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Thursday, May 31, 2012
 

Exclusive: CIA Documents on 9/11

The CIA has released nearly 800 pages of newly declassified documents on Al Qaeda and the September 11 attacks.

The documents were released in response to an INTELWIRE Freedom of Information Act request for material referenced by the 9/11 Commission. Numerous documents were withheld, and those that were released have been heavily redacted. Despite this, it is highly unusual to receive any material from the CIA in response to a FOIA request, and they provide a fascinating look at the state of the agency's understanding of Al Qaeda over the years.

While much of the material has been previously described, by the 9/11 Commission and other sources, seeing the actual documents still has an impact. For instance, the following extracts:






The documents are presented here in two large PDFs. Each individual document is bookmarked within the PDF. Almost everything in the release was previously classified secret or top secret. The CIA also released several items already available on its Web site or in public testimony, which I omitted.

The documents are presented here in no particular order but I grouped material near the top related to warnings about the activities of Khalid Al Mihdhar, one of the hijackers, and material related to 1998 efforts to capture or kill Osama bin Laden together in roughly chronological order.

You are welcome to report from these documents, but you must credit Intelwire.com. If you wish to break out a specific document for a major media outlet, contact me. Smaller outlets, please feel free to grab excerpts using screencaps, but kindly remember to add the credit.

CIA 9/11 Binder 1:
  • DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al Qa'ida 
  • DCI Task Force Report: Improving Intelligence Warning, 29 May 1992 
  • 2003-03-18 Bin Attash in Los Angeles in 2000 
  • 2001-05-15 Email,  Suspicious travel, Khaled and Nawaf 
  • 2001-05-24 Email,  Khalid Al-Mihdar in Malaysia 
  • 2001-08-21 Email, re: Khalid Al Mihdhar 
  • 2001-Undated, Email, Khallad 
  • 2001-08-21, Email, Re: Khalid Al Mihdhar 
  • 1998-05-05 Email, To Michael Scheuer, OBL Rendition 
  • 1998-09-02 Talking points RE OBL Rendition 
  • 1998-11-18 Memo re: OBL Rendition 
  • 1998-11-24 Options for OBL (Rendition) 
  • 1998-12-20 Email to Michael Scheuer, re: urgent re: UBL (missile ) 
  • 1999-02-10 Talking Points: CIA Operations Against Usama bin Ladin 
  • 1999-05-17 Email from Scheuer, your note, UBL ops 
  • 2001-05-03 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attach 
  • 2001-06-25, Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats 
  • 2001-06-30 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Planning High Profile Attacks 
  • 2001-06-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent 
  • 2001-06-30 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief,  Bin Ladin Threats Are Real 
  • 2001-07-02 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues Despite Delay 
  • 2001-07-25 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing 
  • 2001-08-07 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US 
  • 1998-12-04 Memorandum, Usama Bin Laden, From Director CIA 
  • Presidential Daily Brief, Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US 
  • 1997-01-06 Usama bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability 
  • 1997-01-06 Usama bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability  
  • 1992-07-17 Improving Intelligence Warning 
  • 2001-08-23  DCI Update, Terrorist Threat Review, Islamic Extremist Learns To Fly 
  • 12 JUN 20 01 Biographical Information on Usama bin Ladin Associates 
  • 2001-06-24 MBC TV Carries Video Report on Bin Ladin, Followers in Training 
  • 2002-12-06 Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports Facilitates Al Qa'ida Travel 
  • Undated, Bin Ladin Threatening to Attack US Aircraft 
  • 2003-06-20 Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al Qa'ida Train on the Run? 
  • DCI Counterterrorist Center: Attack on the US Cole, Preliminary Findings, 10 November 2000 
  • 2000-10-18 The Threat to US Personnel in Yemen 
  • 1999-04-09  Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively
  • 1999-11-12 DCI UBL Update 
  • 2001-08-12 CIA document, Atta did not travel to Prague 
  • Undated, Planning by Usama Bin Laden to Hijack U.S. Airplane, Successful Circumvention of Security Measures in U.S. Airport
  • 2001-04-12 Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target  
  • 2002-02-27 Identifying Al Qa'ida's Donors and Fundraisers, A Status Report 
  • Undated, Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam -- An Update
  • 1997-08-25 DCI Talking. Points  Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin 
  • 1997-01-08  Memo on OBL Fatwas 
  • 1997-06-17 UBL financial support to Gamaat Islamiyya and others 
  • 1998-12-24 Timeframe for hijacking operation 
  • 1999-01-08 Hijacking Operation 
  • Undated, Sudanese [redacted] ties to Gamaat Islamiyya 
  • Undated, UBL funding of Gamaat Islamiyya 
  • 1998-12-04  Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks
  • 1998-09-22 Incorporation of Ayman Al Zawahiri's Al Jihad into UBL's Al Qa'ida 
  • Undated, Terrorism: Extremists planning attacks against US interests in Pakistan 
  • 2001-03-27 Afghanistan: An Incubator for International  Terrorism
  • 2002-11-14 Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations 

