Exclusive: CIA Documents on 9/11

The CIA has released nearly 800 pages of newly declassified documents on Al Qaeda and the September 11 attacks.

The documents were released in response to an INTELWIRE Freedom of Information Act request for material referenced by the 9/11 Commission. Numerous documents were withheld, and those that were released have been heavily redacted. Despite this, it is highly unusual to receive any material from the CIA in response to a FOIA request, and they provide a fascinating look at the state of the agency's understanding of Al Qaeda over the years.

While much of the material has been previously described, by the 9/11 Commission and other sources, seeing the actual documents still has an impact. For instance, the following extracts:






The documents are presented here in two large PDFs. Each individual document is bookmarked within the PDF. Almost everything in the release was previously classified secret or top secret. The CIA also released several items already available on its Web site or in public testimony, which I omitted.

The documents are presented here in no particular order but I grouped material near the top related to warnings about the activities of Khalid Al Mihdhar, one of the hijackers, and material related to 1998 efforts to capture or kill Osama bin Laden together in roughly chronological order.

You are welcome to report from these documents, but you must credit Intelwire.com. If you wish to break out a specific document for a major media outlet, contact me. Smaller outlets, please feel free to grab excerpts using screencaps, but kindly remember to add the credit.

CIA 9/11 Binder 1:

• DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al Qa'ida 
• DCI Task Force Report: Improving Intelligence Warning, 29 May 1992 
• 2003-03-18 Bin Attash in Los Angeles in 2000 
• 2001-05-15 Email,  Suspicious travel, Khaled and Nawaf 
• 2001-05-24 Email,  Khalid Al-Mihdar in Malaysia 
• 2001-08-21 Email, re: Khalid Al Mihdhar 
• 2001-Undated, Email, Khallad 
• 2001-08-21, Email, Re: Khalid Al Mihdhar 
• 1998-05-05 Email, To Michael Scheuer, OBL Rendition 
• 1998-09-02 Talking points RE OBL Rendition 
• 1998-11-18 Memo re: OBL Rendition 
• 1998-11-24 Options for OBL (Rendition) 
• 1998-12-20 Email to Michael Scheuer, re: urgent re: UBL (missile ) 
• 1999-02-10 Talking Points: CIA Operations Against Usama bin Ladin 
• 1999-05-17 Email from Scheuer, your note, UBL ops 
• 2001-05-03 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attach 
• 2001-06-25, Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats 
• 2001-06-30 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Planning High Profile Attacks 
• 2001-06-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent 
• 2001-06-30 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief,  Bin Ladin Threats Are Real 
• 2001-07-02 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues Despite Delay 
• 2001-07-25 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing 
• 2001-08-07 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US 
• 1998-12-04 Memorandum, Usama Bin Laden, From Director CIA 
• Presidential Daily Brief, Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US 
• 1997-01-06 Usama bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability 
• 1997-01-06 Usama bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability  
• 1992-07-17 Improving Intelligence Warning 
• 2001-08-23  DCI Update, Terrorist Threat Review, Islamic Extremist Learns To Fly 
• 12 JUN 20 01 Biographical Information on Usama bin Ladin Associates 
• 2001-06-24 MBC TV Carries Video Report on Bin Ladin, Followers in Training 
• 2002-12-06 Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports Facilitates Al Qa'ida Travel 
• Undated, Bin Ladin Threatening to Attack US Aircraft 
• 2003-06-20 Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al Qa'ida Train on the Run? 
• DCI Counterterrorist Center: Attack on the US Cole, Preliminary Findings, 10 November 2000 
• 2000-10-18 The Threat to US Personnel in Yemen 
• 1999-04-09  Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively
• 1999-11-12 DCI UBL Update 
• 2001-08-12 CIA document, Atta did not travel to Prague 
• Undated, Planning by Usama Bin Laden to Hijack U.S. Airplane, Successful Circumvention of Security Measures in U.S. Airport
• 2001-04-12 Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target  
• 2002-02-27 Identifying Al Qa'ida's Donors and Fundraisers, A Status Report 
• Undated, Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam -- An Update
• 1997-08-25 DCI Talking. Points  Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin 
• 1997-01-08  Memo on OBL Fatwas 
• 1997-06-17 UBL financial support to Gamaat Islamiyya and others 
• 1998-12-24 Timeframe for hijacking operation 
• 1999-01-08 Hijacking Operation 
• Undated, Sudanese [redacted] ties to Gamaat Islamiyya 
• Undated, UBL funding of Gamaat Islamiyya 
• 1998-12-04  Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks
• 1998-09-22 Incorporation of Ayman Al Zawahiri's Al Jihad into UBL's Al Qa'ida 
• Undated, Terrorism: Extremists planning attacks against US interests in Pakistan 
• 2001-03-27 Afghanistan: An Incubator for International  Terrorism
• 2002-11-14 Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations 

CIA 9/11 Binder 2:

• 2001-07-03  DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review
• 2001-02-06 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing 
• 2004-03-11 Name Variants and Aliases of 11 September Hijackers and Associates 
• 2000-06-30 Intelligence Community Threat Advisory: Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks 
• 2001-03-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Afghanistan: Taliban Holding Firm on Bin Ladin For Now 
• 2001-05-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Terroristr Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plan 
• 2001-05-24 Call-In Threat Of High- Explosive Attack
• 1996-12-17 Africa Division Recommendations Regarding Sudan 
• 1999-09-06 UAE Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin's Finances 
• 1999-03-16 Iraqi Delegation  Meets with Bin Ladin 
• 1997-07-14 Activities of Bin Ladin's in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India 
• 2003-07-02 Bin Ladin Finances 
• 1997-02-13 Al Qaeda Links to Hosni Mubarak Assassination Attempt 
• 1997-08-11 Al Qaeda Plan to Establish Anti-Saddam Hussein Unit 
• 1997-01-31 COOPERATION AMONG USAMA BIN LADIN' S ISLAMIC ARMY, IRAN, AND THE NIF (Sudan) 
• 1997-01-31 TERRORISM: ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT  AMONG USAMA BIN LADIN, IRAN, AND THE NIF
• 1997-03-18 UBL's Attempts to Obtain Uranium  
• 1997-04-30 USAMA BIN LADIN'S ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA AND SUDANESE NI F SUPPORT
• 1997-03-05 USAMA BIN LADIN' S LINKS TO A SOUTHERN YEMENI  GROUP
• 1997-01-08 Regarding 1992 UBL Fatwa 
• 1996-12-19 RESPONSIBILITIES AND BACKGROUND OF ISLAMIC ARMY SHURA COUNCIL MEMBERS 
• 2003-03-10 Al Qa'ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths 
• 1996-11-26 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY,  AND BIN LADIN'S MOVE FROM AFGHANISTAN TO SUDAN 
• 1997-04-18 USAMA BIN LA DIN'S HISTORICAL LINKS TO 'ABDALLAH AZZAM
• 2000-11-02 Bin Ladin's Terrorist  Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable 
• 1999-07-29  Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities
• 2001-07-06 Expanding Links Between Alien Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the United States 
• 1999-12-11 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin to Exploit Looser Security During Holidays 
• Afghanistan: Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Ladin
• Terrorist Threat to US Interests in Caucasus 
• 2001-08-24  TERRORISM: SANITIZED VERSION OF THREAT REPORT
• 2000-07-14  DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat  
• 2000-07-07 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat  
• 2000-05-22 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Update 
• 2000-04 -05 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Update
• 2000-03-06 EXDIR Update: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat 
• 2000-04-03 Islamic Extremist Update 
• 2000-02-18 DCI Update: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat 
• 2000-01-07 Update:  Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat
• 1999-12-16 DCI Briefing Millennium Threat 
• DCI Document Request No. 16, Item No. 1: Production of the [redacted] Usama Bin Ladin  Situation Reports
• 1999-10-28  DDCI UBL Update
• 1999-08-03 UBL Update 
• 2002-08-07 Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes To Keep  al-Qa'ida Functioning
• 1997-01-27 UBL Fatwas 
• 1996-12-18 Structure of UBL's Islamic Army 
• 1996-12-19 TERRORISM: ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY'S MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND POLITICAL AND SHARIA COMMITTEE; PROCESS OF APPROVING TERRORIST OPERATIONS
• 1999-01-27 How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network 
• 2003-12-10 Letter to Douglas Feith from Stanley Moskowitz, Director of Congressional Affairs, re: Corrections to Iraq-AQ claims 
• 1999-04-05 Targeting Study of US Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya 
• 1995-12 Sketch of a South Asia-Based Terrorist Training and Logistic Network
• RESPONSE TO DCI DOCUMENT REQUEST NUMBER 52, ITEM 2 (9/11 Commission) 
• 2001:  Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution
• 1994-10 OIG Inspection Report: The Agency's Counterterrorism Effort 

