Awlaki have now been frozen in time. They will always be the people they are today, any improvement or diminishment of their stature is likely to be minimal, aside from a trickle of new information and unreleased works.

In bin Laden's case, death froze him at a point where his stature had diminished (rightfully or wrongly). His body of works -- audio, video and texts -- are competent but not (in my opinion) especially stirring from an emotional standpoint nor are they especially important in their intellectual content. They are, ultimately, political tracts tied to a certain time and place, and they may not age well.

Awlaki is a different story. Intellectually, he's only a shadow of Azzam. Awlaki's contributions to jihadist thought are negligible, his primary strength was interpreting the work of other ideologues in ways that made them relevant and emotionally resonant to English-speaking audiences. In that role, he was an unparalleled talent, and emotional resonance probably matters more in terms of keeping the flame alive after the body has passed.

Awlaki's personal life narrative may also make his death matter more. For bin Laden, frankly, there was really only one way that his story could end after September 11, and even his adherents accepted that. Awlaki's life story is more rounded and diverse, and his death is already seen as tragic by a wider audience, including people outside of extremist circles. That meme may spread over time and create new headaches for counterterrorism.

But all this is speculation. Now is the time to watch how different communities react to these events and to learn from what transpires. It may be tempting for analysts, after 10 long years and these landmark deaths, to call it a war and move on to other subjects.

Give it a little longer.

Video: J.M. Berger on Fox News discussing Awlaki's 'Larger than death' legacy

For more about Awlaki and Abdullah Azzam's role in radicalizing Americans, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Abdullah-Azzam, Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Awlaki, Jihad-Joe, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Forgeries On The Forums

Updated 1:40 p.m. ET

The system for distributing propaganda on jihadist Web forums has been remarkably robust for a long time now, but in the wake of Osama bin Laden's death, some cracks are beginning to show.

On June 9, a user on one of the more prominent forums posted a video purporting to be from Al Qaeda's As-Sahab media company announcing that Osama bin Laden's son, Hamza, had been selected to take over as emir of Al Qaeda.

The post was not formatted in manner customarily used by As-Sahab, and it included a banner graphic that did not match the usual format. The video itself was fairly unconvincing. It consisted of Arabic title cards and some previously released video of Hamza as a child, opening with a not-quite-right As-Sahab title sequence. In short, it was a pretty obvious fake.



I noted all of this, but didn't pay it much mind. The offending thread was deleted by forum administrators almost immediately, and that, it seemed, was that.

Except it wasn't. The thread kept popping up. On different forums, posted by different users. Each time, it was deleted by forum administrators, but still it kept coming back. A different video was posted on YouTube claiming that Hamza had been named emir.

All of this created confusion and paranoia on the forums, exacerbated by the fact that user accounts were apparently being hijacked to post the videos. Users from Shamikh, the top Al Qaeda-linked forum, would surface on Ansar, the No. 2 forum, complaining that they had been kicked off of Shamikh for posting unauthorized videos that they had no memory of posting.

The fun continued for some time, but finally tapered off toward the beginning of this week.

Then last night, a new apparent forgery appeared. This one was a purported video from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula titled "People of the Victorious Sect." This time, the post had a much more authentic look, formatted in the way official releases are usually formatted.



Users on the Hanein forum began complaining that the video file contained a virus. Once again, administrators rushed to delete the thread, which was cross-posted to several of the most visited forums as of this morning.

The video, obtained by Jihadology, looks to be a fake. Graphics for AQAP's Al-Malahem Media Foundation appear at the start of the video in AQAP's customary widescreen aspect ratio but letterboxed into a 4:3 file. The rest of the video is entirely in 4:3, unlike most of Al-Malahem's releases. Most, if not all, of the footage in the seven-minute clip is recycled from old As-Sahab videos.

The quality of the forgery generally resembles the quality of the Hamza forgery (i.e. sloppy), but this one is slightly improved. I'm showing the player in the screencaps below so you can see the issue with the aspect ratio.



Within minutes of my posting an earlier version of this story, a message appeared on the Al Jahad forum purporting to be from the Al Qaeda-linked distributor Al Fajr Media Center, which is responsible for posting Al Qaeda communiques to the forums. The message mentions both of the above examples and warns users of viruses and other potential threats from following the forgeries.

Of course, the Al Fajr message itself may very well be forged. It only appeared on Jahad and not on any of the other related forums to which I have access. That is, in itself unusual, and there were other irregular features to the post. If that message is also a forgery, this whole thing is approaching conspiracy-paranoia genius.

The one thing that is very clear from all this is that someone is targeting the forums. I don't know if it's an intelligence service or private hackers, and I don't know if the same party is responsible for both of the forgeries, although I have my suspicions on all of these counts.

What I do know is that jihadist forum users are receiving a couple of very clear messages, which they haven't heard before -- "You are not safe here" and "you can't trust your online friends."

There have been a handful of fakes and forgeries in the past, but the scale of this is very interesting and it's targeting a very vulnerable spot in the online jihadist architecture. It'll be very interesting to see how this plays out.

For more about the forums, check out buy J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, out now!

A couple of quick notes:

If you haven't taken the "What is Al Qaeda?" survey, I urge you to check it out. You may find it a bit complicated. That's OK. The point is to figure out exactly what we mean when we're talking about al Qaeda, and I think that's an important issue. We need more responses.

I had an article at Foreign Policy this week on how the ascension of Ayman Al-Zawahiri to Al Qaeda's throne affects his American lap-dog, Adam Gadahn. Check it out, along with the other really excellent contributions to FP's Zawahiri Era roundtable.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Jihadist-Forums, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Berger on Foreign Policy: Zawahiri’s American Court Jester

I have a piece as part of Foreign Policy's roundtable on the start of the Zawahiri era of Al Qaeda.

Osama bin Laden liked having Americans in his entourage. Mohammed Loay Bayazid, a former resident of Kansas City, took notes at the meeting in which al-Qaeda was founded. Wadih El-Hage, formerly of Tucson, was one of the terror network's first members and eventually became bin Laden's personal assistant.

Now that Ayman al-Zawahiri has ascended to al-Qaeda's throne, he will likely bring along his own American courtier - Adam Gadahn, also known as Azzam the American, formerly of Orange County, California.

Click here to read the full story

For more about Gadahn, check out buy J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, out now!

Also be sure to check out the other, rather-more-impressive entries in the FP Roundtable:

William McCants: The al-Qaeda Zawahiri inherits

Leah Farrall: Al-Qaeda’s delayed announcement

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross: Zawahiri’s ascension won’t change al-Qaeda’s strategy

Labels: Adam-Gadahn, Al-Qaeda, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Jihad-Joe, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Ayman Al Zawahiri Releases Video Eulogy For Osama bin Laden

Al Qaeda's former deputy leader, Ayman Al Zawahiri, issued a statement on the death of Osama bin Laden, praising his life but not explicitly addressing the question of who would succeed him as emir of Al Qaeda.

The video, in Arabic with no subtitles, was posted to jihadist forums this morning. According to Der Spiegel (German), Zawahiri called for support to Al Qaeda in Yemen and a jihad against the Syrian regime, as well as making vague threats of revenge.

Update: AP has a preliminary story on the video in English here.

Update 2: ABC seems to think Zawahiri came off as large and in charge of Al Qaeda in the video. The consensus on the forums and among the Twitterfolk I follow seems to be that this was not an inaugural address.

