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News, documents and analysis on violent extremismThursday, May 31, 2012
Exclusive: CIA Documents on 9/11The CIA has released nearly 800 pages of newly declassified documents on Al Qaeda and the September 11 attacks.The documents were released in response to an INTELWIRE Freedom of Information Act request for material referenced by the 9/11 Commission. Numerous documents were withheld, and those that were released have been heavily redacted. Despite this, it is highly unusual to receive any material from the CIA in response to a FOIA request, and they provide a fascinating look at the state of the agency's understanding of Al Qaeda over the years. While much of the material has been previously described, by the 9/11 Commission and other sources, seeing the actual documents still has an impact. For instance, the following extracts:   The documents are presented here in two large PDFs. Each individual document is bookmarked within the PDF. Almost everything in the release was previously classified secret or top secret. The CIA also released several items already available on its Web site or in public testimony, which I omitted. The documents are presented here in no particular order but I grouped material near the top related to warnings about the activities of Khalid Al Mihdhar, one of the hijackers, and material related to 1998 efforts to capture or kill Osama bin Laden together in roughly chronological order. You are welcome to report from these documents, but you must credit Intelwire.com. If you wish to break out a specific document for a major media outlet, contact me. Smaller outlets, please feel free to grab excerpts using screencaps, but kindly remember to add the credit. CIA 9/11 Binder 1:
CIA 9/11 Binder 2:
Check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. RECENT WORK Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Al-Qaeda, CIA, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, Hijackers, Osama-Bin-Laden, September-11 Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Saturday, September 3, 2011
Documents Seen In Secrets of 9/11 And MoreA few notes on recent developments:INTELWIRE has created a new site to host documents related to September 11, as seen on Fox News Reporting: Secrets of 9/11, which aired this weekend in updated form. Click here to visit Unlocking911.com This week, I wrote a review of the new book Review: Bin Laden's Legacy: Why We're Still Losing the War on Terror by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross. I highly recommend this important book, and you can buy it here. Daveed and I also recorded a new entry for the popular online show, Bloggingheads, which should appear in the coming week. We discuss his book, my book, terrorism in the 10 years since 9/11 and the Arab Spring. I will post again once it's live. I'll be appearing on Al Hurra television this week (Arabic-language only) including on September 10 and 11 to discuss America and the state of Al Qaeda since the attacks. And look for a major piece early this week, "The People Vs. Anwar Awlaki: In the Matter of September 11." I will post the link once it becomes available. All the latest from J.M. Berger: For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Awlaki, September-11 Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Monday, August 15, 2011
9/11 Commission Memorandum on Relations with the TalibanThe 9/11 Commission interviewed Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department analyst on Afghanistan and Pakistan, about the evolving understanding of the Taliban from their rise in the mid-1990s through September 11.9/11 Commission Memorandum on Relations with the Taliban Labels: 9-11-Commission, State-Department, Taliban Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Saturday, August 13, 2011
9/11 Commission Interview With Omar Al-BayoumiThe 9/11 Commission interviewed Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi who had contact with Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al Mihdhar in San Diego. Bayoumi was also acquainted with several people who helped the hijackers and with Anwar Awlaki.9/11 Commission Memorandum for the Record, Omar Al-Bayoumi Labels: 9-11-Commission, Anwar-Awlaki, Bayoumi, Fahad-Al-Thumairy, Hashim-Al-Attas, Isamu-Dyson, Khalid-Al-Mihdhar, Mohdar-Abdullah, Nawaf-Al-Hazmi, Osama-Basnan Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Saturday, June 4, 2011
Secrets of 9/11: Watch In HD NowThe Fox News Reporting special "Secrets of 9/11" can now be viewed in HD its entirety courtesy of Hulu.com. The program explores several unanswered questions concerning the September 11 attacks, including the role of Anwar Alwaki in assisting the hijackers. I am featured in the program discussing some of the research behind my new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam, the first comprehensive look at the phenomenon of American jihadists, on sale everywhere.Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Adnan-Shukrijumah, Anwar-Awlaki, Omar-Abdel-Rahman Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Thursday, May 26, 2011