CIA 9/11 Binder 2:
  • 2001-07-03  DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review
  • 2001-02-06 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing 
  • 2004-03-11 Name Variants and Aliases of 11 September Hijackers and Associates 
  • 2000-06-30 Intelligence Community Threat Advisory: Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks 
  • 2001-03-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Afghanistan: Taliban Holding Firm on Bin Ladin For Now 
  • 2001-05-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Terroristr Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plan 
  • 2001-05-24 Call-In Threat Of High- Explosive Attack
  • 1996-12-17 Africa Division Recommendations Regarding Sudan 
  • 1999-09-06 UAE Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin's Finances 
  • 1999-03-16 Iraqi Delegation  Meets with Bin Ladin 
  • 1997-07-14 Activities of Bin Ladin's in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India 
  • 2003-07-02 Bin Ladin Finances 
  • 1997-02-13 Al Qaeda Links to Hosni Mubarak Assassination Attempt 
  • 1997-08-11 Al Qaeda Plan to Establish Anti-Saddam Hussein Unit 
  • 1997-01-31 COOPERATION AMONG USAMA BIN LADIN' S ISLAMIC ARMY, IRAN, AND THE NIF (Sudan) 
  • 1997-01-31 TERRORISM: ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT  AMONG USAMA BIN LADIN, IRAN, AND THE NIF
  • 1997-03-18 UBL's Attempts to Obtain Uranium  
  • 1997-04-30 USAMA BIN LADIN'S ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA AND SUDANESE NI F SUPPORT
  • 1997-03-05 USAMA BIN LADIN' S LINKS TO A SOUTHERN YEMENI  GROUP
  • 1997-01-08 Regarding 1992 UBL Fatwa 
  • 1996-12-19 RESPONSIBILITIES AND BACKGROUND OF ISLAMIC ARMY SHURA COUNCIL MEMBERS 
  • 2003-03-10 Al Qa'ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths 
  • 1996-11-26 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY,  AND BIN LADIN'S MOVE FROM AFGHANISTAN TO SUDAN 
  • 1997-04-18 USAMA BIN LA DIN'S HISTORICAL LINKS TO 'ABDALLAH AZZAM
  • 2000-11-02 Bin Ladin's Terrorist  Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable 
  • 1999-07-29  Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities
  • 2001-07-06 Expanding Links Between Alien Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the United States 
  • 1999-12-11 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin to Exploit Looser Security During Holidays 
  • Afghanistan: Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Ladin
  • Terrorist Threat to US Interests in Caucasus 
  • 2001-08-24  TERRORISM: SANITIZED VERSION OF THREAT REPORT
  • 2000-07-14  DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat  
  • 2000-07-07 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat  
  • 2000-05-22 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Update 
  • 2000-04 -05 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Update
  • 2000-03-06 EXDIR Update: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat 
  • 2000-04-03 Islamic Extremist Update 
  • 2000-02-18 DCI Update: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat 
  • 2000-01-07 Update:  Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat
  • 1999-12-16 DCI Briefing Millennium Threat 
  • DCI Document Request No. 16, Item No. 1: Production of the [redacted] Usama Bin Ladin  Situation Reports
  • 1999-10-28  DDCI UBL Update
  • 1999-08-03 UBL Update 
  • 2002-08-07 Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes To Keep  al-Qa'ida Functioning
  • 1997-01-27 UBL Fatwas 
  • 1996-12-18 Structure of UBL's Islamic Army 
  • 1996-12-19 TERRORISM: ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY'S MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND POLITICAL AND SHARIA COMMITTEE; PROCESS OF APPROVING TERRORIST OPERATIONS
  • 1999-01-27 How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network 
  • 2003-12-10 Letter to Douglas Feith from Stanley Moskowitz, Director of Congressional Affairs, re: Corrections to Iraq-AQ claims 
  • 1999-04-05 Targeting Study of US Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya 
  • 1995-12 Sketch of a South Asia-Based Terrorist Training and Logistic Network
  • RESPONSE TO DCI DOCUMENT REQUEST NUMBER 52, ITEM 2 (9/11 Commission) 
  • 2001:  Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution
  • 1994-10 OIG Inspection Report: The Agency's Counterterrorism Effort 