Check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

RECENT WORK

Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam

New America Foundation Panel: Infiltration and surveillance

New America Foundation report: PATCON, a case study on infiltration

FOREIGN POLICY

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Patriot Games: FBI Undercover Operations And Timothy McVeigh

A Nation of Spies and Snitches

The Boy Who Cried Lone Wolf

Al Qaeda's Merger: 40 New Americans

Monsters and Children: Politics And How We Talk About Muslims

Anwar Awlaki: Gone But Not Forgotten

The Myth of Anwar Awlaki

Did You Hear The One About U.S. Internment Camps? 

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Al-Qaeda, CIA, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, Hijackers, Osama-Bin-Laden, September-11

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Well, Is Al Qaeda Winning Or Not?

Some of my favorite thinkers have diametrically opposing pieces in The Atlantic today. Will McCants and William Rosenau write about How We Won the War on Terror, while Daveed Gartenstein-Ross writes that Al Qaeda is Winning.

Followers of my work will know that I reviewed and agreed with the thesis put forward by Gartenstein-Ross in his new book, Bin Laden's Legacy.

However McCants is a powerhouse in this field, and the piece he and Rosenau put forward makes some very valid points, arriving at a completely different conclusion but ultimately making some of the same policy prescriptions as Gartenstein-Ross.

While there are many reasons I agree with Gartenstein-Ross' thesis, I want to talk briefly about an issue that neither column raises, but which I think is chiefly responsible for Al Qaeda's failure to mount a successful mass casualty attack since 9/11.

For more than a decade prior to September 11, Al Qaeda and its close allies ran a series of mass production terrorist training camps in the AfPak region. The U.S. invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, along with substantial pressure on Pakistan, has crippled that training camp network.

Although the camps have not been totally eliminated, they have been massively disrupted. In the past, the camps could and did process hundreds of recruits at any given time, providing religious indoctrination, basic military training and advanced military training. The training could take place over the course of months or years, and there were relatively few obstacles to traveling to the camps.

Such camps still exist, but they're no longer centralized. They are harder to reach, and the courses they offer are less thorough and much more rushed.

When we talk about Al Qaeda winning or losing, we have to account for the fact we are fighting a war of containment rather than clear victory. The continued pressure we are exerting over the training camp network is largely responsible for Al Qaeda's inability to carry out mass casualty attacks or to train loosely affiliated comrades to do the same.

Since 9/11, we have seen foiled attacks and we have seen failed attacks. On the latter front, from Times Square to the underwear bomber to the lone wolves, lack of training is an overwhelming theme. Training camps still exist, but they are smaller and less secure, with fewer experienced personnel. The training regimen is rushed, candidates enter and are turned around very quickly for attacks without the months or years of advanced training and religious indoctrination seen in the past.

If Faisal Shahzad or Omar Abdulmutallab had been thoroughly and competently trained, their attacks could easily have succeeded, and we'd be having a very different conversation today.

Without fully operational mass-production training camps, there would not have been a World Trade Center bombing in 1993, there would not have been the East African embassy bombings in 1998, and there would not have been a September 11.

Unfortunately, there are two reasons why we can't declare victory on this issue.

First, it is obvious to everyone that we can't stay in Afghanistan forever. Our success in the AfPak region, such as it is, is based on a strategy of constant pressure.

In the absence of that pressure, and under any foreseeable (to me) scenario involving a weak Afghan government and an ambivalent Pakistani military-intelligence apparatus, I see very little reason to think that Al Qaeda's camps won't regenerate once we leave the region. We have the tool of drones today, which we didn't have before, but it's not a magic wand that can operate forever without restraints, especially in the absence of local support.

Second, Al Qaeda now has growing opportunities to train operatives in other places, most notably Somalia and Yemen, and future prospects in Iraq and various points around Africa. Those operations are still small relative to their AfPak predecessors, but they appear to be growing.

We have drone operations in some of these locations, but as noted above, I'm not convinced they can be as effective over a long haul as our substantial military presence in the AfPak theater.

Despite coming at it from different angles, McCants and Gartenstein-Ross -- and a growing chorus of other experts -- all agree that we need to scale back our military and security outlay for reasons both financial and sociological, and I agree with that as well.

But we need to accept that such cutbacks will likely enhance Al Qaeda's prospects for successful attacks in the medium-term future. That enhancement, combined with the wild political uncertainties of the Arab Spring, make it hard for me to be optimistic that we have won -- or can be said to be winning -- our war with Al Qaeda in the foreseeable future.

A final note of caution: The complex attack carried out in Norway by Anders Breivik is likely to inspire imitators. Breivik did something that no one else has -- he showed that a single person can carry out a spectacular terrorist attack, and he provided a detailed account of how he accomplished the task. This could be a game-changer even in the absence of a robust training network, but if and when the network regenerates, the new breed of instructors will most certainly be studying Breivik's tactics (as will other, non-AQ actors).

The war against al Qaeda is most certainly changing, but I'm hard pressed to see how that change puts us in the position of winning or having won. It's arguably an overstatement to say Al Qaeda is winning, per se, but it is successfully executing a large part of the "bleed-to-bankruptcy" strategy it has delineated in its statements. The Arab Spring, the death of bin Laden and other factors may well help us, but we are a long way from seeing the ultimate impact of those events.

For more about al Qaeda training camps and the terror network's American recruits, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: 9-11, Al-Qaeda, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, Faisal-Shahzad, September-11, Umar-Farouk-Abdulmutallab, World-Trade-Center-Bombing

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Embassy Bombing Documents Offer Window Into Al Qaeda Operations

A flood of new details concerning Al Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan and Somalia during the 1990s were revealed Friday, when prosecutors unveiled a series of previously secret documents in the trial of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Guantanamo detainee convicted of conspiracy in Al Qaeda's bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

The documents, meant to support the maximum sentence for Ghailani, contain detailed transcripts of three interrogations:

A 1999 Justice Department interrogation of Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, in South Africa, where he had been detained by immigration officials. Mohamed was later convicted for his role in the embassy bombings. Interrogation of Khalfan Mohamed, Oct. 9, 1999 (PDF)

A 1998 Justice Department interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh, another convicted operative in the embassy bombings. Interrogation of Mohammed Odeh, Aug. 31, 1998 (PDF)

A summary of a Justice Department interrogation of Ghailani after he was captured and imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay. The summary is dated December 2008. Interrogation of Ahmed Ghailani, Dec. 12, 2008 (PDF)

Some of the more interesting details found in these interrogations include substantial information about Al Qaeda's operations in Somalia, more broadly in Africa and in Afghanistan. Some of the material below has been previously reported. These items only scratch the surface of the information contained in these documents, which includes a great deal of data on the logistics of the embassy bombings. Readers are encouraged to review the documents and discuss them with me on Twitter.