Jihad Joe Roundup: Events, Video, Pictures, Writing And More J.M. Berger, left, takes questions at the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington Univeristy during an event launching his new book, "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam." Frank Cilluffo, right, director of HSPI moderated the session.I was honored to be a guest of the Homeland Security Policy Institute on Tuesday to discuss my new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam, the first comprehensive look at the phenomenon of American jihadists. Everyone was very kind, and many people were generous with their time and help throughout my D.C. visit. I also got to meet some people doing the work of the nation and the work of the media, and the sometimes-grind of trying to learn and teach about terrorism and extremism. I'll have some reflections on various things discussed during the trip in the days to come, but for now I wanted to share a few multimedia items related to the book that might of interest. First off, there's a video posted on HSPI's Web site featuring the 90-minute session. The first half hour is me talking, the last hour is a great question-and-answer session I really enjoyed. I want to particularly thank Frank Cilluffo, the head of HSPI, for both the opportunity and his kind words about the book. The Huffington Post ran a a slideshow of America's Most Wanted Jihadists featured in "Jihad Joe." I had an opinion column at on the increasing use of guns by terrorists. Sadly, I think this is a problem that we'll be hearing a lot more about in the months to come.  I appeared May 20 on the Fox News Reporting special "Secrets of 9/11" to discuss the role of Anwar Awlaki in the September 11 attacks. You can find even more revelations about Americans who helped the 9/11 hijackers and Anwar Awlaki's role in Jihad Joe. "Jihad Joe" also reveals the existence of other American support networks for September 11, including infrastructure created by Ali Mohamed, an American citizen and Al Qaeda spy who infiltrated the U.S. Army and played games with the CIA and FBI. Thanks to everyone who worked on the project for including me, and thanks to everyone who had a good word for my appearance. If they make it available on Hulu, I will link it from the blog. Click here to see the INTELWIRE exclusive documents featured on the show Another INTELWIRE exclusive story of note on Awlaki: U.S. Gave Millions To Charity Linked To Al Qaeda, Anwar Awlaki An excerpt from "Jihad Joe" dealing with Awlaki: Anwar Awlaki is NOT the next Osama bin Laden Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, J-M-Berger, Jihad-Joe Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Friday, May 20, 2011
Video Preview of 'Fox News Reporting: Secrets of 9/11'You'll find me here... Check out the story, as well as the program at 10 p.m. ET on Fox News Channel. For a whole lot more about Anwar Awlaki's links to the September 11 attacks, read my new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, available now in bookstores everywhere, on Amazon.com and many other online booksellers.After the program, come back to news.intelwire.com to see the original documents featured during the show. Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, J-M-Berger, Jihad-Joe Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Thursday, May 19, 2011
American Terrorist Anwar Awlaki's Role Examined In 'Secrets of 9/11'You can see me talking about Anwar Awlaki's role in 9/11 and my new book "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam" in the Fox News Reporting special "Secrets of 9/11," Friday at 10p ET, hosted by Bill Hemmer.I'm in the teaser at 1:05. And just in case this begs the question, I did not tell them Awlaki was the new Osama bin Laden. For a whole lot more about Anwar Awlaki's links to the September 11 attacks, read my new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, available now in bookstores everywhere, on Amazon.com and many other online booksellers. Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, J-M-Berger, Jihad-Joe Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Monday, April 4, 2011
USA v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed et al.: The Trial That Might Have BeenThe Justice Department announced today that it will drop plans to hold civilian trials Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and others accused in the September 11 attacks, instead of trying them before a military commission at Guantanamo Bay.The debate over which approach is best has been dominated by a steaming pile of nothing. While both the criminal and military approaches have their merits and disadvantages, the political conversation in this country consists of "You don't think we're at war!" vs. "Yes, we do, but..." This conversation is almost entirely emotional in basis and profoundly lacking in substance. I've written before about my view on this issue, and it's a utilitarian view. The U.S. public is better served by a criminal trial. Contrary to popular belief, holding a trial isn't *just* about protecting the rights of the defendants. It's also about making government transparent to the people, an issue President Obama has talked about but largely failed to deliver. Specifically, in this case, a criminal trial serves the purpose of educating the public about terrorism and the adequacy of the government's response. If it had not been for USA v. Usama