Zawahiri criticized the burial of bin Laden at sea, and urged Pakistanis to follow the Arab Spring and rise up against the government. This is not the first time we've heard him say that, although the Arab Spring frame of reference is now.

The video lasts just under half an hour. Production on the video was completed May 30, nine days before it was released. Zawahiri's speech was likely recorded earlier than that. The video was recorded in front of a plain backdrop, and Zawahiri wore a clip-on microphone.

A higher-quality screencap is here for use by media outlets. Mandatory credit to Intelwire when using the image.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Jihadist-Forums, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Charting Bin Laden's Death Among Arabic-Speaking Hardcore Jihadis Online

Here's the third, and for now, final, installment of jihadist forum analysis, this time focusing on the Ansar Al-Mujahideen Arabic-language forum. I'm putting up some raw data for the moment, and hopefully I will have some time to compile a more sophisticated thought or two on the analysis over the next few weeks. I welcome any analysis from readers in the meantime, tweet at me to discuss. Keep in mind this is raw data that could use another set of eyes, so allow for probably about a 5 percent margin of error.

Previously:

Ansar English forum results

Hanein Arabic forum results

Ansar Al-Mujahideen Arabic is a full-on jihadist forum, unlike the Hanein forum I looked at the the last installment. More on this in a bit. For now here are the results for the first four weeks after the death of Osama bin Laden.

Predictably, Ansar users, consisting of hardcore jihadists ideologically aligned with Al Qaeda, were most concerned with the death of Osama bin Laden. There were 2104 threads created on Ansar during the sample period. Osama bin Laden was the main focus of 648 threads, with 231 devoted to Arab Spring developments, and four pertaining to Anwar Awlaki.

As far as the weak Awlaki number, I wouldn't read too much into this without more data. For instance, most references to Zawahiri were either in the context of bin Laden's death or a new media release, and Awlaki didn't have any media out in May except for Inspire, which was duly noted. I'd like to examine this more over time and on a more normal month.

The breakdown of Arab Spring countries looks like this:

The country totals are:

Algeria -- 6
Bahrain -- 3
Egypt -- 89
Jordan -- 17
Libya -- 12
Morocco -- 21
Multiple/general -- 21
Syria -- 29
Tunisia -- 13
Unclear reference -- 2
Yemen -- 10

As I found in the Hanein forum, Syria was the second-most referenced Arab Spring country, which makes me think we need to see some more reporting about jihadist interest/influence there than what the mainstream media has provided so far. As with Hanein, and not surprisingly, Egypt was the clear winner as the country most referenced. But again, the comparison the Palestinian-issues yields a surprising result.

There were 89 posts pertaining primarily to Egyptian political developments vs. only 84 posts about Palestinian issues, and many of the latter were largely content-free gestures attempting to tack bin Laden's death on to the Palestinian cause. The sample period included significant developments on Palestinian issues between majors speeches by Obama and Netanyahu as well as international movement toward recognizing a Palestinian state. So the fact that Egypt wins even among hardcore jihadists suggests to me that we might want to examine some of our precoceptions about the primacy of the Palestinian conflict in the hearts of jihadists. However, I caution that this is too preliminary and too small a sample to jump to any big conclusions.

Ansar also featured more generalized discussions about the Arab Spring than the more nationalistic Hanein forum, mainly because jihadists are having trouble crafting an ideological response to recent developments. But for the overall focus, Hanein (which used to have a much more jihadist orientation) shows that the Arab Spring may indeed prove to be a significant threat to the jihadist movement. Consider the following chart which excludes the "other" category:

Both Ansar and Hanein had roughly the same number of threads created during the sample period, 2104 versus 2315 respectively. So the strength of their conversations are pretty comparable. But the exodus of Hanein users in recent months from a primarily Salafist-jihadist orientation to more of what I guess you would call a militant-nationalist orientation is pretty striking.

More on all of this soon.

For more about how American jihadists use the Internet, buy J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, out now!

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Awlaki, Jihadist-Forums, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

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Charting Bin Laden's Death On An Arabic-Language, Jihad-Friendly Forum

Following up on my chart of topics from the English-speaking online jihadists for the first four weeks after bin Laden's death, I decided to examine one of the Arabic-language forums to see how the emphasis compared.

In the English-speaking forum I looked at, Ansar Al Mujahideen, interest in the death of Osama bin Laden dwarfed interest in the Arab Spring.

For comparison, I decided to look at the Hanein forum, which bills itself as "an independent network that seeks to Preach for Allah as well as for what is best to serve the Islamic nation." I picked Hanein in part because I follow it fairly regularly and in part for technical reasons related to how I'm mining the data.

Hanein vs. Ansar English is not exactly an apples-to-apples comparison. Hanein was once a higher-tier jihadist forum that went through a shutdown and various problems before re-emerging in its present form.

Aaron Weisburd at Internet Haganah characterizes Hanein as suffering " from a certain amount of not-Islamicly-correct nationalism," and has recently stopped listing it as a jihadist forum. So it's an interesting barometer for folks who might as easily swing either toward an Islamist extremist orientation or toward a more secular political orientation.

The posts I examined were taken from its "news" subsection, whereas the Ansar posts were taken from all posts. Hanein is a much more complicated forum with more sections and subsections. Most of the impact of that difference falls under the "other" category but it does skew things somewhat toward the Arab Spring over the death of bin Laden.

I ran through this data myself, once, which is all the time I can afford to commit to this right now, so keep in mind that the data could most definitely use a second set of eyes. Figure a 2 to 5 percent margin of error because of that. With caveats in place, here's what I found in the four weeks following the death of Osama bin Laden.



There were 2315 total threads created during the four-week period, consisting of 750 mainly related to the Arab Spring, 340 mainly related to the death of Osama bin Laden, and just three related to Anwar Awlaki, whom I include as a point of comparison due to my own interest in American jihadists (cue obligatory book plug).

That's a sharp difference from the English-language Ansar forum results for the same period, where bin Laden handily trounced the Arab Spring as a topic of conversation.



Even allowing for the differences in forum structure noted above, I think this is significant. There are a number of possible reasons for the difference. Obviously, jihadists for whom English is a primary language will be living in the West more often than those for whom Arabic is a first language. So Hanein's users are geographically closer to the Middle East and its uprisings in addition to its aforementioned shift in character.

But it's worth noting that Ansar users are not only less interested in the Middle East but less interested in politics generally. Most of the "other" entries from Ansar are battlefield reports from jihadists in various locations. There isn't much conversation about world events, although it's not totally absent.

Since Hanein has a much bigger sample size (more than four times as many posts), it's worth looking at the breakdown of topics a little bit more. First, here's how the Arab Spring section breaks down:



Here are the totals, listed alphabetically:

1. Algeria -- 15
2. Bahrain -- 15
3. Egypt -- 276
4. Iraq -- 2
5. Jordan -- 7
6. Libya -- 115
7. Morocco -- 32
8. General (multiple countries) -- 37
9. Oman -- 2
10. Syria -- 174
11. Tunisia -- 15
12. Unclear reference -- 7
13. Yemen -- 50

I will admit to being surprised by these numbers. Most notably, I would have expected that Libya and Yemen would make a stronger showing than Syria. Yemen and the Gulf (excluding Iraq) are not generally well represented in the sample.