Odeh was ordered to Somalia by Saif Al Adel, one of the most senior surviving members of Al Qaeda still active in the organization and one of the most important figures in Al Qaeda's Somalia operations. The orders originated with Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda focused on one tribe, the Um Rehan, which was most ideologically compatible. (Much of this information came out during the first embassy bombings trial.)

Khalfan Mohamed went to Somalia twice in 1997 on behalf of Al Qaeda. He helped train members of Al Ittihad, a Somali Islamic group led by Hassan Dahir Aweys, who later helped found the Islamic Courts Union and is now a member of Al Shabab. Odeh also reported interacting with Al Ittihad.

According to Odeh, "Sheikh Hassan" (possibly Aweys) asked Al Qaeda's military commander, Mohammed Atef, aka Abu Hafs, for help. Atef brought five Al Qaeda trainers to Somalia and temporarily took over the operation from Saif Al Adel. Odeh reported that his group exchanged fire with UN officials during this period.

In June or July of 1998, a few months after bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring war on America, Sheikh Hassan from Somalia requested a meeting with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. It was not clear if the meeting ever took place, given the close proximity of the request to the embassy bombings.

A number of Al Qaeda members questioned the fatwa against America, worrying that Al Qaeda had become isolated from its former allies by 1998, but their loyalty to bin Laden outweighed their objections.

Odeh explained that Al Qaeda's core membership was small (he put the number at 150), but that the "friends of Al Qaeda" worked in close tandem with the organization without being sworn members.

During interrogation, Ghailani described meeting or interacting with a number of key players in the September 11 attacks, including several hijackers, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh and Zacarias Moussoui. The information here is mostly incidental, interesting but not necessarily significant.

New information about American Al Qaeda members also emerged in the transcripts.

A previously undocumented American jihadist, "Sulieman America [sic]," described by Khalfan Mohamed as a being tall and thin with curly brown hair and a medium complexion. The name is probably correctly transcribed as Suleiman Al Amriki. Suleiman attended basic training at Al Qaeda's Markaz Fath training camp in Afghanistan, then later received advanced training in the assembly of improvised explosives. Suleiman left the camp in 1995.

Abu Suleiman is one alias used by Ihab Ali, an Egyptian and naturalized U.S. citizen who lived in Florida and worked with Wadih El Hage and Ali Mohamed, two of the most American U.S. Al Qaeda members. It's not clear if this Abu Suleiman was Ihab Ali. Ali is in U.S. custody under unclear circumstances, much like Ali Mohamed, who pleaded guilty under a plea deal but was never sentenced.

Odeh reported that American citizen Al Qaeda member Wadih El Hage was visited by an Egyptian named "Nawi" who also lived in America. That person is almost certainly Ihab Ali, who also used the alias Nawawi. Odeh said Nawi was responsible for facilitating travel for Al Qaeda members. In an intriguing aside, Odeh said Nawi "was once jailed in Peshawar but was taken out of jail by an American."

Odeh also mentioned two American Al Qaeda trainers, "Abu Osama" and "Abdul Malek." From the aliases and descriptions, it's clear he is referring to known Al Qaeda members Ali Mohamed and Christopher Paul.

Labels: Ahmad-Khalfan-Ghailani, Al-Qaeda, Ali-Mohamed, American-Al-Qaeda, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, Ihab-Ali, Jihad-Joe, Khalfan-Mohamed, Mohammed-Sadeek-Odeh, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, January through September 11, 2001

1/4/2001: Summary of meeting with Yemeni officials, re: Cole Bombing

1/10/2001: Communication, photo book for witnesses, re: Cole Bombing

1/16/2001: Communication, sensitive source, Pakistan

1/31/2001: FD-302, interrogation of Fahd Al Quso (Cole Bombing)

2/3/2001: FD-302, interrogation of Fahd Al Quso (Cole Bombing)

3/19/2001: FD-302, interrogation of confidential source (proffer agreement)

3/19/2001: FD-302, interrogation of confidential source (proffer agreement)

4/13/2001: Bulletin, attacks planned by Al Qaeda, Abu Zubaidah

5/7/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (threat to New York from walk-in informant)

6/22/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (possible near-term strike on U.S. interests)

7/2/2001: FBI National Threat Warning, Terrorism (chatter, possible attacks abroad)

7/16/2001 to 8/1/2001: Terrorism threats

7/16/2001: Protective Services Working Group, briefing with Michael Rolince

7/20/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (includes references to Bojinka, Abdul Hakim Murad)

8/1/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (threat from walk-in informant, "red mercury")

7/2/2001: FBI National Threat Warning, Terrorism (anniversary of East African embassy bombings

Labels: 9-11, Cole-Bombing, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, INTELFILES

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, January through September 11, 2001

1/4/2001: Summary of meeting with Yemeni officials, re: Cole Bombing

1/10/2001: Communication, photo book for witnesses, re: Cole Bombing

1/16/2001: Communication, sensitive source, Pakistan

1/31/2001: FD-302, interrogation of Fahd Al Quso (Cole Bombing)

2/3/2001: FD-302, interrogation of Fahd Al Quso (Cole Bombing)

3/19/2001: FD-302, interrogation of confidential source (proffer agreement)

3/19/2001: FD-302, interrogation of confidential source (proffer agreement)

4/13/2001: Bulletin, attacks planned by Al Qaeda, Abu Zubaidah

5/7/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (threat to New York from walk-in informant)

6/22/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (possible near-term strike on U.S. interests)

7/2/2001: FBI National Threat Warning, Terrorism (chatter, possible attacks abroad)

7/16/2001 to 8/1/2001: Terrorism threats

7/16/2001: Protective Services Working Group, briefing with Michael Rolince

7/20/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (includes references to Bojinka, Abdul Hakim Murad)

8/1/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (threat from walk-in informant, "red mercury")

7/2/2001: FBI National Threat Warning, Terrorism (anniversary of East African embassy bombings

Labels: 9-11, Cole-Bombing, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, INTELFILES

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, 1995 to 2000

5/11/1995: FD-302, interrogation of Abdul Hakim Murad (comments)

8/31/1998: FBI interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh (East African Embassy Bombings) (comments)

9/9/1998: FD-302, interrogation of Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali (East African Embassy Bombings)

7/8/1999: Summary of Information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

9/16/1999: FD-302, confidential informant, Al Qaeda in Africa

9/23/1999: FD-302, Confidential Informant, Somalia issues

12/29/1999: Bulletin, Millennium Bombing plot

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Bojinka, Cole-Bombing, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, INTELFILES, KSM

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, 1995 to 2000

5/11/1995: FD-302, interrogation of Abdul Hakim Murad (comments)

8/31/1998: FBI interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh (East African Embassy Bombings) (comments)

9/9/1998: FD-302, interrogation of Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali (East African Embassy Bombings)

7/8/1999: Summary of Information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

9/16/1999: FD-302, confidential informant, Al Qaeda in Africa

9/23/1999: FD-302, Confidential Informant, Somalia issues

12/29/1999: Bulletin, Millennium Bombing plot

Labels: 9-11, Bojinka, Cole-Bombing, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, INTELFILES, KSM

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

1998-08-31: FBI interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh (East African Embassy Bombings)

This document is a record of the interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh.