Check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

RECENT WORK

  • Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam
  • New America Foundation Panel: Infiltration and surveillance
  • New America Foundation report: PATCON, a case study on infiltration

  • FOREIGN POLICY
  • Exclusive: Why American jihadist Omar Hammami fears Al Shabab will kill him
  • Patriot Games: FBI Undercover Operations And Timothy McVeigh
  • A Nation of Spies and Snitches
  • The Boy Who Cried Lone Wolf
  • Al Qaeda's Merger: 40 New Americans
  • Monsters and Children: Politics And How We Talk About Muslims
  • Anwar Awlaki: Gone But Not Forgotten
  • The Myth of Anwar Awlaki
  • Did You Hear The One About U.S. Internment Camps? 
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    Thursday, September 8, 2011
     

    Well, Is Al Qaeda Winning Or Not?

    Some of my favorite thinkers have diametrically opposing pieces in The Atlantic today. Will McCants and William Rosenau write about How We Won the War on Terror, while Daveed Gartenstein-Ross writes that Al Qaeda is Winning.

    Followers of my work will know that I reviewed and agreed with the thesis put forward by Gartenstein-Ross in his new book, Bin Laden's Legacy.

    However McCants is a powerhouse in this field, and the piece he and Rosenau put forward makes some very valid points, arriving at a completely different conclusion but ultimately making some of the same policy prescriptions as Gartenstein-Ross.

    While there are many reasons I agree with Gartenstein-Ross' thesis, I want to talk briefly about an issue that neither column raises, but which I think is chiefly responsible for Al Qaeda's failure to mount a successful mass casualty attack since 9/11.

    For more than a decade prior to September 11, Al Qaeda and its close allies ran a series of mass production terrorist training camps in the AfPak region. The U.S. invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, along with substantial pressure on Pakistan, has crippled that training camp network.

    Although the camps have not been totally eliminated, they have been massively disrupted. In the past, the camps could and did process hundreds of recruits at any given time, providing religious indoctrination, basic military training and advanced military training. The training could take place over the course of months or years, and there were relatively few obstacles to traveling to the camps.

    Such camps still exist, but they're no longer centralized. They are harder to reach, and the courses they offer are less thorough and much more rushed.

    When we talk about Al Qaeda winning or losing, we have to account for the fact we are fighting a war of containment rather than clear victory. The continued pressure we are exerting over the training camp network is largely responsible for Al Qaeda's inability to carry out mass casualty attacks or to train loosely affiliated comrades to do the same.

    Since 9/11, we have seen foiled attacks and we have seen failed attacks. On the latter front, from Times Square to the underwear bomber to the lone wolves, lack of training is an overwhelming theme. Training camps still exist, but they are smaller and less secure, with fewer experienced personnel. The training regimen is rushed, candidates enter and are turned around very quickly for attacks without the months or years of advanced training and religious indoctrination seen in the past.

    If Faisal Shahzad or Omar Abdulmutallab had been thoroughly and competently trained, their attacks could easily have succeeded, and we'd be having a very different conversation today.

    Without fully operational mass-production training camps, there would not have been a World Trade Center bombing in 1993, there would not have been the East African embassy bombings in 1998, and there would not have been a September 11.

    Unfortunately, there are two reasons why we can't declare victory on this issue.

    First, it is obvious to everyone that we can't stay in Afghanistan forever. Our success in the AfPak region, such as it is, is based on a strategy of constant pressure.

    In the absence of that pressure, and under any foreseeable (to me) scenario involving a weak Afghan government and an ambivalent Pakistani military-intelligence apparatus, I see very little reason to think that Al Qaeda's camps won't regenerate once we leave the region. We have the tool of drones today, which we didn't have before, but it's not a magic wand that can operate forever without restraints, especially in the absence of local support.