Here's a look at the breakdown of Arab Spring vs. Bin Laden vs. Palestine. Totals here are slightly off due to some posts having more than one coded topic.



Interesting here is the relative weakness of Palestinian issues. There were 269 posts on Palestine compared to 276 on Egypt and 340 on bin Laden. I can understand Bin Laden trumping Palestine given the uniqueness of that event, but Egypt's narrow win was noteworthy, especially given fairly major developments on the Palestinian issue relating to speeches by Obama and Netanyahu.

Several posts were about both Egypt and Palestine, regarding likely and actual changes in border security and political positions.

Otherwise, the posts on Egypt covered a pretty wide gamut of topics, including Mubarak schadenfreude, general uprising news, and (based on an eyeball estimate) a fairly significant number of posts regarding sectarian violence, particularly in Imbaba.

For more about how American jihadists use the Internet, buy J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, out now!

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Arab-Spring, Jihadist-Forums, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

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Charting Bin Laden's Death Among English-Speaking Jihadis Online

It's been four weeks since the death of Osama bin Laden. I thought it might be interesting to take a look at activities on one of the more significant English language jihadist forums -- Ansar Al Mujahideen. Click here for stats from the Arabic Hanein forum.

See also:

Charting Bin Laden's Death Among Arabic-Speaking Hardcore Jihadis Online

Charting Bin Laden's Death On An Arabic-Language, Jihad-Friendly Forum

Over the last four weeks, there were 525 threads created on Ansar, of which 111 were primarily concerned with bin Laden and his death. By way of comparison, 27 threads dealt mainly with the Arab Spring and only two were devoted to Anwar Awlaki (this among English-speaking jihadis, his supposed core constituency).

The following breakdown by week shows the progression of the story. Ansar was down two days during the first week and one day during the second week, but even so you can see the spike. At its peak, the death of bin Laden took up 37.1 percent of the forum's threads.

Of the Arab Spring threads, Libya and Yemen were very well represented, with other fronts receiving only an occasional mention. The "other" category includes the usual press releases from various jihad fronts, announcements of media releases and news stories about jihad from mainstream media.

Roughly a third of the bin Laden threads were based on mainstream news sources. The spike in postings on the second week came with the official confirmation of bin Laden's death by Al Qaeda, and a series of condolence statements from various AQ affiliates.

The data set includes threads deleted by moderators and threads with duplicate content posted by different authors. Exact duplicate threads were deleted. I judged the content based primarily on the headlines but looked up individual threads when the headline was unclear.

On the Arab Spring category, I had to make judgment calls on a couple of threads dealing with fighting in Yemen. Threads primarily concerned with AQAP were omitted from the count (there were only a handful like this), but threads describing fighting without citing AQAP in the headline were counted as Arab Spring references.

Here's a look at the bin Laden thread titles, sorted by date:

Is our Shaikh Osama Bin Laden dead?

Sheikh Usama bin Laden reported shaheed (Insha'Allah) by the kuffar

May Allah increase you rank in Jannah o Sheikh Usamah!

CNN : Inside the Raid of Killing "Sheikh Usamah"

::: Video Statement ::: Commander Waliu al-Rahman H.A / Sheikh Osama Bin laden is alive and doing well!

Ex-CIA Official - Bin Laden Should Be Respected

Fake Picture circulating of the Body of Shaykh Usama (Fake!!!!!)

IEA: Statement by the Official Spokesman about What Obama Announced Regarding the Martyrdom of Shaykh Usama Bin Laden 5/3/2011

The moment of the raid in pictures

::: Video Statement ::: Commander Waliu al-Rahman H.A / Sheikh Osama Bin laden is alive and doing well!

{{{{{obama Killed}}}}}

Usama is Alive!!! Sheikh Husain b. Mahmoud

Pakistan Refuses To Hand Over Bin Laden's Shot Wife To US

Yemen's Qaeda vows to avenge bin Laden

::: New Artcile ::: [ Sheikh Osama Bin Laden between Jihad and Martydom for the sake of Allah ] "By the poor servant of Allah (ANSAR)"

Advice to Muslims on the Death of Osama bin Ladin by Sheikh Haitham al-Haddad

As-Sahab Media ::Presents:: Why do not grieve over your heart? "By Sheikh Khalid al-Hosainaan H.A"

Top Al shabaab official denies he was killed

Egypt Salafi Cleric Says Bin Laden Died A Martyr

Obama REFUSES to release photos of OBL

# The Victory of Allah is near # As-Sahab Media ::Presents:: Jihad of the Soul "By Sheikh Khalid al-Hosainaan H.A"

Al-Andalus Media: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: "Condolence and Congratulation for the Ummah on its Loss of Our Shaykh Usama bin Laden

Al-Fajr Media: The General Command of Al-Qaedah: A Statement Concerning the Defiant Battle, and the Martyrdom of Sheikh Usama bin Laden (may Allah have mercy on him)

Al-Qaida group in Iraq supports Zawahiri, vows revenge for bin Laden death

GIMF: The General Command of Al-Qaedah "You Live a Praised Life and You Died a Marty"- A Statement Concerning the Defiant Battle, & the Martyrdom of Usama bin Laden R.A.

Interview: Michael Scheuer, former CIA bin Laden tracker

Osama bin Laden “Bleeds” US Economy, Strategy Remains In Place

Pakistan PM: 'We Did Not Hide Bin Laden'

Pentagon releases new Osama bin Laden footage

The Cost of bin Laden: $3 Trillion Over 15 Years

Dar Al Murabiteen Publications- Farewell O Honourable Shiekh!

Demo + Janazah in London for Shaykh Usama after Jummah

Islamic State of Iraq / Statement on the Martyrdom of the Mujahid Shaykh Usama bin Laden ||05-09

Kavkaz , UnJust Media "Command of al-Qaeda confirms martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden"

Reaction to Martherdom(InshaAllah) of Shaykh Osama(rahimAllah) from Turkey!

Statement of the Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Regarding the Martyrdom of the Great Martyr Sheik Osama bin Laden

How Jihadis are reacting to bin Laden's death

I met Sheikh Osama Bin Laden

# Here We Renew The Covenant # A Collection of Video & Audio Statements "The

Legacy of Sheikh Usama bin Laden" (may Allah accept him)

Abdullah Azzam Brigades || Statement to the Ummah - Usama You are the Glory and the Splendor

Ansar al-Islam: Congratulating the Islamic nation on the occasion of the martyrdom of the Lion of Islam the Mujahid Abu Abdillah Usama bin Laden

Ansar al-Mujahideen Arabic Forum: Presents: Visual Excerpts from the Words of Shaykh al-Jihad {Osama bin Laden} may Allah accept him

In the Footsteps of Sheikh Osama Bin Laden

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan statement about the martyrdom of Sheik Osama bin Laden

Joint Statement from Shamukh al-Islam & Ansar al-Mujahideen Arabic Forum: The Rise of Our Imams, Verily We are Walking in Their Footsteps

Muslims VS Munafiq: Clashes between Muslims and Munafiq "Imam" in Kuwait regarding performing Salaat "al-Gha'ib"for Osama Bin Laden R.A (Images and video)

Somalia's al Shabaab vows to avenge bin Laden

Statement from Al-Fajr Center for Media || Condolences and Congratulations to the