Much of this document has been redacted. As is the case with many of the documents released, the redaction is inappropriate since much of this document was disclosed during testimony in U.S. v. Bin Laden. An extended excerpt is included below, to illustrate the unreasonable nature of the redaction.

There were two versions of the document released, each redacted differently, which illustrates the FBI's capricious approach to claiming FOIA exemptions. The redacted material revealed by the comparison is completely innocuous.

1998-08-31: FBI interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh (East African Embassy Bombings)

Testimony: U.S. v. Bin Laden, Feb. 28, 2001

1617



   1   time that you deployed to Kenya as part of your duties with

   2   the FBI?

   3   A.  Yes.

   4   Q.  Was that following the bombings in Africa?

   5   A.  Yes.

   6   Q.  Let me direct your attention to later that month.  Did

   7   there come a time when you interviewed Mohamed Sadeek Odeh?

   8   A.  Yes.

   9   Q.  Can you tell the jury what day you began to interview

  10   Mohamed Sadeek Odeh.

  11   A.  We began the interview on August 15.

  12   Q.  For how many days did you interview Mohamed Odeh in Kenya?

  13   A.  Until August 27.

  14   Q.  After that point in time, was Mohamed Odeh brought back to

  15   the United States?

  16   A.  Yes, he was.

  17   Q.  Between August 15 and the 27th, did you interview him

  18   every day?

  19   A.  Not every day.

  20   Q.  Do you know how many days you did not speak to him during

  21   that time?

  22   A.  Approximately two days.

  23   Q.  When you did interview him, what was the earliest, or when

  24   did you generally start interviewing him during each

  25   interview?



                                                                1618



   1   A.  During the daytime we started about, the earliest we

   2   started was about 9, sometimes later.

   3   Q.  How late would you work during those interview sessions?

   4   A.  We never worked past -- one time we worked till 6.  That

   5   was probably the latest.

   6   Q.  Did you always interview him for the full day or did you

   7   ever work half days?

   8   A.  We worked several half a days.

   9   Q.  Let me direct your attention to the first day of the

  10   interviews, August 15.  Do you know what time you started that

  11   day?

  12   A.  We started approximately 10:00.

  13   Q.  Where did the interview take place?

  14   A.  At Kenyan police department headquarters.

  15   Q.  Was it inside that Kenyan police headquarters building?

  16   A.  Yes.

  17   Q.  Can you tell the jury who was present for the interview?

  18   A.  Myself, two other US officials, and three Kenyan

  19   officials.

  20   Q.  Over the course of the following days, was it always the

  21   same people there?

  22   A.  No.

  23   Q.  Generally, how many American officials were present during

  24   the interview?

  25   A.  Two to three.



                                                                1619



   1   Q.  How many Kenyan officials would be present?

   2   A.  It varied.  Sometimes three, sometimes two, sometimes one.

   3   Q.  In what language did you conduct the interview?

   4   A.  In English.

   5   Q.  Did you have any difficulty understanding Mr. Odeh in

   6   English?

   7   A.  No.

   8   Q.  Did you ever have to repeat a question or have him repeat

   9   an answer to a question?

  10   A.  Yes.

  11   Q.  Did he ever ask you to repeat a question to him?

  12   A.  Yes.

  13   Q.  Can you tell the jury how you began the interview on

  14   August 15.

  15   A.  On August 15 we started the interview by first advising

  16   Mr. Odeh of his rights.  We told him that he had the right to

  17   remain silent, anything he said would be used against him.  We

  18   were going over a form that the FBI uses when dealing with

  19   subjects overseas, and the form also went on to say that if

  20   you were in the United States you would have the right to have

  21   an attorney present and if you were in the United States, if

  22   you could not afford an attorney one would be appointed to

  23   you.

  24   Q.  Let me approach you with what has been premarked as

  25   Government's Exhibit 3 for identification, and I will ask you



                                                                1620



   1   if you recognize this form?  Do you recognize Government's

   2   Exhibit 3?

   3   A.  Yes.

   4   Q.  What is that?

   5   A.  That is the advice of rights form that he signed.

   6   Q.  You mentioned that you read it to him.  Did you show him a

   7   copy of that form?

   8   A.  Yes.

   9   Q.  What happened when you finished reading the form or while

  10   you were reading the form and showing him a copy of the form?

  11   A.  While we were explaining the form to him he had a

  12   question.  When we were talking about attorneys, he said, he

  13   mentioned something about having an attorney available; a

  14   Kenyan attorney.

  15   Q.  What happened then?

  16   A.  He asked a couple of other questions, and that original

  17   question got lost because he followed up with another

  18   question, and eventually he stated that he would be willing to

  19   talk to us, but he did not want to sign the form, he first

  20   wanted to talk, how he called it, small talk to get to know

  21   each other.

  22   Q.  What happened then?

  23   A.  At that point we didn't want to pursue that, with that

  24   question that he had outstanding, so we broke and we went out

  25   into the hallway to discuss that amongst ourselves and with



                                                                1621



   1   the Kenyans.

   2   Q.  Did you go back into the room with Odeh after that?

   3   A.  Yes.

   4   Q.  What if anything was Odeh told at that point?

   5   A.  We told him that I had talked to the Kenyan authorities

   6   and that under their rule of law, that a Kenyan -- that they

   7   don't have the same thing as we do, they don't have the right

   8   to counsel at that stage of the investigation.

   9   Q.  What else if anything was said to Odeh at that point about

  10   his rights?

  11   A.  We told him that we could not provide him with an

  12   attorney, we did not have a United States, a U.S. attorney

  13   with us to represent him.  We told him that if he wished to

  14   have an attorney that we would respect that wish, and then the

  15   US representatives would not partake in the interview and we

  16   would leave the room.

  17   Q.  Just so we are clear for the record, he had asked about an

  18   Kenyan attorney and one of the things you made clear to him

  19   was that you did not have an American attorney available there

  20   to represent him.

  21   A.  Right.

  22   Q.  Can you explain what you understood about a Kenyan

  23   attorney.

  24   A.  We also asked him if he had his own Kenyan attorney.  He

  25   said he did not have an attorney.  We told him we could not



                                                                1622



   1   provide him a Kenyan attorney.

   2   Q.  What was he told about what his options were at that point

   3   in time?

   4   A.  We told him he had basically three options.  One was that

   5   he had the right to remain silent and he did not have to talk

   6   to either the Kenyan authorities or the US authorities, and if

   7   he invoked that right to not talk, that would have ended the

   8   matter right there.  And the second option was that if he

   9   wished to have an attorney present during that questioning,

  10   that we would oblige that and we would leave the room.  And

  11   then he would have to be with the Kenyan authorities to

  12   continue the interview or interrogation, but he also had the

  13   right to tell them that he didn't want to talk.  And the third

  14   option was that he could talk to the US authorities and the

  15   Kenyan authorities together with no attorney.

  16   Q.  What if anything did Odeh say when that was explained to

  17   him?

  18   A.  He came up with a fourth one.  He said can I just talk to

  19   the US authorities alone?

  20   Q.  What happened at that point?

  21   A.  At that point we all left the room to discuss that.

  22   Remaining in the room with Mr. Odeh was a Kenyan official, and

  23   by the time I got out to the hallway, the Kenyan official came

  24   out and said he's agreed to talk to both of us, to both

  25   authorities.



                                                                1623



   1   Q.  Did you go back in the room with Odeh at that point?

   2   A.  Yes.

   3   Q.  Did he indicate anything about whether he was willing to

   4   talk to both the Kenyan and American authorities?

   5   A.  Yes.  He said that he figured that if he spoke to the US

   6   authorities alone, that we would tell the Kenyan authorities

   7   anyway, so he figured why not just talk to both of them at the

   8   same time.