bin Laden, the criminal trial prosecuting the 1998 East African embassy bombings, Americans would have known precious little about Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001. USA v. Usama bin Laden et al. was then and remains today the single most important publicly accessible primary source on terrorism for the 21st century. The rules of court and the push-pull between defense and prosecution provide a rigorous vetting of the data entered into the record. That doesn't mean all the data is perfect, but its weaknesses are on display for all to see. USA v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed et al. would have created the definitive public record of the September 11 attacks, almost certainly eclipsing the 9/11 Commission Report. The loss of that information is an incalculable loss to the American public. Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Al-Qaeda, Khalid-Shaikh-Mohammed, Osama-Bin-Laden Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Thursday, February 3, 2011
Mapping Awlaki's 9/11 Social Network A map of Anwar Awlaki's social network prior to September 11. Click for full-size image. Following up on yesterday's post looking at Anwar Awlaki's movements relative to newly revealed 9/11 suspects, I wanted to briefly discuss Awlaki's relationship to the previously known 9/11 hijackers. The social network map above may be helpful in understanding these relationships. For a map of Awlaki's current social network, click here. When the 9/11 Commission Report came out, a lot of attention focused on Omar Al Bayoumi, an apparent Saudi government agent, who met two of the hijackers -- Khalid Al Mihdhar and Nawaf Al Hazmi -- in Los Angeles, then helped them get an apartment. Several of Bayoumi's associates helped with English lessons and logistical needs while they were there. What I discovered in FBI source documents, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, and in the National Archives collection of internal Commission documents, was that Bayoumi's associates, and Bayoumi himself, were all also connected to Anwar Awlaki and in most cases considered themselves to be his followers. Furthermore, Eyad Rababah, a follower of Awlaki on the East Coast with no connection to Bayoumi, gave the same kind of assistance to some of the same hijackers, including at least Al Mihdhar and Hani Hanjour. Beyond these considerations, Bayoumi was not known to be connected to Al Qaeda, and his connection to the Saudi government was nebulous. In contrast, Awalki had contact with a number of Al Qaeda-linked figures and Al Qaeda members. According to 9/11 documents obtained by INTELWIRE, Awlaki was connected to Ziyad Khalil, an Al Qaeda facilitator who helped purchase satellite phones for Osama bin Laden during the 1990s. Awlaki described Abdul Majid Zindani, a close associate of bin Laden, as one of his mentors. Prior to September 11, Awlaki also worked for a charity founded by Zindani. Finally, the phone number of Awlaki's Dar Al Hijrah mosque in Virginia was found among the belongings of Ramzi Binalshibh, an Al Qaeda facilitator who helped arrange logistical assistance for some of the hijackers who were not being helped by Awlaki. According to 9/11 documents, Awlaki, Al-Mihdhar and Binalshibh may all have been in Yemen during the same period of summer 2000. In sum, while the case for Awlaki's role in 9/11 remains frustratingly circumstantial, it is far stronger than the case for Bayoumi. For more on Awlaki and his possible role in September 11, pre-order J.M. Berger's new book "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam," the first comprehensive look at the phenomenon of American jihadists from the 1970s to the present. Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Abdul-Majid-Zindani, Anwar-Awlaki, Jihad-Joe, Khalid-Al-Mihdhar, Nawaf-Al-Hazmi Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Wednesday, February 2, 2011
New 9/11 Suspects In California, New Questions About Awlaki's RoleNew questions about the role of Yemeni-American cleric Anwar Awlaki in the September 11 attacks have emerged in the wake of a Wikileaks cable naming previously unknown Al Qaeda operatives who may have been intended as a fifth team of hijackers.According to the cable, first reported by The Telegraph newspaper, Meshal Alhajri, Fahad Abdulla and Ali Alfehaid were Qatari citizens who flew into New York on Aug. 15, 2001. According to the cable, "They visited the World Trade Centre, the Statue of Liberty, the White House and various areas in Virginia." The men flew to Los Angeles, where their behavior aroused suspicions. On Sept. 10, 2001, they booked seats on American Airlines Flight 144, bound for Washington. The plane used in that flight was designated American Flight 77 the next day, when it was hijacked and crashed into the Pentagon. But instead of boarding the flight, they booked another trip to Doha, Qatar, leaving the country before the attack. Two of the hijackers on Flight 77, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar had a close relationship with Anwar Awlaki, a Yemeni-American cleric who is today affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As many as two other hijackers may have met with Awalki in Virginia. Awlaki has long been suspected of playing a role in the