Islamic Ummah on the Occasion of the Martyrdom of the Lion of Islam, Shaykh Usama

Statement from Al-Fajr Media Center: Condolence and Congratulations to the Ummah of Islam at the Event of the Martyrdom of the Lion of Islam, Sheikh Usama bin Laden

Statement from Minbar at-Tawḥid wa’l-Jihad: On the Martyrdom of Shaykh al-Mujahideen and Jihād, Sheikh Usama bin Laden (may Allah accept him in Eleeyeen)

Yemeni Al-Qaeda chief warns jihad will intensify

Bin Laden Sons Say U.S. Broke International Law

CNN: Reports about the escape of Hamza bin Osama bin Laden from the American raid on the Abbottabad

Flashpoint Partners: Exclusive Interview with TTP Spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan: Threatens Pakistan and US for UBL’s Death

I knew Bin Laden - Aljazeera program

Statement Issued by the Sons of Sheikh Usama bin Laden

Ansar al-Mujahideen Arabic Forum: Legacy of Sheikh Osama bin Laden may Allah accepted him (Video & Audio)

Missing: One 'Crown Prince Of Terror' (Hamza bin Laden)
Pictures from the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen conference entitled: 'We are all Usama'

Somalia's Islamists vow to avenge bin Laden's death

The Islamic Emirate Of Afghanistan: The Martyrdom Of Sheikh Osama Will Not Benefit America

The Islamic Emirate Of Afghanistan: The Martyrdom Of Sheikh Osama Will Not Benefit America

Al Jazeera World: I knew bin Laden

Bin Laden's wife: 'I want to be martyred with you'

Eulogies and fury: Jihadists eager to avenge bin Laden's death

Noam Chomsky: My Reaction to Osama bin Laden’s Death

**TAKBIR!** |REVENGE| Twin bombs kill at least 80 FC apostates in Charsadda, Pakistan

Abu Mansour Al-Ameriki speech at the "We are all Osama" conference

AQAP: Crusader-USA Will Miss The Days When Shaykh Usamah (RH) Was Alive

How Did Shaykh Usamaah earn his martyrdom?

IEA: Martyrdom Of Shaykh Usamah Will Not Benefit Crusader-USA

Bin Laden death: Security fears for US Navy Seal team

English translation of "Interview of Shaykh Usamah bin Laden (Rahimahullah) with

Al-Jazeera reporter Tayseer Allouni on Shaban 5, 1422 A.H. (October 21st, 2001)"

Kuffar want to insult our Beloved Sheikh Osama (ra)

GIMF: Obituary and Congratulation to the Ummah of Islam for the Martyrdom of the Lion of Islam, Usama bin Laden

Sheikh Osama and Inspire Magazine

Pakistan Gov says Drone Strikes must stop, no enquiry for Bin Laden Raid

Get To Know Shaykh Usamah (RH) Through His Risalah

In the memory of beloved Sheikh OSAMA BIN LADEN

Obama's Grandmother Threatened by Al-Qaida

Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus: Emir Dokku Abu Usman (HA) talks about Sheikh Usama, the losses suffered by the mujahideen, and the Arab revolutions

Al-Qadisiyyah Media: Urdu Translation of the Statement Concerning the Defiant Battle, & the Martyrdom of Usama bin Laden R.A.

Chechnya: Amir Dokku Abu-Uthman Speaks On Shaykh Usamah Ibn Ladin (RH) & Casualties Of Mujahideen

Clarifying The Lame-Old-Claim Of Shaykh Usamah Ibn Ladin (RH) Being An 'Agent'

Youth Mujahideen Movement [General Command]: Message of condolence for the martyrdom of Imam Sheikh Usama bin Laden (May Allah Have Mercy On Him)

Youth Mujahideen Movement: Holding a Jihadist Conference entitled "We Are All Usama" in the Islamic province of Lower Shabelle (05/16/2011)

Al Qaeda after Bin Laden - Abdel Bari Atwan

Al Qaeda releases posthumous bin Laden audio recording

Munafiqeen Rejoice: Shaykh Abdul-Muhsin Al-'Abbaad on the Killing of Bin Laden 'al-Khaarijee'

Osama Bin Laden's Death: A Leader's Wish Fulfilled | Abdel Bari Atwan

Pakistani Newspaper: Saifal Adel made acting al-Qaeda chief

Pakistani Taliban warns of Retaliation for Sheikh Usama's Martyrdom
So-

Called Scholars view of Sheikh Usama Ibn Ladin (Rahimahullah)

Why bin Laden was radicalized - Abdel Bari Atwan

"Shaykh Bin Laden's Wives and Children are Our Kinsfolk and Honour; Every Muslim is Duty Bound to Defend their Honour" - Abdel Bari Atwan

As-Sahab Media: presents: The Last Speech of the Martyr of Islam - as we see him - [Shaykh Usama Bin Laden] "To The Muslim Ummah"

"Security and Intelligence" - by the Commander Saif al-Adel with an Explanation by Abdullah Bin Adam

Last public word of Shaykh Osamah bin Laden RA)

Jihad Media Center: Presents: [Transcript] ~ [Graphic Design] of the Speech by the Lion, Sheikh Usama bin Laden "To the Muslim Ummah"

O American... this is Osama // Penned by Sheikh Husain Bin Mahmoud (H.A)

Anger simmers in Pakistani army over bin Laden raid

GIMF: The English translation of As-Sahab's audio release - The Speech by the Martyr of Islam (As We Consider Him‪)‬ The Mujahid Sheikh Usama Bin Laden - May Allah Have

Professor Abdel-Bari Atwan, commenting on the martyrdom of Shaykh Usama Bin Laden [(ARABIC)]

Sheikh Uthaymeen regarding his meeting with Sheikh Usama Rahimahullah
Tehreek Taliban Pakistan: The Expedition of Sheikh Usama bin Laden R.A {Karachi}

From Usama bin Laden to his muslim ummah (bosnian)

A consolidated statement of between AMEF, AMAF and Shumukh on the killing of Sheikh Usama Bin Laden R.A.

Sudan: Statement On Sh.Usamah Ibn Laadin by Dr. Abdul Hayy Yousef

The Allegiance of Commander az-Zarqaawee (Rahimahullah) to the Shaykh of the Mujaahideen, Shaykh Osamah ibn Ladin (Rahimahullah)

Soon with the Permission of Allah(swt) from As-Sahab Media Foundation

do they hate osama ra?

For more about how American jihadists use the Internet, buy J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, out now!

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Awlaki, Jihadist-Forums, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New bin Laden Video Still Just Audio

Osama bin Laden's "final" message was released on jihadist forums last night. You can see the video at Jihadology and read about its praise for the Arab uprisings at the New York Times.

For now, my only comment on this communique is note, with some interest, that the release is an audio-only communique wrapped in a video that amounts to nothing more than a still picture of bin Laden.

As I wrote a couple of weeks ago, we now know that bin Laden had very good video recording equipment at his Abbottabad manse and he clearly intended for his videos to be seen -- as evidenced by his dyed beard and carefully chosen garb.

Any operational security rationale to withhold video in favor of audio (which was already paper-thin) is now completely voided by bin Laden's death. So again I wonder: Why no video?

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Osama-Bin-Laden, Terrorist-Communiques

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Jihad Joe Excerpt Now Available On Aslanmedia.com

Reza Aslan's Aslanmedia.com is graciously hosting an excerpt from my new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam.