   9   Q.  What happened at that point?

  10   A.  At that point he agreed to talk and he signed the form.

  11   Q.  What happened then?

  12   A.  He asked some questions about what if I change my mind.

  13   We told him that it was fine, that he was the boss, that he

  14   was in complete control of his own way of dealing with us.  He

  15   could stop talking at any time.  He could pick and choose to

  16   answer the questions, if he didn't like a question he didn't

  17   have to answer it.

  18   Q.  Did he then answer questions after that point?

  19   A.  Yes.

  20   Q.  What did he tell you about where he was born and where he

  21   grew up?

  22   A.  He told me that he was born in Saudi Arabia and grew up in

  23   Jordan.

  24   Q.  Did he indicate what his ethnic heritage was?

  25   A.  That he was of Palestinian heritage.



                                                                1624



   1   Q.  Over the course of the interviews, did he indicate what

   2   other names he was known by besides Mohamed Sadeek Odeh?

   3   A.  He is also known as Abu Yasser, Noureldine, Marwan, and

   4   Abu Moath.

   5   Q.  Did he indicate whether he had a son during the interview?

   6   A.  Yes.

   7   Q.  What was the son's name?

   8   A.  Yassi.

   9   Q.  What did he tell you about where he went to school?

  10   A.  He, I believe, went to school for the earlier grades back

  11   in Jordan, but in 1986 he went to university, the Far Eastern

  12   University in Manila, Philippines.

  13   Q.  Did he indicate what he studied at that school?

  14   A.  Architecture and engineering.

  15   Q.  Did he indicate whether he became involved in any studies

  16   besides school during the time he was in the Philippines?

  17   A.  Yes.  During his studies in the Philippines, he became

  18   active in Islamic societies, and he also mentioned a Kuwaiti

  19   Islamic center that he used to go to.

  20   Q.  Did he indicate what if anything he was exposed to when he

  21   would go to Islamic societies in the Philippines?

  22   A.  Yes.  He became particularly interested, he told me, in

  23   the concept of jihad by listening to tape recordings and

  24   videos of individual named Abdallah Azzam, who was the leader

  25   of Arabs who were fighting in Afghanistan.



                                                                1625



   1   Q.  Did he indicate whether there came a time when he left the

   2   Philippines?

   3   A.  Yes.  In his final year of school, he was getting ready to

   4   do his thesis, but he needed a thousand dollars, and his

   5   father sent him a thousand dollars, and when he got that money

   6   he decided to call a religious scholar back home where he came

   7   from, to ask him his advice on what to do with the thousand

   8   dollars, should he use it to complete his studies or should he

   9   use it to join the jihad movement and go to Afghanistan and do

  10   jihad.

  11   Q.  Did he indicate what advice he was given and what he did?

  12   A.  His advice that was given to him was to stop what he was

  13   doing immediately and go do jihad.

  14   Q.  What did he tell you that he did?

  15   A.  From the Philippines he traveled to -- made his way to

  16   Afghanistan but he traveled first to Hong Kong and then to

  17   Pakistan.

  18   Q.  Did he indicate where he went in Pakistan?

  19   A.  Yes.  He landed in Karachi and then went from Karachi to

  20   the city of Peshawar.

  21   Q.  Did he indicate how he got from Karachi to Peshawar?

  22   A.  By bus.

  23   Q.  What did he tell you that he did once he arrived in

  24   Peshawar?

  25   A.  When he first arrived at Peshawar, he went to a place



                                                                1626



   1   called Bait Al Ansar, which I think it translates to House of

   2   Support, where people who were doing that, that's the first

   3   place they stopped.

   4   Q.  Did he tell you approximately what year, and, if you

   5   remember, what month it was that he went from the Philippines

   6   to Peshawar, Pakistan?

   7   A.  I think it was October 1990.

   8   Q.  What did he tell you happened when he arrived at the Bait

   9   al Ansar in Peshawar, Pakistan?

  10   A.  He stayed there for two days, I believe, and then he made

  11   his way by bus to the Afghan border.

  12   Q.  Then what did he tell you happened there?

  13   A.  After he got to the border they transferred to another

  14   vehicle, and they went to one of the camps, called the Farouq

  15   camp.

  16   Q.  Did he tell you what city, if any, was located near the

  17   Farouq camp?

  18   A.  It's in the area of Khost.

  19   Q.  What did Mr. Odeh tell you happened at the Farouq camp?

  20   A.  That was where he received his first series of basic

  21   training.

  22   Q.  Did he tell you how long he spent at the Farouq camp?

  23   A.  Approximately two months.

  24   Q.  Did he tell you what type of training he received during

  25   those two months?



                                                                1627



   1   A.  He received military training that was broken up into

   2   three segments.  The first segment was basic use of firearms,

   3   particularly the AK47, and kind of moved up to a belt-fed

   4   machine gun.

   5   Q.  Did he describe what the second level of training was like

   6   at the Farouq camp?

   7   A.  The second level, they started learning about topography,

   8   map reading, and they got introduced to explosives,

   9   particularly C3, C4, and TNT.

  10   Q.  Did he indicate what happened at the third level of

  11   training?

  12   A.  The third level of training involved more sophisticated

  13   weapons, like antitank missiles, rocket launchers, mortars,

  14   and antiaircraft weapons.

  15   Q.  Did Odeh indicate who was the person in charge of the camp

  16   at the time he was training?

  17   A.  For most of the time there, except for the first two

  18   weeks, the person in charge was a guy named Basheer.

  19   Q.  Did Odeh indicate what country Basheer was from?

  20   A.  I don't remember.

  21   Q.  Did Odeh indicate whether or not he was approached by any

  22   organization at or about the time or after the time he

  23   attended the Farouq camp?

  24   A.  While at the Farouq camp, he was approached by members of

  25   the of Al Qaeda organization, if he was interested in joining.



                                                                1628



   1   Q.  Did he indicate his belief as to why he had been

   2   approached?

   3   A.  He stated that he was approached because of his good

   4   character, his understanding of the religion, and his ability

   5   to get along with other people.

   6   Q.  Did Mr. Odeh tell you at that time whether he decided at

   7   that time to join the Al Qaeda group?

   8   A.  At that time he decided against joining.  He wanted to

   9   wait for a while.

  10   Q.  Did he tell you what he then did after he finished his

  11   training at the Farouq camp?

  12   A.  After he finished the training at the Farouq camp, they

  13   were sent back to Peshawar, where they were going to be

  14   deployed.

  15   Q.  Did he indicate how long he stayed at Peshawar after he

  16   went back there?

  17   A.  He didn't stay very long.  He had to take care of some

  18   dental work.  He had dental problems.

  19   Q.  What happened after that?

  20   A.  After that, he was sent to Jalalabad to work -- that's not

  21   too far from where the fighting was going on.  He was sent to

  22   Jalalabad to work in a rear area support for the front lines.

  23   Q.  Did he indicate what role he played in the rear area

  24   support in Jalalabad?

  25   A.  I believe he was taking care of wounded.



                                                                1629



   1   Q.  Do you know if he was working as a medic?

   2   A.  Yes, medic.  He was taking care of wounded people.

   3   Q.  Did Odeh indicate how long he spent in the area of

   4   Jalalabad at that time?

   5   A.  I believe he was there for about a month.

   6   Q.  What did Odeh tell you he did after that month in the area

   7   of Jalalabad?

   8   A.  After that, he went back to Peshawar.

   9   Q.  Did he indicate what he did there?

  10   A.  After he returned to Peshawar, he was only there a short

  11   time, and then I believe he wound up going back to Jalalabad.