    Second, Al Qaeda now has growing opportunities to train operatives in other places, most notably Somalia and Yemen, and future prospects in Iraq and various points around Africa. Those operations are still small relative to their AfPak predecessors, but they appear to be growing.

    We have drone operations in some of these locations, but as noted above, I'm not convinced they can be as effective over a long haul as our substantial military presence in the AfPak theater.

    Despite coming at it from different angles, McCants and Gartenstein-Ross -- and a growing chorus of other experts -- all agree that we need to scale back our military and security outlay for reasons both financial and sociological, and I agree with that as well.

    But we need to accept that such cutbacks will likely enhance Al Qaeda's prospects for successful attacks in the medium-term future. That enhancement, combined with the wild political uncertainties of the Arab Spring, make it hard for me to be optimistic that we have won -- or can be said to be winning -- our war with Al Qaeda in the foreseeable future.

    A final note of caution: The complex attack carried out in Norway by Anders Breivik is likely to inspire imitators. Breivik did something that no one else has -- he showed that a single person can carry out a spectacular terrorist attack, and he provided a detailed account of how he accomplished the task. This could be a game-changer even in the absence of a robust training network, but if and when the network regenerates, the new breed of instructors will most certainly be studying Breivik's tactics (as will other, non-AQ actors).

    The war against al Qaeda is most certainly changing, but I'm hard pressed to see how that change puts us in the position of winning or having won. It's arguably an overstatement to say Al Qaeda is winning, per se, but it is successfully executing a large part of the "bleed-to-bankruptcy" strategy it has delineated in its statements. The Arab Spring, the death of bin Laden and other factors may well help us, but we are a long way from seeing the ultimate impact of those events.

    For more about al Qaeda training camps and the terror network's American recruits, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

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    Saturday, September 3, 2011
     

    Documents Seen In Secrets of 9/11 And More

    A few notes on recent developments:

    INTELWIRE has created a new site to host documents related to September 11, as seen on Fox News Reporting: Secrets of 9/11, which aired this weekend in updated form.

    Click here to visit Unlocking911.com

    This week, I wrote a review of the new book Review: Bin Laden's Legacy: Why We're Still Losing the War on Terror by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross. I highly recommend this important book, and you can buy it here.

    Daveed and I also recorded a new entry for the popular online show, Bloggingheads, which should appear in the coming week. We discuss his book, my book, terrorism in the 10 years since 9/11 and the Arab Spring. I will post again once it's live.

    I'll be appearing on Al Hurra television this week (Arabic-language only) including on September 10 and 11 to discuss America and the state of Al Qaeda since the attacks.

    And look for a major piece early this week, "The People Vs. Anwar Awlaki: In the Matter of September 11." I will post the link once it becomes available.

    All the latest from J.M. Berger:

  • Interview with Online Jihadist Abu Suleiman
  • Slideshow: Is Al Qaeda's Inspire Uninspired?
  • Analysis: White House PVE strategy light on new ideas
  • A Way Forward for CVE: The Five Ds
  • How Terrorists Use The Internet: Just Like You
  • Hyping the Terrorist Internet
  • The Atlantic: Why Johnny Jihad Doesn't Listen
  • Inspire Issue Six: Martyrs and Mixed Messages
  • FBI Spied on ABC News, McVeigh Defense Team in OKC Probe

    For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

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    BOOKS

    "...smart, granular analysis..."

    ISIS: The State of Terror
    "Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger's new book, "ISIS," should be required reading for every politician and policymaker... Their smart, granular analysis is a bracing antidote to both facile dismissals and wild exaggerations... a nuanced and readable account of the ideological and organizational origins of the group." -- Washington Post

    More on ISIS: The State of Terror

    "...a timely warning..."

    Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam:
    "At a time when some politicians and pundits blur the line between Islam and terrorism, Berger, who knows this subject far better than the demagogues, sharply cautions against vilifying Muslim Americans. ... It is a timely warning from an expert who has not lost his perspective." -- New York Times

    More on Jihad Joe

    ABOUT

    INTELWIRE is a web site edited by J.M. Berger. a researcher, analyst and consultant covering extremism, with a special focus on extremist activities in the U.S. and extremist use of social media. He is a non-resident fellow with the Brookings Institution, Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, and author of the critically acclaimed Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, the only definitive history of the U.S. jihadist movement, and co-author of ISIS: The State of Terror with Jessica Stern.

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