The excerpt is the tail-end of the book's second chapter on Anwar Awlaki, and the title of the excerpt is "Anwar Awlaki is NOT the next Osama bin Laden."

There's a lot more depth, color and background on Awlaki to be found in the book, which is available starting this weekend, but I thought this particular section was the right choice given the recent and wildly irresponsible media speculation about Awlaki possibly "taking over" for Osama bin Laden.

Enjoy the excerpt, and check out the book!

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Awlaki, Jihad-Joe, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

The Bin Laden Porn Stash

Many of us in the terrorism-watching biz were waiting to hear about this, and today the news officially broke. Nestled among the mountains of intelligence recovered from Osama bin Laden's Abbottabad compund was a stash of pornography.

The reason we were waiting for this news is that anyone who has taken a peek at a terrorist hard drive has found porn lurking amidst the bits. It's common enough to be a punch line. From Afghanistan to Iraq to Saudi Arabia and beyond, terrorists love porn.

I found the images below in Al Qaeda computer data recovered in Bosnia. I've cleaned them up since this isn't that kind of Web site, but this should give you an idea about what Islamic extremists like -- big fake boobs, Asian women and MMF action.

Click to view images (probably not safe for work)

Oh, but it gets worse. In Iraq, they loved porn so much they made it themselves. Computers captured by the U.S. military from Islamist insurgents revealed unedited footage of homemade child pornography, according to sources who have viewed the footage. Insurgents could be heard on the clips coaching young boys on how to perform sexual acts.

People in the PSYOPS counterterrorism world have long tried to figure out how to exploit these images. After all, they show a level of hypocrisy that is more than epic. The problem, of course, particularly in the Iraq situation, is that analysts can barely stand to look at the material, let alone figure out a way to reference it productively.

The bin Laden porn stash, at last, offers an opportunity to bring this issue into the light. There's a lot more to be said about jihadists and their sexual "issues," and I'm working on a longer piece about this subject, but for now, a little schadenfreude is the order of the day, and the deeper levels will provide much fodder for thought and discussion in the weeks to come.

J.M. Berger is author of the new book, "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam," available from Amazon.com. For videos and documents related to the book, check out JihadJoeBook.com. Follow @intelwire on Twitter for updates about American jihadists.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Iraq, Osama-Bin-Laden, Pornography

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New Osama bin Laden Videos: More Questions Than Answers

Five new videos of Osama bin Laden were released by the Defense Department today, and they immediately raise more questions than they answered. (See them all at the Danger Room.)

One video, likely not intended for release while bin Laden was alive, showed the Al Qaeda leader watching himself on satellite TV, while sitting on the floor wrapped in a blanket. The remaining four videos appear to be raw footage from propaganda pieces.

The latter videos beg the question: Why haven't we seen them? Or have we?


9/11/2007 video of Osama bin Laden

Two of the videos released today closely match the very last video publicly released by bin Laden, on the occasion of the anniversary of September 11 in 2007. Bin Laden is wearing the same clothing and looks to be about the same in terms of age and beard coloration. That video was released in a very low quality version in which the image actually froze midway through bin Laden's speech and stayed that way until the end.

It's clear from today's releases that the original videos were of very good quality, although the backgrounds were less than perfect. However the background issue is a relatively simple problem to solve. (Other videos from AQ leaders have featured comparable background embarrassments as well.)

Since 2007, bin Laden's releases have all been audio-only. They haven't even included new still pictures. Meanwhile, Ayman Al Zawahiri and other Al Qaeda leaders have issued a procession of high quality videos with no significant technical problems.

Myself and others have speculated about why that might have been. The most common theories included:

Bin Laden had changed his appearance and was holding back images to protect his anonymity.

Bin Laden was hiding somewhere where he didn't have access to good recording equipment.

Bin Laden was so frail and unhealthy from living in a cave without his dialysis machine that he couldn't project enough strength to justify a video.

Today's release, along with news that bin Laden had been squirreled away in his Abbottabad manse for years, never emerging from the house and with his kidneys working just fine, make it clear that none of these reasons apply.

The fact that bin Laden went to the trouble of dressing and dying his beard for these tapes indicates that he intended for them to be seen. So why weren't they released?

Media honcho Adam Gadahn and video starlet Ayman Al Zawahiri have some 'splaining to do. While one can construct a Machiavellian rationale that they intended to perpetuate one or more of the above theories, that seems a bit cumbersome to me and the tradeoff of failing to project strength doesn't seem especially compelling.

It's possible (and before this week I would have said likely) that Gadahn or Zawahiri controlled the release mechanism for the videos. They were the gatekeepers, so to speak, and the video had to pass through their hands before being released to the forums. However, the more we learn about bin Laden's secure location and his apparent operational relevance, the more that premise has to be re-examined. It may very well turn out to be true, but it doesn't look like a slam dunk given the latest revelations.

Who decided that Osama bin Laden's face would no longer be seen? What were their reasons? Was it an attempt to protect bin Laden or to marginalize him? Or maybe it's as simple as bin Laden was recording RMVB files and Gadahn didn't have the right codecs to convert them for editing?

Stay tuned. The information download from Abbottabad is only just beginning.

Labels: Abbottabad, Adam-Gadahn, Al-Qaeda, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Can "Lone Wolves" Travel In Packs?

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

The death of Osama bin Laden has a lot of people worried about Al Qaeda's revenge. How will the terrorist organization respond to the death of its leader? Will there be new attacks on America?

It's not a simple question. The central Al Qaeda organization -- the group of men based in Afghanistan and Pakistan who attacked us on September 11 -- was already under pressure before bin Laden's death, and it's going to be under a lot more pressure once U.S. intelligence finishes reading the computer hard drives they seized from bin Laden's house.

Then there are Al Qaeda's affiliates abroad, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al Shabab. These organizations may have better capacity for an attack, but they also have distractions -- namely revolutions in their backyards. Some or all of these groups are likely to attempt something, but the nature and timing of such attacks could take any number of forms.

The biggest question mark comes from the group uniquely positioned to avenge Osama bin Laden's death -- the homegrown American terrorists commonly referred to as "lone wolves."

Since September 11, U.S. authorities have become increasingly concerned about the terrorist threat from radicalized American Muslims who are willing and able to carry out acts of violence without institutional support from a formal terrorist network such as Al Qaeda. My new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, looks at the few successes and significant failures of the lone-wolf crowd.

In truth, most of the American lone wolves were not truly alone; they are loosely networked with each other and with various Al Qaeda franchises. Fort Hood gunman Nidal Hasan was guided by Anwar Awlaki, who is tied to Al Qaeda in Yemen. Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad was trained and financed by the Pakistani Taliban. The would-be Portland Christmas bomber Mohamed Mohamud thought he was being helped by al Qaeda Central, but his helpers turned out to be FBI agents. The same thing happened to Antonio Martinez, who hoped to bomb a U.S. military recruiting station near Baltimore.

Worries about these homegrown terrorists acting alone, or with minimal support and supervision, can be traced back to the writings of a jihadist ideologue whom not many Americans have heard of -- Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, better known by his nom de jihad, Abu Musab Al Suri.

Al Suri is an Al Qaeda member who produced massive amount of jihadist training material in video and in books. His works, which are currently being reprinted in serialized form by Al Qaeda in Yemen's English language magazine "Inspire," call for individual Muslims to take up the banner of jihad without waiting for support from a formal terrorist organization.