  12   Q.  Did he indicate what happened on his second time he went

  13   to Jalalabad?

  14   A.  The second time he went to Jalalabad, he went back as a

  15   medic and he was -- well, when he was in Peshawar that

  16   first -- after the camp, after Jalalabad the first time, a

  17   doctor, I believe his name was Mohamed, approached him and

  18   said if he wanted to go back and be a medic for a small

  19   salary, and he did.

  20   Q.  What happened when he went back to Jalalabad to serve as a

  21   medic?

  22   A.  While there, he was injured in an air raid.  He was

  23   wounded in the head.

  24   Q.  What did he do as a result of the wounds?

  25   A.  He went again back to Peshawar to recover.



                                                                1630



   1   Q.  Did he indicate what he did after he recovered from the

   2   injury?

   3   A.  I believe that --

   4   Q.  Let me ask you this.  Did he tell you about a number of

   5   different camps and places where he served --

   6   A.  He went back into Afghanistan to several of the camps.  I

   7   believe the second camp he went to after that was the Jihad

   8   Wal camp.

   9   Q.  What did he tell you -- first of all, did he tell you how

  10   long, approximately, he spent at the Jihad Wal camp?

  11   A.  I think 45 days.

  12   Q.  Did he tell you what he did at the Jihad Wal camp?

  13   A.  At that camp, they learned different military tactics.

  14   They trained in how to attack certain installations and

  15   certain points.

  16   Q.  Did he indicate whether or not he received any nonmilitary

  17   training during that time period after he was done in the

  18   Jihad Wal camp?

  19   A.  After the Jihad Wal, a friend of his asked him if he

  20   wanted to go for a three-month religious studies course.

  21   Q.  Did Odeh indicate whether he did --

  22   A.  Yes, and he did, he went to that course.

  23   Q.  Did he indicate where he attended these studies?

  24   A.  In the area, I believe, around Pakistan -- I mean, in

  25   Peshawar.



                                                                1631



   1   Q.  Did he indicate when he was done the three months of his

   2   Islamic training or study, do you recall what time frame he

   3   indicated that would be?

   4   A.  That was around early '92.

   5   Q.  Did he indicate whether or not the topic of his joining Al

   6   Qaeda ever came up again in 1992?

   7   A.  Yes.  And he was approached to join Al Qaeda at that time,

   8   and he decided that he wanted to join Al Qaeda, he was

   9   impressed with the philosophy of it and he wanted to join.

  10   Q.  Did he indicate what it was about Al Qaeda versus other

  11   groups that made Al Qaeda attractive to him?

  12   A.  He liked Al Qaeda because it represented the whole Muslim

  13   world.  He told me that he didn't want to join like a

  14   Palestinian group or another group based upon one country, one

  15   ethnic background, because Al Qaeda represented all Muslims.

  16   Q.  Did he indicate what he thought of whether or not Al Qaeda

  17   was Islamically pure as compared to the other groups?

  18   A.  He did.  He said that compared to the other groups that Al

  19   Qaeda was Islamically pure and that the leadership in other

  20   groups might do things that are not Islamically correct.

  21   Q.  Did he indicate how he went about becoming a member of Al

  22   Qaeda?

  23   A.  Yes.  He took bayat, it's called.

  24   Q.  Did Odeh explain to you what his understanding -- this

  25   will be the last question, your Honor.



                                                                1632



   1            Did Odeh indicate to you what his understanding was

   2   of what the bayat required him to do?

   3   A.  Bayat is when he pledges his allegiance to Usama Bin Laden

   4   and that he will follow his orders as long as those orders are

   5   Islamically correct.

   6            (Continued on next page)

   7

   8

   9

Labels: East-African-Embassy-Bombings, INTELFILES, Odeh

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

1998-08-31: FBI interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh (East African Embassy Bombings)

This document is a record of the interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh.

Much of this document has been redacted. As is the case with many of the documents released, the redaction is inappropriate since much of this document was disclosed during testimony in U.S. v. Bin Laden. An extended excerpt is included below, to illustrate the unreasonable nature of the redaction.

There were two versions of the document released, each redacted differently, which illustrates the FBI's capricious approach to claiming FOIA exemptions. The redacted material revealed by the comparison is completely innocuous.

1998-08-31: FBI interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh (East African Embassy Bombings)

Testimony: U.S. v. Bin Laden, Feb. 28, 2001

1617



   1   time that you deployed to Kenya as part of your duties with

   2   the FBI?

   3   A.  Yes.

   4   Q.  Was that following the bombings in Africa?

   5   A.  Yes.

   6   Q.  Let me direct your attention to later that month.  Did

   7   there come a time when you interviewed Mohamed Sadeek Odeh?

   8   A.  Yes.

   9   Q.  Can you tell the jury what day you began to interview

  10   Mohamed Sadeek Odeh.

  11   A.  We began the interview on August 15.

  12   Q.  For how many days did you interview Mohamed Odeh in Kenya?

  13   A.  Until August 27.

  14   Q.  After that point in time, was Mohamed Odeh brought back to

  15   the United States?

  16   A.  Yes, he was.

  17   Q.  Between August 15 and the 27th, did you interview him

  18   every day?

  19   A.  Not every day.

  20   Q.  Do you know how many days you did not speak to him during

  21   that time?

  22   A.  Approximately two days.

  23   Q.  When you did interview him, what was the earliest, or when

  24   did you generally start interviewing him during each

  25   interview?



                                                                1618



   1   A.  During the daytime we started about, the earliest we

   2   started was about 9, sometimes later.

   3   Q.  How late would you work during those interview sessions?

   4   A.  We never worked past -- one time we worked till 6.  That

   5   was probably the latest.

   6   Q.  Did you always interview him for the full day or did you

   7   ever work half days?

   8   A.  We worked several half a days.

   9   Q.  Let me direct your attention to the first day of the

  10   interviews, August 15.  Do you know what time you started that

  11   day?

  12   A.  We started approximately 10:00.

  13   Q.  Where did the interview take place?

  14   A.  At Kenyan police department headquarters.

  15   Q.  Was it inside that Kenyan police headquarters building?

  16   A.  Yes.

  17   Q.  Can you tell the jury who was present for the interview?

  18   A.  Myself, two other US officials, and three Kenyan

  19   officials.

  20   Q.  Over the course of the following days, was it always the

  21   same people there?

  22   A.  No.

  23   Q.  Generally, how many American officials were present during

  24   the interview?

  25   A.  Two to three.



                                                                1619



   1   Q.  How many Kenyan officials would be present?

   2   A.  It varied.  Sometimes three, sometimes two, sometimes one.

   3   Q.  In what language did you conduct the interview?

   4   A.  In English.

   5   Q.  Did you have any difficulty understanding Mr. Odeh in

   6   English?

   7   A.  No.

   8   Q.  Did you ever have to repeat a question or have him repeat

   9   an answer to a question?

  10   A.  Yes.

  11   Q.  Did he ever ask you to repeat a question to him?

  12   A.  Yes.

  13   Q.  Can you tell the jury how you began the interview on

  14   August 15.

  15   A.  On August 15 we started the interview by first advising

  16   Mr. Odeh of his rights.  We told him that he had the right to

  17   remain silent, anything he said would be used against him.  We

  18   were going over a form that the FBI uses when dealing with

  19   subjects overseas, and the form also went on to say that if

  20   you were in the United States you would have the right to have

  21   an attorney present and if you were in the United States, if

  22   you could not afford an attorney one would be appointed to

  23   you.