September 11 hijacking. Several of his disciples in San Diego and Virginia assisted the hijackers with rides, lodging and in obtaining IDs, as detailed in my forthcoming book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam. An FBI agent interviewed by the 9/11 Commission said "if anyone had knowledge of the plot, it was Awlaki." Although suspicion has long focused on Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi government facilitator who initially met Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar in Los Angeles, virtually everyone who helped the hijackers -- including Bayoumi himself -- was also linked to Awlaki. And at least one disciple of Awlaki's on the East Coast, who did not know Bayoumi, also assisted some of the hijackers. According to the Wikileaks cable, the Qatari suspects were assisted by Mohamed Ali Mohamed Mansoori, "who is [as of February 2010] under investigation by the FBI for his possible involvement in the 11 September 2001 attacks. He is suspected of aiding people who entered the US before the attacks to conduct surveillance of possible targets and providing other support to the hijackers." Mansoori was a resident of Los Angeles and Irvine, California, through at least 2001. Awlaki was in Virginia around the time the Qataris visited the state, and he was in Southern California when the Qataris were there, just prior to September 11. Awlaki told a reporter for the Copley News Service in 2001 that he had attended an event in Irvine, California, just days before September 11. Irvine is about 40 miles from Los Angeles, where the Qataris were staying, but more than 80 miles from San Diego, where Awlaki caught his flight to Washington. The event Awlaki attended was a September 9, 2001, benefit dinner for Jamil Al-Amin, at the Muslim Students Union of the University of California, Irvine. Also attending the event were Muzammil Siddiqi, then-President of ISNA, who worked for the Muslim World League during the 1970s. Both Siddiqui and Awlaki had lectured in separate panels at ISNA's national convention near Chicago just days earlier (click for video). Also attending the benefit was Maher Hathout, founder of the Muslim Public Affairs Council. Jamil Al-Amin is an American Muslim activist convicted in 2002 of killing a police officer. Just after the Qataris left the country, Awlaki flew from San Diego to Washington, arriving at Reagan International Airport on the morning of September 11, shortly after the hijackers he had assisted departed from Dulles on their suicide mission. [Joe Cantlupe and Dana Wilkie, "Former San Diego Islamic spiritual leader defends mosque," Copley News Service, Sept. 28, 2001] Awlaki was also reportedly in Yemen during the summer of 2000, around the same time as hijacker Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Al Qaeda facilitator Ramzi Al Binalshibh, who assisted a group of hijackers not believed to be connected to Awlaki. More INTELWIRE Exclusive Documents On Awlaki The Commission was informed about the Qatari suspects, but former commission director Philip Zelikow told the New York Daily News that the lead "had not panned out." Families of the 9/11 victims expressed outrage to the Daily News today about the withholding of this information from the public. Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, Wikileaks Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Saturday, June 27, 2009
9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews9/11 Commission interview with Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State, and Jamie Borek, Assistant Legal Counsel, Department of State. Discussion of improvements, and areas in need of improvement, related to the State Department's handling of intelligence in the wake of September 11. Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, State-Department Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews9/11 Commission interview with Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State, and Jamie Borek, Assistant Legal Counsel, Department of State. Discussion of improvements, and areas in need of improvement, related to the State Department's handling of intelligence in the wake of September 11. Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, State-Department Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 9/12/2003, CIA BudgetMemorandum for the Record, 9/11 Commission, 9/12/2003: CIA InterviewsThis is a tough examination of the effect of politically mandated budget cuts on the CIA prior to September 11. Subjects interviewed were Pat Hanback of the CIA's Inspector General Office and another subject whose name has been redacted. Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Budget, CIA, Counterterrorism, INTELFILES Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 9/12/2003, CIA BudgetMemorandum for the Record, 9/11 Commission, 9/12/2003: CIA InterviewsThis is a tough examination of the effect of politically mandated budget cuts on the CIA prior to September 11. Subjects interviewed were Pat Hanback of the CIA's Inspector General Office and another subject whose name has been redacted. Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Budget, CIA, Counterterrorism, INTELFILES Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Tuesday, May 12, 2009
9/11 Commission Memoranda on Extremism in PakistanIn light of recent developments in Pakistan, it's useful and interesting to take a look at some of the interviews conducted in Pakistan by the 9/11 Commission, which spoke with State Department hands, Pakistani officials at various levels and local journalists.What immediately grabs you about these accounts is the breathtaking state of denial among Pakistani officials. One wonders what they think now. 10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Retired Lt. Gen. Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province "[T]he Governor strongly disputed the coalition perception of the situation. He flatly stated that terrorist groups could not have a base in the NWFP; it was 'impossible.' Madrassas were in cities, not the countryside. Weapons would have to be used for training, making noise that would give them away. That would be reported. Most of the population was not with the jihadis. These people were probably being harbored in Afghanistan." 10/26/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with U.S. State Department Country Team, Islamabad "Asked what the current government wants to accomplish, beyond the defense and foreign policy sphere, emphasis was placed on economic stability, controlling corruption, sustaining some kind of democratic transition, and developing moderate Islam." 10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Ashraf Naser, Chief Secretary of Balochistan "We told him that we had concerns about Balochistan, that many informed officials in both Afghanistan and Pakistan had told us that it is unsafe, insecure and that extremists are gaining the upper hand there. Naser disagreed vehemently with this characterization. 'Why don't you come to Quetta with me? He invited. Foreign journalists roam freely there. I don't see a problem.' [...] "Naser said that the U.S. had more or less brought the 9/11 attacks on itself. You left Afghanistan unattended, we told you that was a mistake. We knew what was happening there. But the Pakistanis could not control the Taliban in Afghanistan. "He asserted that the recent sectarian killings in Balochistan were part of an Afghan plot to destabilize the region. The suicide bombers were part of Taliban groups trained in Afghanistan, he said. These suicide bombers were Baloch from south of Quetta, they were trained by Indians in Afghanistan. 'The Northern Alliance is openly contemptuous of us.'" 10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Secretary Tasneem Noorani, Pakistani Ministry of Interior "He indicated that he and the entire Ministry were in shock by the 9-11 attacks and were struck by the scale and scope of the attacks. They couldn't image that the attacks could be connected with Pakistan. The initial reaction was a total blank. They didn't know how to react. "Only after the US began discussing Usama bin Laden did the Ministry become aware of UBL and that the region, Pakistan and Afghanistan, was somehow involved. UBL was not known in Pakistan. He is an eccentric Saudi and was not understood by most people. [...] "The Secretary seemed completely surprised by evidence that KSM had been active in Karachi and that he celebrated the 9-11 attacks in there and was actually interviewed by a journalist in Karachi about the attack. This information was a surprise to the Secretary. He asked for proof. He didn't believe any accounts of journalists in this regard." The U.S. consul in Karachi didn't fare much better before the Commission's questioning. 10/20/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Douglas C. Rohn, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Karachi "The Consul did not have a very informed understanding of the type and sophistication of the threat in Karachi or the region. He had no estimate of the al Qai' da presence, though he recognized that they have long operated in the region. His insights into the terrorist threat, from his few months on the job, were very basic and didn't provide any new information ... 'we've been attacked here in Karachi, the bad guys are out there, I'm trying to keep American safe.'" It wasn't all bad, however. There were a few people who seemed to know what they were talking about. 10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Arlene Ferrill, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Peshawar "CG Ferrill commented on the NWFP government that arose out of the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2002. Eveyone had been surprised, including the victors, by the success of the six-party Islamic coalition, led by the JI (Qazi Hussain Ahmed) and JUI(Fezlur Rahman), Their rhetorical agenda calls for restoration of Sharia law and stresses anti-American themes. [Comment: An Islamic coalition also won power at the same time in Balochistan.] The popular climate in the NWFP is anti-American. In that sense, not much has changed in Peshawar since 9111. Though openly wearing guns has stopped in Peshawar, it continues in the tribal areas - as does the availability of a wide variety of arms in nearby bazaars." 10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with journalist Ahmed Rashid "[Prior to 9/11], the US had a policy on terrorism, focused only on what they wanted with Bin Laden. But the Americans did not present Pakistan, then under sanctions, either with carrots or with sticks. Clinton had snubbed Pakistan with the way he had handled his visit, favoring India, in March 2000. To present carrots and/or sticks would have required a real geopolitical strategy toward Pakistan, not just toward terrorism." Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, MFR, Pakistan, State-Department Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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9/11 Commission Memoranda on Extremism in PakistanIn light of recent developments in Pakistan, it's useful and interesting to take a look at some of the interviews conducted in Pakistan by the 9/11 Commission, which spoke with State Department hands, Pakistani officials at various levels and local journalists.What immediately grabs you about these accounts is the breathtaking state of denial among Pakistani officials. One wonders what they think now. 10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Retired Lt. Gen. Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province "[T]he Governor strongly disputed the coalition perception of the situation. He flatly stated that terrorist groups could not have a base in the NWFP; it was 'impossible.' Madrassas were in cities, not the countryside. Weapons would have to be used for training, making noise that would give them away. That would be reported. Most of the population was not with the jihadis. These people were probably being harbored in Afghanistan." 10/26/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with U.S. State Department Country Team, Islamabad "Asked what the current government wants to accomplish, beyond the defense and foreign policy sphere, emphasis was placed on economic stability, controlling corruption, sustaining some kind of democratic transition, and developing moderate Islam." 10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Ashraf Naser, Chief Secretary of Balochistan "We told him that we had concerns about Balochistan, that many informed officials in both Afghanistan and Pakistan had told us that it is unsafe, insecure and that extremists are gaining the upper hand there. Naser disagreed vehemently with this characterization. 'Why don't you come to Quetta with me? He invited. Foreign journalists roam freely there. I don't see a problem.' [...] "Naser said that the U.S. had more or less brought the 9/11 attacks on itself. You left Afghanistan unattended, we told you that was a mistake. We knew what was happening there. But the Pakistanis could not control the Taliban in Afghanistan. "He asserted that the recent sectarian killings in Balochistan were part of an Afghan plot to destabilize the region. The suicide bombers were part of Taliban groups trained in Afghanistan, he said. These suicide bombers were Baloch from south of Quetta, they were trained by Indians in Afghanistan. 'The Northern Alliance is openly contemptuous of us.'" 10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Secretary Tasneem Noorani, Pakistani Ministry of Interior "He indicated that he and the entire Ministry were in shock by the 9-11 attacks and were struck by the scale and scope of the attacks. They couldn't image that the attacks could be connected with Pakistan. The initial reaction was a total blank. They didn't know how to react. "Only after the US began discussing Usama bin Laden did the Ministry become aware of UBL and that the region, Pakistan and Afghanistan, was somehow involved. UBL was not known in Pakistan. He is an eccentric Saudi and was not understood by most people. [...] "The Secretary seemed completely surprised by evidence that KSM had been active in Karachi and that he celebrated the 9-11 attacks in there and was actually interviewed by a journalist in Karachi about the attack. This information was a surprise to the Secretary. He asked for proof. He didn't believe any accounts of journalists in this regard." The U.S. consul in Karachi didn't fare much better before the Commission's questioning. 10/20/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Douglas C. Rohn, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Karachi "The Consul did not have a very informed understanding of the type and sophistication of the threat in Karachi or the region. He had no estimate of the al Qai' da presence, though he recognized that they have long operated in the region. His insights into the terrorist threat, from his few months on the job, were very basic and didn't provide any new information ... 'we've been attacked here in Karachi, the bad guys are out there, I'm trying to keep American safe.'" It wasn't all bad, however. There were a few people who seemed to know what they were talking about. 10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Arlene Ferrill, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Peshawar "CG Ferrill commented on the NWFP government that arose out of the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2002. Eveyone had been surprised, including the victors, by the success of the six-party Islamic coalition, led by the JI (Qazi Hussain Ahmed) and JUI(Fezlur Rahman), Their rhetorical agenda calls for restoration of Sharia law and stresses anti-American themes. [Comment: An Islamic coalition also won power at the same time in Balochistan.] The popular climate in the NWFP is anti-American. In that sense, not much has changed in Peshawar since 9111. Though openly wearing guns has stopped in Peshawar, it continues in the tribal areas - as does the availability of a wide variety of arms in nearby bazaars." 10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with journalist Ahmed Rashid "[Prior to 9/11], the US had a policy on terrorism, focused only on what they wanted with Bin Laden. But the Americans did not present Pakistan, then under sanctions, either with carrots or with sticks. Clinton had snubbed Pakistan with the way he had handled his visit, favoring India, in March 2000. To present carrots and/or sticks would have required a real geopolitical strategy toward Pakistan, not just toward terrorism." Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, MFR, Pakistan, State-Department Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Sunday, April 26, 2009
9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, Jan. 1, 2004 to End of FOIA ResponseA note to readers: This is the last batch of chronological documents provided by the FBI to the 9/11 Commission and referenced in footnotes to that report.There are a handful of major reports left to post, representing some of the FBI's deepest analytical works regarding the September 11 attacks. Those reports will be posted over the next several weeks. A substantial amount of additional 9/11 materials are available and will continue to be posted here, as well as a variety of declassified government documents on various topics of intererst, including crime and law enforcement, national security, intelligence, war on terror, and more. 01/04/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Lotfi Raissi 01/04/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Lotfi Raissi Raissi was an Algerian national who lived in Phoenix and attended flight school shortly after Hani Hanjour, one of the 9/11 hijackers. This 22-page document contains a substantial amount of information the FBI collected on Raissi, including alleged links to Hanjour and previous investigations in several countries. The document also contains information about Hanjour's flight training and additional unknown individuals who took flight training at the same time. 02/09/2004: FBI/DS Deployment to Sierra Leone 02/09/2004: FBI/DS Deployment to Sierra Leone 02/09/2004: FBI/DS Deployment to Sierra Leone Details of an FBI investigative trip to Sierra Leone. The reasons for the trip are related to the investigation of conflict diamonds to finance al Qaeda. 03/25/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Louise Sweeney (9/11 Families) 04/07/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Fuad Omar Bazarah 04/07/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Fuad Omar Bazarah 05/17/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah 05/18/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah 05/18/2004: FBI Summary, Interview of Charles Sabah Toma (re: Modhar Mohamed Abdullah) 06/09/2004: FBI, Information in Preparation for Interview of Yazeed Saad Atif Al-Salmi 06/17/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Yazeed Al Salmi 06/17/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Yazeed Al Salmi 06/17/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Yazeed Al Salmi 07/01/2004: FBI Lead Sheet, Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah The four documents that follow appear to be the same document with wildly different patterns of redaction applied by the FBI. 04/25/2006: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia 04/25/2006: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia Date Unclear: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia Date Unclear: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, FBI, Flight-Schools, Hijackers, INTELFILES, Lotfi-Raissi, Saudi-Arabia Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, Jan. 1, 2004 to End of FOIA ResponseA note to readers: This is the last batch of chronological documents provided by the FBI to the 9/11 Commission and referenced in footnotes to that report.There are a handful of major reports left to post, representing some of the FBI's deepest analytical works regarding the September 11 attacks. Those reports will be posted over the next several weeks. A substantial amount of additional 9/11 materials are available and will continue to be posted here, as well as a variety of declassified government documents on various topics of intererst, including crime and law enforcement, national security, intelligence, war on terror, and more. 01/04/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Lotfi Raissi 01/04/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Lotfi Raissi Raissi was an Algerian national who lived in Phoenix and attended flight school shortly after Hani Hanjour, one of the 9/11 hijackers. This 22-page document contains a substantial amount of information the FBI collected on Raissi, including alleged links to Hanjour and previous investigations in several countries. The document also contains information about Hanjour's flight training and additional unknown individuals who took flight training at the same time. 02/09/2004: FBI/DS Deployment to Sierra Leone 02/09/2004: FBI/DS Deployment to Sierra Leone 02/09/2004: FBI/DS Deployment to Sierra Leone Details of an FBI investigative trip to Sierra Leone. The reasons for the trip are related to the investigation of conflict diamonds to finance al Qaeda. 03/25/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Louise Sweeney (9/11 Families) 04/07/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Fuad Omar Bazarah 04/07/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Fuad Omar Bazarah 05/17/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah 05/18/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah 05/18/2004: FBI Summary, Interview of Charles Sabah Toma (re: Modhar Mohamed Abdullah) 06/09/2004: FBI, Information in Preparation for Interview of Yazeed Saad Atif Al-Salmi 06/17/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Yazeed Al Salmi 06/17/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Yazeed Al Salmi 06/17/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Yazeed Al Salmi 07/01/2004: FBI Lead Sheet, Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah The four documents that follow appear to be the same document with wildly different patterns of redaction applied by the FBI. 04/25/2006: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia 04/25/2006: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia Date Unclear: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia Date Unclear: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, FBI, Flight-Schools, Hijackers, INTELFILES, Lotfi-Raissi, Saudi-Arabia Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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Tuesday, February 17, 2009
9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, Jan. 1, 2003 to Dec. 31, 20031/8/2003: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas1/8/2003: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas (unredacted) 1/16/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Derar Mohammed Saleh 2/4/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Shareef Abdulmuttaleb El-Arbi 2/4/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Shareef Abdulmuttaleb El-Arbi (less redacted) 2/4/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Shareef Abdulmuttaleb El-Arbi (different redactions) 2/2003: FBI Secret Report, "The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model" 3/19/2003: FBI Information Control Document, ADENBOM 3/19/2003: FBI Information Control Document, ADENBOM (second version) 3/19/2003: FBI Information Control Document, Redacted, Refs Hamas, Al Qaeda 4/2/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Abdulaziz Al-Roomi 4/2/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Abdulaziz Al-Roomi (second version) 4/2/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Abdulaziz Al-Roomi (third version) 7/18/2003: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Al Qaeda and Conflict Diamonds 7/18/2003: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Al Qaeda and Conflict Diamonds (version 2) 8/18/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of Interrogation, Interview of Omar Al Bayoumi 9/17/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of Interrogation, Interview of Omar Al Bayoumi 9/17/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of Interrogation, Interview of Omar Al Bayoumi (version 2) 9/22/2003: FBI Information Control Document, Rayed Mohammed Abdullah 10/16/2003: FBI Information Control Document, Hamdan Ghareeb Al-Shalawi 11/14/2003: FBI Chronology of Hijackers' Activities 11/17/2003: FBI Summary of Abdelghani Mzoudi Proceedings 12/4/2003: FBI Transcript of Flight 93 Cockpit Recorder 12/5/2003: FBI Summary of Abdelghani Mzoudi Proceedings 12/5/2003: FBI Summary of Abdelghani Mzoudi Proceedings (2) 12/5/2003: FBI Summary of Abdelghani Mzoudi Proceedings (3) Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, FBI, Hijackers, INTELFILES Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.
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RECENTNewest posts!A Paler Shade of White: In-Group Critique in James... J.M. BERGER DISCUSSES CAPITOL ATTACK ON PBS NEWSHOUR OPTIMAL: J.M. BERGER'S NEW DYSTOPIAN NOVEL J.M. BERGER ON 'FRESH AIR' MAN AND MANIFESTO THE ALT-RIGHT TWITTER CENSUS OUT NOW: 'EXTREMISM' by J.M. BERGER Calling Them Nazis Extremist Construction of Identity INTELWIRE Resources on Right-Wing and Racist Extre... EXCLUSIVESNew York Pipe Bomb Suspect Linked to Revolution Muslim The Utility of Lone Wolves Interview with Online Jihadist Abu Suleiman Al Nasser A Way Forward for CVE: The Five Ds How Terrorists Use The Internet: Just Like You PATCON: The FBI's Secret War on the Militia Movement Interview About Jihad With Controversial Cleric Bilal Philips Forgeries on the Jihadist Forums U.S. Gave Millions To Charity Linked To Al Qaeda, Anwar Awlaki State Department Secretly Met With Followers of Blind Sheikh State Department Put 'Political Pressure' On FBI To Deport Brother-in-Law Of Osama Bin Laden In 1995 FBI Records Reveal Details Of Nixon-Era Racial Profiling Program Targeting Arabs Gaza Flotilla Official Was Foreign Fighter in Bosnia War U.S. Had 'High Confidence' Of UBL Attack In June 2001 Behind the Handshake: The Rumsfeld-Saddam Meeting |
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