This is most commonly referred to today as "leaderless jihad," and it takes more than a few pages from a concept known as "leaderless resistance," which was championed by white supremacist Louis Beam for use in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s.

Thus far, leaderless jihad -- like leaderless resistance before it -- has been a perennial underachiever. While a fairly impressive number of radicals have attempted to act on their own, most have crafted terrorist attacks that were doomed to fail, and even the most successful "leaderless" events (like Hasan's shooting spree) have been small in comparison to September 11 or the Al Qaeda's 1998 East African embassy bombings.

There are a lot of factors holding back leaderless jihadists. For one thing, terrorism tends not to be easy, especially if you're trying to build a bomb or pull off a complicated stunt. Money and training -- of the sort provided by a formal terrorist organization -- exponentially increase the effectiveness of a would-be terrorist.

And the people most likely to have been influenced by Al Suri's ideas tend to be, well, let's call it "kinetically challenged." They spend a lot of time banging on keyboards in darkened rooms. They tend to be young. Very few have any real experience or training in fighting, unlike the American jihadists of the pre-9/11 era, who were often military veterans.

But the leaderless jihad has now arrived at a crossroads with the death of Osama bin Laden.

Louis Beam's "leaderless" followers shared a common conception. One day, they imagined, a pivotal event would cause all of the leaderless cells to step forward and take action, inspired by a common provocation, and sweep over the country, kicking ass, taking names and generally overthrowing the status quo.

The invasion of Panama was seen as such a precipitating event. When it happened, there was a lot of talk, but no one acted. The Oklahoma City bombing (inspired in part by Beam's philosophy) was exactly the sort of thing that was supposed to launch the revolution. When it happened, they didn't even talk. Virtually all of the racist and anti-government militia groups crawled into the deepest, darkest holes they could find and stayed there for about 10 years. The lesson learned is this: When you don't have a leader, it's pretty easy to stay home.

The death of Osama bin Laden has raised the specter of reprisals. Some sort of response from institutional Al Qaeda and its affiliates is a real possibility, but there are also compelling tactical arguments for them to keep their powder dry. And the culture of jihadist terrorist organizations skews toward long-term thinking. Such reprisals are a serious concern but not a fait accompli. And of course, these organizations are constantly planning terror attacks, with or without provocation, so to some extent, it's just business as usual for them.

The tactical arguments that might slow institutional terrorists don't apply to American "lone wolves," however. Their actions are simpler, and they lack the weight of Al Qaeda's not-insignificant bureaucracy on their shoulders. They are already living next to their targets; the logistics are much simpler.

And so we come to the day of reckoning, the killing by American forces of the global jihad's most important patron, Osama bin Laden. If the lone wolves are a force to contend with, this must be their moment. The opportunity cost for action is negligible. The affront to their sensibilities is enormous.

We really don't have a good handle on how many potential lone wolves might be out there. We know that the number of Americans who take part in jihadist online forums runs at least into the hundreds and most likely into the thousands. A 2007 survey of American Muslims by Pew found that 5 percent admitted to having a favorable view of Al Qaeda, which translates into tens of thousands of people.

But not all of those sympathetic people are likely to act out with violence. So far the number has been extraordinarily small, a fraction of one percent of the total U.S. Muslim population. The open question is how many of these are close to acting and just waiting for the right combination of considerations.

We're about to find out whether the threat from leaderless lone wolves is destined to remain a trickle of malcontents lashing out sporadically, or whether Abu Musab Al Suri's vision of an organically synchronized jihad without borders or affiliations has real legs to carry it into the 21st century.

If not now, when?

We don't know whether the lone wolves have what it takes to make a lasting impact, and that lack of knowledge is more unsettling than comforting. It might be time to try out that new terror alert system. It seems like the right moment for an ounce of prevention.

J.M. Berger is author of the new book, "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam," available from Amazon.com. For videos and documents related to the book, check out JihadJoeBook.com. Follow @intelwire on Twitter for updates about American jihadists.

Labels: Abu-Musab-Al-Suri, Al-Qaeda, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, Jihad-Joe, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

So We've Killed Osama Bin Laden;
What Happens Next Matters

Osama bin Laden is dead. So what happens now?

There have been a number of pieces outlining what should be (but isn't) the obvious fact that the war on terrorism is far from over. Check out the following piece by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross for an exhaustive review and a more concise but still very good version from Eric Schmitt of the New York Times.

The big picture analysis and commentary will be flowing all day and for some time to come. I want to talk about a couple of high-stakes questions about what happens next.

NO PICTURES PLEASE

When Abu Musab Zarqawi was killed, the U.S. government trotted out pictures of the body almost immediately and within hours, jihadists online had transformed those pictures into online shrines to Zarqawi's martyrdom. As I noted in a post last year, it would be a tremendous mistake to do the same thing with bin Laden. Jihadist propaganda thrives on pictures of dead martyrs -- and there's no bigger martyr than Osama bin Laden. It's probably inevitable that the pictures will come out, but hopefully it will be months or years later, when passions and interests have diminished somewhat. It will still be a big deal even later, but it's better not to give the jihadis a rallying image at this critical moment.

MESSAGING AND OPERATIONS

This is arguably the most critical moment in the history of Al Qaeda Central. While the war on terrorism, and the Al Qaeda movement, is far from over, Al Qaeda's core operation -- Al Qaeda 1.0, the organization that carried out September 11 -- has suffered a series of challenges over the last several months.

Al Qaeda has always been more about narrative than capabilities. It didn't militarily defeat the Soviets and it was never going to militarily defeat the United States. The question was whether it could create a compelling narrative claim of victory, as it did with the Soviets. Truth is not what's important here, perception is. And that's a two-edged sword.

The Arab uprisings have created a new and growing narrative about Al Qaeda's irrelevance. If Ayman Al-Zawahiri is too slow in issuing a messaging response and a military (i.e., terrorist) response to bin Laden's death, that narrative is going to snowball, and it's going to be a big challenge for Al Qaeda Central to recover.

Zawahiri critically fumbled the ball on the Arab uprisings by issuing a tedious, multipart history lesson that seemed to have been half-written before the protests even started. If he doesn't come out with a strong and relevant statement within the next couple of days, he's going to look even more out of touch and irrelevant, and risks appearing to cower in the face of American threats. And I will wager good money that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will have an issue of Inspire on "newsstands" before Zawahri speaks, further boosting the status of AQAP against AQ Central.

Similarly, the uprisings created significant narrative pressure on the broad Al Qaeda movement to carry out terrorist or other military operations. The narrative question here is: If Al Qaeda can't strike in the middle of rampant chaos, can it really do anything outside of Afghanistan? Again, the truth is less important than the perception. Al Qaeda can't afford to look toothless, because teeth are really the only thing that the terrorist organization has to offer. Unlike Hamas, Al Qaeda offers no social services. Its religious scholarship is questionable at best. Despite recent tentative efforts, it has no coherent political platform. If Al Qaeda doesn't have a military capability, it doesn't have much of anything. If AQC cannot carry out a credible strike in revenge for bin Laden's death, it's going to be left behind by its more vigorous children in Yemen and Somalia, among others.