  24   Q.  Let me approach you with what has been premarked as

  25   Government's Exhibit 3 for identification, and I will ask you



                                                                1620



   1   if you recognize this form?  Do you recognize Government's

   2   Exhibit 3?

   3   A.  Yes.

   4   Q.  What is that?

   5   A.  That is the advice of rights form that he signed.

   6   Q.  You mentioned that you read it to him.  Did you show him a

   7   copy of that form?

   8   A.  Yes.

   9   Q.  What happened when you finished reading the form or while

  10   you were reading the form and showing him a copy of the form?

  11   A.  While we were explaining the form to him he had a

  12   question.  When we were talking about attorneys, he said, he

  13   mentioned something about having an attorney available; a

  14   Kenyan attorney.

  15   Q.  What happened then?

  16   A.  He asked a couple of other questions, and that original

  17   question got lost because he followed up with another

  18   question, and eventually he stated that he would be willing to

  19   talk to us, but he did not want to sign the form, he first

  20   wanted to talk, how he called it, small talk to get to know

  21   each other.

  22   Q.  What happened then?

  23   A.  At that point we didn't want to pursue that, with that

  24   question that he had outstanding, so we broke and we went out

  25   into the hallway to discuss that amongst ourselves and with



                                                                1621



   1   the Kenyans.

   2   Q.  Did you go back into the room with Odeh after that?

   3   A.  Yes.

   4   Q.  What if anything was Odeh told at that point?

   5   A.  We told him that I had talked to the Kenyan authorities

   6   and that under their rule of law, that a Kenyan -- that they

   7   don't have the same thing as we do, they don't have the right

   8   to counsel at that stage of the investigation.

   9   Q.  What else if anything was said to Odeh at that point about

  10   his rights?

  11   A.  We told him that we could not provide him with an

  12   attorney, we did not have a United States, a U.S. attorney

  13   with us to represent him.  We told him that if he wished to

  14   have an attorney that we would respect that wish, and then the

  15   US representatives would not partake in the interview and we

  16   would leave the room.

  17   Q.  Just so we are clear for the record, he had asked about an

  18   Kenyan attorney and one of the things you made clear to him

  19   was that you did not have an American attorney available there

  20   to represent him.

  21   A.  Right.

  22   Q.  Can you explain what you understood about a Kenyan

  23   attorney.

  24   A.  We also asked him if he had his own Kenyan attorney.  He

  25   said he did not have an attorney.  We told him we could not



                                                                1622



   1   provide him a Kenyan attorney.

   2   Q.  What was he told about what his options were at that point

   3   in time?

   4   A.  We told him he had basically three options.  One was that

   5   he had the right to remain silent and he did not have to talk

   6   to either the Kenyan authorities or the US authorities, and if

   7   he invoked that right to not talk, that would have ended the

   8   matter right there.  And the second option was that if he

   9   wished to have an attorney present during that questioning,

  10   that we would oblige that and we would leave the room.  And

  11   then he would have to be with the Kenyan authorities to

  12   continue the interview or interrogation, but he also had the

  13   right to tell them that he didn't want to talk.  And the third

  14   option was that he could talk to the US authorities and the

  15   Kenyan authorities together with no attorney.

  16   Q.  What if anything did Odeh say when that was explained to

  17   him?

  18   A.  He came up with a fourth one.  He said can I just talk to

  19   the US authorities alone?

  20   Q.  What happened at that point?

  21   A.  At that point we all left the room to discuss that.

  22   Remaining in the room with Mr. Odeh was a Kenyan official, and

  23   by the time I got out to the hallway, the Kenyan official came

  24   out and said he's agreed to talk to both of us, to both

  25   authorities.



                                                                1623



   1   Q.  Did you go back in the room with Odeh at that point?

   2   A.  Yes.

   3   Q.  Did he indicate anything about whether he was willing to

   4   talk to both the Kenyan and American authorities?

   5   A.  Yes.  He said that he figured that if he spoke to the US

   6   authorities alone, that we would tell the Kenyan authorities

   7   anyway, so he figured why not just talk to both of them at the

   8   same time.

   9   Q.  What happened at that point?

  10   A.  At that point he agreed to talk and he signed the form.

  11   Q.  What happened then?

  12   A.  He asked some questions about what if I change my mind.

  13   We told him that it was fine, that he was the boss, that he

  14   was in complete control of his own way of dealing with us.  He

  15   could stop talking at any time.  He could pick and choose to

  16   answer the questions, if he didn't like a question he didn't

  17   have to answer it.

  18   Q.  Did he then answer questions after that point?

  19   A.  Yes.

  20   Q.  What did he tell you about where he was born and where he

  21   grew up?

  22   A.  He told me that he was born in Saudi Arabia and grew up in

  23   Jordan.

  24   Q.  Did he indicate what his ethnic heritage was?

  25   A.  That he was of Palestinian heritage.



                                                                1624



   1   Q.  Over the course of the interviews, did he indicate what

   2   other names he was known by besides Mohamed Sadeek Odeh?

   3   A.  He is also known as Abu Yasser, Noureldine, Marwan, and

   4   Abu Moath.

   5   Q.  Did he indicate whether he had a son during the interview?

   6   A.  Yes.

   7   Q.  What was the son's name?

   8   A.  Yassi.

   9   Q.  What did he tell you about where he went to school?

  10   A.  He, I believe, went to school for the earlier grades back

  11   in Jordan, but in 1986 he went to university, the Far Eastern

  12   University in Manila, Philippines.

  13   Q.  Did he indicate what he studied at that school?

  14   A.  Architecture and engineering.

  15   Q.  Did he indicate whether he became involved in any studies

  16   besides school during the time he was in the Philippines?

  17   A.  Yes.  During his studies in the Philippines, he became

  18   active in Islamic societies, and he also mentioned a Kuwaiti

  19   Islamic center that he used to go to.

  20   Q.  Did he indicate what if anything he was exposed to when he

  21   would go to Islamic societies in the Philippines?

  22   A.  Yes.  He became particularly interested, he told me, in

  23   the concept of jihad by listening to tape recordings and

  24   videos of individual named Abdallah Azzam, who was the leader

  25   of Arabs who were fighting in Afghanistan.



                                                                1625



   1   Q.  Did he indicate whether there came a time when he left the

   2   Philippines?

   3   A.  Yes.  In his final year of school, he was getting ready to

   4   do his thesis, but he needed a thousand dollars, and his

   5   father sent him a thousand dollars, and when he got that money

   6   he decided to call a religious scholar back home where he came

   7   from, to ask him his advice on what to do with the thousand

   8   dollars, should he use it to complete his studies or should he

   9   use it to join the jihad movement and go to Afghanistan and do

  10   jihad.

  11   Q.  Did he indicate what advice he was given and what he did?

  12   A.  His advice that was given to him was to stop what he was

  13   doing immediately and go do jihad.

  14   Q.  What did he tell you that he did?

  15   A.  From the Philippines he traveled to -- made his way to

  16   Afghanistan but he traveled first to Hong Kong and then to

  17   Pakistan.

  18   Q.  Did he indicate where he went in Pakistan?

  19   A.  Yes.  He landed in Karachi and then went from Karachi to

  20   the city of Peshawar.

  21   Q.  Did he indicate how he got from Karachi to Peshawar?

  22   A.  By bus.

  23   Q.  What did he tell you that he did once he arrived in

  24   Peshawar?

  25   A.  When he first arrived at Peshawar, he went to a place



                                                                1626



   1   called Bait Al Ansar, which I think it translates to House of

   2   Support, where people who were doing that, that's the first

   3   place they stopped.

   4   Q.  Did he tell you approximately what year, and, if you

   5   remember, what month it was that he went from the Philippines

   6   to Peshawar, Pakistan?