Of course, the franchises will also be under pressure to act, and whoever acts first is going to get a big boost. If absolutely none of Al Qaeda's franchises even manage to carry out a serious strike in the near to mid-term future, we're going to have to revisit a whole lot of assumptions. Unfortunately, I expect we don't have to worry about that problem.

One can argue, of course, that Al Qaeda and its affiliates are patient, long-term planners, which is absolutely true, and that they can afford to wait this out, which may be true. But the fact is that we live in a world where the rate of change is phenomenal and accelerating, and Arab spring shows that the culture of speed is not just a Western affectation. In order to be a force on the world stage, jihadism has to make some concessions to the tempo of the modern world.

Of course, if Al Qaeda does act quickly, it will expose Ayman Al-Zawahiri and its most important operatives to an unprecedented level of risk, given the intelligence that was most certainly acquired during the bin Laden strike. To win the battle, Zawahiri should be hiking out into the wilderness for a long camping trip with just a couple close friends. To stay in the war, he's going to have to take risks. And if we capture or kill Zawahiri within weeks of capturing or killing bin Laden, the narrative of Al Qaeda Central is likely to suffer a catastrophic collapse.

And hitting Awlaki at the same time... Well, I'll save that for another day, but a trifecta here would really create some fundamental change on the battlefield. Not because Awlaki's a particularly good or necessarily vital operational leader. Again, it's the narrative.

TEST FOR THE LONE WOLVES

The stakes are also high for those who argue that Abu Musab Al Suri has revolutionized the terrorist world through his concept of "leaderless jihad." If lone-wolfism has truly arrived on the world stage, we should expect to see a series of lone actors striking out over the next several days. If not now, then when?

There's been a lot of talk about leaderless jihad, and I think that analysts have, so far, given Al Suri credit for a lot more influence and efficacy than he has, so far, deserved. This is Al Suri's moment. If leaderless jihad is the wave of the future, we're going to see dozens of individual actors carry out small attacks to avenge bin Laden over the next few days. If leaderless jihad is a lot of hot air, the lone-wolves will stay home and try to score "rep points" on the forums with their clever posts about bin Laden's death.

Let me be perfectly honest here and say I don't know which way this will go. Leaderless jihad has largely underwhelmed over the last few years. The attacks have been truly small and most (but not all) have lacked serious impact. They also haven't been truly leaderless as most (but not all) of the terrorists who have been classified as lone wolves had (or thought they had) contacts with formal terrorist networks including Al Qaeda Central.

We need to watch this situation closely because it's the real proof of concept. If we don't see a significantly large series of individual actors spontaneously rise to violence in response to this news, I'm inclined to think that "leaderless jihad" (like Louis Beam's earlier "leaderless resistance") will be a perennial underachiever and should be demoted in terms of national security priorities.

If the lone wolves do rise up en masse, we need to start having some new national conversations. Stay tuned.

J.M. Berger is the author of "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam," hitting bookstands in less than two weeks. Order today!

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Aulaqi, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Osama bin Laden Killed in Abottabad, Pakistan, Mansion

President Barack Obama announced tonight that Osama bin Laden, the founder and top leader of Al Qaeda, was killed by a U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Bin Laden was staying in a mansion in a relatively urban area.

Obama said the intelligence on bin Laden's location was obtained in August 2010 and the operation has been planned for months. Bin Laden was killed during a firefight with U.S. forces. No Americans were killed in the attack.

UPDATE: We've Killed Bin Laden, What Happens Next?

Labels: Abbottabad, Al-Qaeda, Osama-Bin-Laden, Pakistan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

USA v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed et al.: The Trial That Might Have Been

The Justice Department announced today that it will drop plans to hold civilian trials Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and others accused in the September 11 attacks, instead of trying them before a military commission at Guantanamo Bay.

The debate over which approach is best has been dominated by a steaming pile of nothing. While both the criminal and military approaches have their merits and disadvantages, the political conversation in this country consists of "You don't think we're at war!" vs. "Yes, we do, but..." This conversation is almost entirely emotional in basis and profoundly lacking in substance.

I've written before about my view on this issue, and it's a utilitarian view. The U.S. public is better served by a criminal trial. Contrary to popular belief, holding a trial isn't *just* about protecting the rights of the defendants. It's also about making government transparent to the people, an issue President Obama has talked about but largely failed to deliver.

Specifically, in this case, a criminal trial serves the purpose of educating the public about terrorism and the adequacy of the government's response.

If it had not been for USA v. Usama bin Laden, the criminal trial prosecuting the 1998 East African embassy bombings, Americans would have known precious little about Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001.

USA v. Usama bin Laden et al. was then and remains today the single most important publicly accessible primary source on terrorism for the 21st century. The rules of court and the push-pull between defense and prosecution provide a rigorous vetting of the data entered into the record. That doesn't mean all the data is perfect, but its weaknesses are on display for all to see.

USA v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed et al. would have created the definitive public record of the September 11 attacks, almost certainly eclipsing the 9/11 Commission Report. The loss of that information is an incalculable loss to the American public.

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Al-Qaeda, Khalid-Shaikh-Mohammed, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Embassy Bombing Documents Offer Window Into Al Qaeda Operations

A flood of new details concerning Al Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan and Somalia during the 1990s were revealed Friday, when prosecutors unveiled a series of previously secret documents in the trial of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Guantanamo detainee convicted of conspiracy in Al Qaeda's bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

The documents, meant to support the maximum sentence for Ghailani, contain detailed transcripts of three interrogations:

A 1999 Justice Department interrogation of Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, in South Africa, where he had been detained by immigration officials. Mohamed was later convicted for his role in the embassy bombings. Interrogation of Khalfan Mohamed, Oct. 9, 1999 (PDF)

A 1998 Justice Department interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh, another convicted operative in the embassy bombings. Interrogation of Mohammed Odeh, Aug. 31, 1998 (PDF)

A summary of a Justice Department interrogation of Ghailani after he was captured and imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay. The summary is dated December 2008. Interrogation of Ahmed Ghailani, Dec. 12, 2008 (PDF)

Some of the more interesting details found in these interrogations include substantial information about Al Qaeda's operations in Somalia, more broadly in Africa and in Afghanistan. Some of the material below has been previously reported. These items only scratch the surface of the information contained in these documents, which includes a great deal of data on the logistics of the embassy bombings. Readers are encouraged to review the documents and discuss them with me on Twitter.

Odeh was ordered to Somalia by Saif Al Adel, one of the most senior surviving members of Al Qaeda still active in the organization and one of the most important figures in Al Qaeda's Somalia operations. The orders originated with Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda focused on one tribe, the Um Rehan, which was most ideologically compatible. (Much of this information came out during the first embassy bombings trial.)

Khalfan Mohamed went to Somalia twice in 1997 on behalf of Al Qaeda. He helped train members of Al Ittihad, a Somali Islamic group led by Hassan Dahir Aweys, who later helped found the Islamic Courts Union and is now a member of Al Shabab. Odeh also reported interacting with Al Ittihad.

According to Odeh, "Sheikh Hassan" (possibly Aweys) asked Al Qaeda's military commander, Mohammed Atef, aka Abu Hafs, for help. Atef brought five Al Qaeda trainers to Somalia and temporarily took over the operation from Saif Al Adel. Odeh reported that his group exchanged fire with UN officials during this period.

In June or July of 1998, a few months after bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring war on America, Sheikh Hassan from Somalia requested a meeting with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. It was not clear if the meeting ever took place, given the close proximity of the request to the embassy bombings.