   7   A.  I think it was October 1990.

   8   Q.  What did he tell you happened when he arrived at the Bait

   9   al Ansar in Peshawar, Pakistan?

  10   A.  He stayed there for two days, I believe, and then he made

  11   his way by bus to the Afghan border.

  12   Q.  Then what did he tell you happened there?

  13   A.  After he got to the border they transferred to another

  14   vehicle, and they went to one of the camps, called the Farouq

  15   camp.

  16   Q.  Did he tell you what city, if any, was located near the

  17   Farouq camp?

  18   A.  It's in the area of Khost.

  19   Q.  What did Mr. Odeh tell you happened at the Farouq camp?

  20   A.  That was where he received his first series of basic

  21   training.

  22   Q.  Did he tell you how long he spent at the Farouq camp?

  23   A.  Approximately two months.

  24   Q.  Did he tell you what type of training he received during

  25   those two months?



                                                                1627



   1   A.  He received military training that was broken up into

   2   three segments.  The first segment was basic use of firearms,

   3   particularly the AK47, and kind of moved up to a belt-fed

   4   machine gun.

   5   Q.  Did he describe what the second level of training was like

   6   at the Farouq camp?

   7   A.  The second level, they started learning about topography,

   8   map reading, and they got introduced to explosives,

   9   particularly C3, C4, and TNT.

  10   Q.  Did he indicate what happened at the third level of

  11   training?

  12   A.  The third level of training involved more sophisticated

  13   weapons, like antitank missiles, rocket launchers, mortars,

  14   and antiaircraft weapons.

  15   Q.  Did Odeh indicate who was the person in charge of the camp

  16   at the time he was training?

  17   A.  For most of the time there, except for the first two

  18   weeks, the person in charge was a guy named Basheer.

  19   Q.  Did Odeh indicate what country Basheer was from?

  20   A.  I don't remember.

  21   Q.  Did Odeh indicate whether or not he was approached by any

  22   organization at or about the time or after the time he

  23   attended the Farouq camp?

  24   A.  While at the Farouq camp, he was approached by members of

  25   the of Al Qaeda organization, if he was interested in joining.



                                                                1628



   1   Q.  Did he indicate his belief as to why he had been

   2   approached?

   3   A.  He stated that he was approached because of his good

   4   character, his understanding of the religion, and his ability

   5   to get along with other people.

   6   Q.  Did Mr. Odeh tell you at that time whether he decided at

   7   that time to join the Al Qaeda group?

   8   A.  At that time he decided against joining.  He wanted to

   9   wait for a while.

  10   Q.  Did he tell you what he then did after he finished his

  11   training at the Farouq camp?

  12   A.  After he finished the training at the Farouq camp, they

  13   were sent back to Peshawar, where they were going to be

  14   deployed.

  15   Q.  Did he indicate how long he stayed at Peshawar after he

  16   went back there?

  17   A.  He didn't stay very long.  He had to take care of some

  18   dental work.  He had dental problems.

  19   Q.  What happened after that?

  20   A.  After that, he was sent to Jalalabad to work -- that's not

  21   too far from where the fighting was going on.  He was sent to

  22   Jalalabad to work in a rear area support for the front lines.

  23   Q.  Did he indicate what role he played in the rear area

  24   support in Jalalabad?

  25   A.  I believe he was taking care of wounded.



                                                                1629



   1   Q.  Do you know if he was working as a medic?

   2   A.  Yes, medic.  He was taking care of wounded people.

   3   Q.  Did Odeh indicate how long he spent in the area of

   4   Jalalabad at that time?

   5   A.  I believe he was there for about a month.

   6   Q.  What did Odeh tell you he did after that month in the area

   7   of Jalalabad?

   8   A.  After that, he went back to Peshawar.

   9   Q.  Did he indicate what he did there?

  10   A.  After he returned to Peshawar, he was only there a short

  11   time, and then I believe he wound up going back to Jalalabad.

  12   Q.  Did he indicate what happened on his second time he went

  13   to Jalalabad?

  14   A.  The second time he went to Jalalabad, he went back as a

  15   medic and he was -- well, when he was in Peshawar that

  16   first -- after the camp, after Jalalabad the first time, a

  17   doctor, I believe his name was Mohamed, approached him and

  18   said if he wanted to go back and be a medic for a small

  19   salary, and he did.

  20   Q.  What happened when he went back to Jalalabad to serve as a

  21   medic?

  22   A.  While there, he was injured in an air raid.  He was

  23   wounded in the head.

  24   Q.  What did he do as a result of the wounds?

  25   A.  He went again back to Peshawar to recover.



                                                                1630



   1   Q.  Did he indicate what he did after he recovered from the

   2   injury?

   3   A.  I believe that --

   4   Q.  Let me ask you this.  Did he tell you about a number of

   5   different camps and places where he served --

   6   A.  He went back into Afghanistan to several of the camps.  I

   7   believe the second camp he went to after that was the Jihad

   8   Wal camp.

   9   Q.  What did he tell you -- first of all, did he tell you how

  10   long, approximately, he spent at the Jihad Wal camp?

  11   A.  I think 45 days.

  12   Q.  Did he tell you what he did at the Jihad Wal camp?

  13   A.  At that camp, they learned different military tactics.

  14   They trained in how to attack certain installations and

  15   certain points.

  16   Q.  Did he indicate whether or not he received any nonmilitary

  17   training during that time period after he was done in the

  18   Jihad Wal camp?

  19   A.  After the Jihad Wal, a friend of his asked him if he

  20   wanted to go for a three-month religious studies course.

  21   Q.  Did Odeh indicate whether he did --

  22   A.  Yes, and he did, he went to that course.

  23   Q.  Did he indicate where he attended these studies?

  24   A.  In the area, I believe, around Pakistan -- I mean, in

  25   Peshawar.



                                                                1631



   1   Q.  Did he indicate when he was done the three months of his

   2   Islamic training or study, do you recall what time frame he

   3   indicated that would be?

   4   A.  That was around early '92.

   5   Q.  Did he indicate whether or not the topic of his joining Al

   6   Qaeda ever came up again in 1992?

   7   A.  Yes.  And he was approached to join Al Qaeda at that time,

   8   and he decided that he wanted to join Al Qaeda, he was

   9   impressed with the philosophy of it and he wanted to join.

  10   Q.  Did he indicate what it was about Al Qaeda versus other

  11   groups that made Al Qaeda attractive to him?

  12   A.  He liked Al Qaeda because it represented the whole Muslim

  13   world.  He told me that he didn't want to join like a

  14   Palestinian group or another group based upon one country, one

  15   ethnic background, because Al Qaeda represented all Muslims.

  16   Q.  Did he indicate what he thought of whether or not Al Qaeda

  17   was Islamically pure as compared to the other groups?

  18   A.  He did.  He said that compared to the other groups that Al

  19   Qaeda was Islamically pure and that the leadership in other

  20   groups might do things that are not Islamically correct.

  21   Q.  Did he indicate how he went about becoming a member of Al

  22   Qaeda?

  23   A.  Yes.  He took bayat, it's called.

  24   Q.  Did Odeh explain to you what his understanding -- this

  25   will be the last question, your Honor.



                                                                1632



   1            Did Odeh indicate to you what his understanding was

   2   of what the bayat required him to do?

   3   A.  Bayat is when he pledges his allegiance to Usama Bin Laden

   4   and that he will follow his orders as long as those orders are

   5   Islamically correct.

   6            (Continued on next page)

   7

   8

   9

Labels: East-African-Embassy-Bombings, INTELFILES, Odeh

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