A number of Al Qaeda members questioned the fatwa against America, worrying that Al Qaeda had become isolated from its former allies by 1998, but their loyalty to bin Laden outweighed their objections.

Odeh explained that Al Qaeda's core membership was small (he put the number at 150), but that the "friends of Al Qaeda" worked in close tandem with the organization without being sworn members.

During interrogation, Ghailani described meeting or interacting with a number of key players in the September 11 attacks, including several hijackers, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh and Zacarias Moussoui. The information here is mostly incidental, interesting but not necessarily significant.

New information about American Al Qaeda members also emerged in the transcripts.

A previously undocumented American jihadist, "Sulieman America [sic]," described by Khalfan Mohamed as a being tall and thin with curly brown hair and a medium complexion. The name is probably correctly transcribed as Suleiman Al Amriki. Suleiman attended basic training at Al Qaeda's Markaz Fath training camp in Afghanistan, then later received advanced training in the assembly of improvised explosives. Suleiman left the camp in 1995.

Abu Suleiman is one alias used by Ihab Ali, an Egyptian and naturalized U.S. citizen who lived in Florida and worked with Wadih El Hage and Ali Mohamed, two of the most American U.S. Al Qaeda members. It's not clear if this Abu Suleiman was Ihab Ali. Ali is in U.S. custody under unclear circumstances, much like Ali Mohamed, who pleaded guilty under a plea deal but was never sentenced.

Odeh reported that American citizen Al Qaeda member Wadih El Hage was visited by an Egyptian named "Nawi" who also lived in America. That person is almost certainly Ihab Ali, who also used the alias Nawawi. Odeh said Nawi was responsible for facilitating travel for Al Qaeda members. In an intriguing aside, Odeh said Nawi "was once jailed in Peshawar but was taken out of jail by an American."

Odeh also mentioned two American Al Qaeda trainers, "Abu Osama" and "Abdul Malek." From the aliases and descriptions, it's clear he is referring to known Al Qaeda members Ali Mohamed and Christopher Paul.

Labels: Ahmad-Khalfan-Ghailani, Al-Qaeda, Ali-Mohamed, American-Al-Qaeda, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, Ihab-Ali, Jihad-Joe, Khalfan-Mohamed, Mohammed-Sadeek-Odeh, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

More Ruminations about Al Qaeda's War on Scholarship

Aaron Zelin has an interesting and informative post over at al-Wasat that provides some very useful context to my recent post about the newest messages from Anwar Awlaki and Adam Gadahn.

My post analyzed a recent move by Al Qaeda's American shills to throw out any Islamic scholarship that potentially refutes Al Qaeda's positions on jihad in favor of truthiness -- following a gut feeling that military jihad in the form of killing Americans is simply right, or as Awlaki put it "obvious."

Awlaki openly argues that no scholarship is necessary to justify this conclusion; Gadahn argues that Al Qaeda has its own scholarship which supports jihad, but like McCarthy's oft-cited list of Communists in the State Department, you'll just have to take his word for it.

Aaron shows that there is a lot of historical context behind this move and that jihadists have historically thrown out scholarship that they don't agree with. I would tentatively argue that what's new(ish) here is an attack on the actual process of scholarship.

Of the examples Aaron cites, Hassan Al-Banna, Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Muhammad Al Maqdisi all dispute the scholars who disagree with them, arguing that they are corrupt or simply wrong. That's a little different from what Awlaki is saying in his latest message, which is that scholarship is itself unnecessary -- a radical shift from a cleric who has in the past tried very hard to justify his own scholarly prowess.

Compare this to Abdullah Azzam, the father of the modern jihadist movement, who believed the conclusions of scholarship fully justified his position on jihad and bemoaned the lack of Islamic scholarship and education among the soldiers who came to Afghanistan. In "Join the Caravan," he wrote:

As for the juristic details of jihad, such as distribution of booty and treatment of prisoners of war, these matters have arisen in many regiments. Due to ignorance about them, however, they were forced to pass them on to an area in which there was a scholar or scholars who could give their decisions according to the Islamic law. You will become aware, on account of the profound signs left by the Arab youths of modest education (possibly not even surpassing secondary school), of the severe need for propagators, Imams, reciters of the Qur'an and religious scholars.

The final example Aaron cites is a particularly interesting one, from "The Neglected Duty" by Muhammad Faraj, which corresponds pretty closely to the position Awlaki just staked out:

So he who says that knowledge is Jihad must realize that what is fard [obligatory] is fighting … If a person wants to increase his knowledge … he could do so, because there are no restrictions on knowledge, which is available for everybody. But to delay Jihad because of seeking knowledge is an evidence of the one who has no evidence … However, we do not underestimate knowledge and scholars, rather we call for that. But we do not use it as evidence to abandon the obligations that Allah ordained.

While Faraj goes out of his way to say he's not underestimating scholarship, he's saying that thinking shouldn't get in the way of killing. Or, in American idiom, shoot first and ask questions later.

Rather than competing in the battlefield of ideas, Awlaki walks his readers through an argument that dismisses the entire debate and says that it is incumbent on individuals to accept the common-sense argument for jihad without regard for scholarship as a process, or finding consensus, another key process in Islam.

Fighting Satan does not require a jurisprudence. It does not require consulting. It does not need a prayer for the cause.

Gadahn says almost exactly the same thing in his recent message, emphasizing the supremacy of "common sense" over scholarship and learning:

I shall mention briefly here a number of obvious facts which young men recognize before old men and laymen recognize before Ulama [scholars]. [...] This is why anyone who wants to debate the legal basis for the contemporary Jihad must refute all those fatwas and reject all those proven consensus and not just make do with relying to one fatwa or Alim [scholar].

Gadahn, however, hedges his bets by explaining that the mujahideen have their own scholarly books of jurisprudence, which he may or may not disclose at a later date, assuming someone gets around to writing them.

In sum, I am reading these latest communiques as an attack on the process of scholarship itself, rather than on specific types of scholars, i.e., corrupt vs. pure, or modern vs. historical.

Will this initiative against scholarship per se (as opposed to fighting individual opinions) will take hold in Al Qaeda? We'll see. Back in the 1980s, I think you could get away with this, because there was much less emphasis on self-education about Islam. There was no Internet. Would-be jihadists were shaped by those who they met and learned from.

Today, the online pool of potential jihadists loves to endlessly dissect Islamic scholarship and pose as educated people themselves. You can find interminable, tedious arguments about fiqh, madhabs and precedents on almost every jihadist message board. This process helps harden extremist views for many of the participants. The lesson here? A little knowledge is a lot more dangerous than no knowledge.

On the other hand, the core argument used by Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups is more political than religious and is predicated on the assumption that Muslims are being victimized all over the world. This is the primary driver of jihadist recruitment; the religious arguments are a form of secondary reinforcement.

The approach Al Qaeda is beta-testing with these releases may attract more unstable people in the short term (a speciality of Awlaki's), but it's only going to accelerate the transformation of Al Qaeda's membership from soldiers to thugs, a shift that has been sapping the organization's effectiveness for some years now.

Labels: Abdullah-Azzam, Adam-Gadahn, Al-Qaeda, American-Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Awlaki, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Muhammad-Al-Maqdisi, Muhammad-Faraj, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink