9/11 Commission Memorandum on Relations with the Taliban

The 9/11 Commission interviewed Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department analyst on Afghanistan and Pakistan, about the evolving understanding of the Taliban from their rise in the mid-1990s through September 11.

9/11 Commission Memorandum on Relations with the Taliban

Labels: 9-11-Commission, State-Department, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

What Is Al Qaeda, Part 2

Part one
| Part two | Part three

In the first part of the "What is Al Qaeda" survey, we looked at textbook definitions for the kinds of people and organizations that experts consider to included in Al Qaeda. Click here to read the results.

In the second part, we're looking at what specific organizations those same experts consider to be part of the U.S. government's mandate to wage war against Al Qaeda. The answers are, again, interesting, showing a lack of consensus on key groups, and they do not always sync with the definitions identified in the first question. The bar charts below are once again thanks to Clint Watts of SelectedWisdom.com who also set up the survey page and collected and coded its results.

The survey asked respondents to comment on the following groups. The percentage of "yes" answers is given for each organization. Questions which did not achieve a two-thirds consensus are marked in yellow, questions which were close to a 50-50 split are marked in red.

Organization	Yes votes
Al Qaeda in Afghanistan	96.3%
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	94.5%
Al Qaeda in Iraq	92.7%
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	81.5%
Al Shabab	58.2%
Lashkar e Tayyibah	48.1%
Afghan Taliban	50.4%
Tehrik e Taliban	50.9%
Haqqani Network	53.7
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group	31.7
Revolution Muslim	26.7

Once you get past the groups with Al Qaeda in the name, consensus rapidly fell apart in this segment of the survey.



Responses on whether the Taliban should be considered part of Al Qaeda split almost perfectly down the middle, with different groups of respondents coming in all over the map. Academics voted no by two-thirds, while their students voted yes by the same amount. I find that disconnect pretty interesting. Government employees voted yes by just 55.5 percent. Media voted yes by 57.1 percent, and private sector voted no by 54.3 percent.

The status of the Taliban is a crucial question in the wsr in Afghanistan, as the U.S. considers negotiations with the Taliban as part of its withdrawal from Afghanistan. The differences among the various sectors of respondents are less important than the fact that no more than two-thirds of any given segment could agree on the question. Given that no one in government has ever seriously broached the idea that the U.S. could negotiate with Al Qaeda, the question is not a light one.



Pakistani militant group Lashkar e Tayyiba has shared facilities with Al Qaeda Central and provided support to AQC personnel. It would seem to qualify (at best) under "nominally independent extremist networks that provide significant services used in Al Qaeda operations,such as training camps or money laundering." Voters on Question One split 50-50 on whether that description could be considered part of Al Qaeda.

About the same percentage of respondents were willing to include LeT in the U.S. mandate to wage war on Al Qaeda than the Afghan Taliban, whose overt alliance with Al Qaeda was responsible for the invasion of Afghanistan in the first place.

Academics voted "no" by 71.4 percent, while government and media voted no by two-thirds and 62.5 percent respectively. Students and the private sector voted yes by 65.7 percent and 75 percent respectively. Government and academics as a combined group voted no by 68.7 percent, suggesting that there is more agreement among those in a position to know than the overall number might indicate.

Similar numbers were seen on the Haqqani network, within academics voting no by 65 percent, government almost evenly split, and media, private and student groups all voting yes by varying margins. I'd be interested to revisit this question in light of the CTC at West Point paper published this week by Dan Rassler and Vahid Brown on the Haqqani network's interconnections with Al Qaeda.

Outside of Af-Pak, Al Shabab is certainly one of the more pressing questions in counterterrorism at the moment. The Question One category best fitting Al Shabab based on open-source data at the time the survey was taken was "organizations whose leaders have publicly expressed loyalty to AQ or its emir," for which respondents could not come to a consensus, splitting 60-40 in favor of inclusion. Academics split on the question 61 percent against inclusion, while government responders could only muster a slim 52 percent support.

The survey was conducted prior to recent allegations of operational links between Al Shabab and AQAP and a corresponding uptick in U.S. strikes in Somalia. As the American CT effort in Shabab grows, the question of its classification also grows. The breakdown among professions shows very sharp divisions among different groups as to whether Shabab should be part of the U.S. war against Al Qaeda:



Academics voted "no" by a strong majority of 71.5 percent, while government employees voted "yes" by a less convincing 59.2 percent. The government vote is particularly interesting since, individual views aside, the Obama administration has made it crystal clear over the last several days that Shabab is on its targeting list. With votes from both groups taken together, 54.2 percent voted "yes," indicating a massive lack of consensus.

Once you get past those two key demographics, media respondents split 50-50 on the question of Shabab, whereas students and the private sector relatively strongly voted to include the Somali militant group, by 76.5%.

The next post on the survey, probably next week some time, will look at individual people and whether they are considered part of Al Qaeda. These results are all over the map and the most erratic of all three polls when evaluated on a factual basis and in comparison to the principles outlined in Question One, so be sure to check back.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda-In-Iraq, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Al-Shabab, AQAP, AQIM, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Survey, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Feds: US Supporters of Pakistani Taliban Sent At Least $50,000 To Fund Terror

UPDATED

Three naturalized American citizens in South Florida have been indicted for providing money and material support to the Pakistani Taliban, the Justice Department announced today.

Those arrested today and charged include:

Hafiz Muhammed Sher Ali Khan, 76, imam of the Miami Masjid

Hafiz Khan's son, Irfan Khan, 37, also of Miami, Jamaat Al-Mu’mineen Mosque in Margate, Fla.

Izhar Khan, 24, of North Lauderdale, Fla.

Hafiz and Izhar Khan were arrested in Florida. Izhar Khan was arrested in Los Angeles. Three others living in Pakistan were charged under the same indictment, but are still at large. It was not immediately clear if they were also American citizens.

Ali Rehman, aka “Faisal Ali Rehman”

Hafiz Khan's daughter, Amina Khan

Hafiz Khan's grandson, Alam Zeb

Full text of indictment

Hafiz Khan, a native of the Swat Valley region of Pakistan, has been imam at the Miami Masjid in the U.S. since at least 1999, according to the indictment. He is accused of soliciting, collecting and transferring funds to Tehrik-e Taliban, the Pakistani group behind the attempted bombing of Times Square by American citizen Faisal Shahzad.

“Despite being an Imam, or spiritual leader, Hafiz Khan was by no means a man of peace," U.S. Attorney Wifredo A. Ferrer said in a statement.

Hafiz Khan is also accused of founding and controlling a madrassa in the Swat region of Pakistan, Madrassa Arabia Ahya-al-Aloom, which was used to provide shelter and support to TTP members as well as to indoctrinate children in jihad. Children from the madrassa were allegedly sent to fight Americans in Afghanistan.

Ali Rehman, one of the suspects living in Pakistan, was charged with trying to provide guns and financial support to TTP. The rest of the suspects were accused of collecting and delivering money to TTP. Formal charges for all six include conspiracy to commit murder and kidnapping, and material support of a terrorist organization.

Significant amounts of money moved through the network, according to the indictment. Between 2008 and 2010, at least $50,000 in funds were moved from the U.S. to Pakistan for use by TTP. Ferrer told the Miami Herald that considerably more money was involved.

Hafiz Khan took part in phone conversations with Irfan Khan and others in which he called for a suicide bomb attack on the Pakistani parliament as well as strategies to assassinate Pakistani officials using guns. In a separate conversation, he called for the death of Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari and an Iranian-style revolution to establish Islamic law in Pakistan.

The fundraising was not generalized. At times, Hafiz Kahn specifically directed funds to fighters or units and advised couriers in Pakistan on how to avoid detection. Most of the money was intended to buy guns and pay Taliban fighters and their families.

The Muslim Communities Association & Coalition of South Florida Muslim Organizations issued a statement today saying they were "aware of the indictment." According to the statement, the organizations have "been working with the U.S. Attorney's Office and the Miami FBI office, and appreciate the efforts of law enforcement to root out potential sources and supporters of terrorism. We stand together with the U.S. Attorney, Wifredo Ferrer, and the men and women of the FBI, and have been and will be cooperating with law enforcement to our fullest ability."

The statement said Khan had been suspended as imam of the Masjid Miami.

South Florida has long been a center for Islamic extremists. Prior to September 11, followers of the blind sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman helped recruit jihadists in the area to fight in Bosnia and Chechnya.

Two of Al Qaeda's most famous American recruits also hail from the area -- Jose Padilla, who was sent to the U.S. by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed on a mission to blow up apartment buildings, and Adnan Shukrijumah, who the FBI believes is an important leader of Al Qaeda's external opertations.

TTP was responsible for the attempted bombing of Times Square in May 2010. Faisal Shazad, a naturalized American citizen, was trained and partially financed by TTP. He was also videotaped meeting with senior leaders of the group.

Just this week, TTP carried out a suicide bombing in Pakistan that killed 80 people. A statement issued by the group said that the attack was "revenge" for the killing of Osama bin Laden.

For much more about American jihadists in Florida and all over the United States, buy J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, out now!.

Labels: Faisal-Shahzad, Florida, Hafiz-Khan, Izhar-Khan, Taliban, Tehrik-E-Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Recently on INTELWIRE...

INTELWIRE Exclusives:

Flotilla Official Was Foreign Fighter in Bosnia

U.S. Gave Millions to Terror-Linked Yemeni Charity

Document Posts

Documents On Yemen Charity Funded by U.S.

Al Qaeda Financiers Arrested In New York

Robert Novak FBI files

INTELWIRE/MMG Seen on TV

National Geographic Explorer: Talibanistan

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Labels: Anwar-Awlaki, Bosnia, Charitable-Society-for-Social-Welfare, Gaza-Flotilla, IHH, INTELFILES, INTELWIRE-Exclusive, National-Geographic, Sarajevo-Ricochet, Taliban, Weblog

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

National Geographic Explorer: Talibanistan

National Geographic Explorer presents Talibanistan, a documentary on the activities of the Taliban along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. INTELWIRE's parent company, the Multifaceted Media Group, contributed footage of insurgents to the program. The episode airs Tuesday, June 8, at 10 p.m. Eastern. Natgeo's episode description is as follows:

For eight years the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have bogged down US and NATO troops in Afghanistan-all the while seizing territory and creating chaos in nuclear-armed Pakistan. In mid October, under pressure from the US, Pakistan announced that it would launch a military campaign designed to destroy the Taliban, The Taliban responded with a series of brazen attacks against the Pakistani Army, the police, and civilians, leaving the US in doubt over Pakistans ability to secure its nuclear weapons, and its own ability to fight the agile Taliban in Afghanistan. National Geographic Explorer was in Pakistan and Afghanistan during these explosive days documenting the fight on the ground and in the skies above this territory controlled by the Taliban, known as "Talibanistan." Explorer asks the question: who is winning this war and is this Obama's Vietnam or will he be the first to pacify Afghanistan?

For more information about how your production can commission research and license terrorist and insurgent footage from INTELWIRE and MMG, click here.

Labels: Afghanistan, Multifaceted-Media-Group, National-Geographic, Pakistan, Stock-Footage, Taliban, Weblog

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Faisal Shahzad, Times Square Bomber, Criminal Complaint

Pakistan, traveled to the United States, transported a sports utility vehicle to the vicinity of 45th Street and Seventh Avenue in Manhattan, New York, and attempted to detonate explosive and incendiary devices located inside the sports utility vehicle. [...]

Click here for full document

Labels: Faisal-Shahzad, INTELFILES, Pakistan, Taliban, Times-Square

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Mehsud Letter Again Cites Aafia Siddiqi

From the Associated Press:

In an undated letter obtained Wednesday by The Associated Press, the militant commander, Hakimullah Mehsud, threatened attacks on America and Pakistan in retaliation for the conviction in the United States of Aafia Siddiqui, a 37-year old Pakistani scientist.

Siddiqui was convicted in New York in February of trying to kill American service personnel in Afghanistan. Her case has triggered anger among Pakistani Islamist $groups and in sections of the media, where she is portrayed as innocent.
The letter is addressed to Siddiqui's sister, Fozia, who is campaigning for her release.

"We are with you in the pain you have suffered in connection with Aafia Siddiqui. God willing, we will give a reply to America and the cruel rulers in Pakistan in such a way they will remember for their whole life."
The letter was given to the AP by a reporter for the local TV station that first reported its existence.

Click on the tag for previous posts on this subject.

Labels: Aafia-Siddiqui, Hakimullah-Mehsud, Pakistan, Taliban, Times-Square, Weblog

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Times Square: A Dramatic Arrest And A Parcel Of New Questions

In a dramatic last-minute save, Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized American citizen of Pakistani origin, was snatched off an airplane bound for Dubai and a connection to Pakistan.

The FBI issued a cautiously worded statement indicating it was still looking for possible other conspirators, but Shahzad claimed to have been working alone. He had traveled to Dubai at least one time previously.

It's not clear when he was last in Pakistan, and his family is from the Northwest. All of this lends significant credibility to Sunday's claim of responsibility by the Pakistani Taliban, first reported by the Long War Journal. The claim was initially greeted with some skepticism by many people, including (I must admit) myself. A follow-up message indicated that multiple terrorist operatives were deployed to the U.S., a possibility which must be taken very seriously.

HAKIMULLAH MEHSUD

The head of a major Pakistani Taliban faction, Hakimullah Mehsud has not exactly been a household name in the United States, although he's a well-known figure to anyone following events in the Af/Pak region.

Mehsud was thought to be dead, or at least that's the story the Pakistani government was peddling, so his sudden re-emergence in conjunction with an attack on the U.S. homeland is a rather dramatic turn of events and one which leaves Pakistani counterterrorism officials with egg on their collective face.

As I noted earlier, the Pak Taliban claim of responsibility for the "recent attack" in the U.S. cited U.S. treatment of Aafia Siddiqi as one of the reasons for the attack. It's bad enough that Mehsud came back from the dead in dramatic manner to strike a blow against the United States on its own soil (albeit a failed blow), but that attack is also tied to an issue that has a lot of traction among ordinary Pakistanis. As I reported a couple weeks ago, the tale of Aafia Siddiqi has been boiling over in Pakistani media outlets, with no sign of cooling.

In short, the narrative around this attack really catapults Mehsud into a position of prominence and imbues him with some populist credibility he previously lacked. It's a dangerous development. Terrorism is storytelling, and Mehsud's story just became a lot more compelling. Let's hope he doesn't have any additional operatives running around on U.S. soil.

Finally, some reports have indicated that the Taliban videos were posted from Connecticut, where Shahzad lives. The first claim video was fairly generic, but if Shahzad (or another member of his cell) was empowered to post the first video of Mehsud since his alleged death, that means he's probably more than just a useful idiot. On the other hand, that conclusion is undermined by the bomb itself.

THE BOMB DESIGN

If Shahzad is indeed affiliated with the Pak Taliban, it's really surprising that he didn't use a better bomb design.

Keep in mind that when I and others talk about the bomb design being "good" or "bad" or "amateurish" we're not saying it's undangerous or that it might not have gone off and killed people.

What "amateurish" means is that the bomb is 1) inefficient for its size, 2) not suited to its apparent target, and 3) not equipped with a reliable detonation system.

In this case, the bomb is also "amateur" looking in that it doesn't resemble the most common forms of improvised explosive devices which have traditionally been taught by Al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

So if Shahzad was born in Pakistan, and his family hails from the Northwest (near Peshawar per CNN TV), how is it that he became involved in this kind of operation without getting better training in bomb design?

It's possible that Shahzad was simply personally incompetent. Terrorists come in all varieties, ranging from stupid to brilliant. However, bombs come in all varieties too, from simple to complicated, and the Times Square bomb was a bad combination of complicated and inept. If Shahzad was incompetent, but working for Mehsud, I would have expected his handlers to give him the simplest possible shopping list for bomb components.

I'll have some more thoughts about this when we have more facts.

Labels: American-Jihadists, Faisal-Shahzad, Hakimullah-Mehsud, Pakistan, Taliban, Times-Square, Weblog

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

LWJ: Pakistani Taliban Claim "Recent Attack" in US

The Long War Journal is reporting that the Pakistani Taliban has claimed responsibility for the failed attack in Times Square last night.

The claim does not make it so, but the LWJ offers some compelling reasons to think it may be legitimate. If so, this is a very interesting situation in light of the observations below, should they prove to be the culprits. I'll have more to say about that later, should the claim prove true.

An important counter-indicator is that the communique does not specify New York or Times Square, which is something between curious and suspicious. The person who posted the YouTube video may have been told to watch for an attack around this time, but may not have been told what attack to look for. That means a professional terrorist attack may still be in the works.

Also worth noting is that the message specifically cites the treatment of Aafia Siddiqi as a motive for the attack (among several other things). This may indicate an effort to win Pakistani hearts and minds -- Siddiqi's case in extremely contentious in Pakistan, where she has become something of a folk hero, depicted as a victim of America.

UPDATE: A new video of Haikimullah Mehsud, a top Pakistani Taliban leader, surfaced today to definitively refute reports of his death and to threaten attacks on the U.S. homeland within a month. That makes me increasingly uneasy that the real attack has not yet arrived. (See also this.)

Click here to see the claim of responsibility.

Labels: Aafia-Siddiqui, American-Jihadists, Faisal-Shahzad, New-York, Pakistan, Taliban, Times-Square, Weblog

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

State Department Documents Cited in 9/11 Commission Report, Part 1 of 2

The following documents are State Department cables which were referenced in the footnotes of the 9/11 Commission Report. A second batch will be posted within the next few weeks.

5/21/1996: Communique from Sudan re: Osama bin Laden

Notification to U.S. government that Bin Laden and "Egyptian terrorist elements" have left the Sudan.

8/6/1996: Major Usama Bin Laden Asset Deregistered

Bin Laden's Taba Investments (Tabba For Investment) deregistered by Sudanese government. Four Bin Laden firms are also discussed -- Wadi-Alageeg Construction Company, Tabba For Investment, El-Thimar Al-Mobark Agricultural Company, and the Khartoum Tannery.

9/14/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban Official Abdul Hakim Mujahid

Taliban warned that harboring Osama bin Laden has put "the Taliban and the U.S. on a collision course." Taliban reported that they had "warned
him once again not to engage in political or press activities."

10/12/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban official Maulawi Wakil Ahmed

Suggests "the Taliban are wrestling with the Bin Ladin issue and that their heretofore hard-line stance on this issue may be in some, sort of flux."

2/16/1999: Secret Memo, The Saudi Binladin Group, Builders to the King

Claims company "has sought to make clear that it has no links with the Islamist fanatic (and half brother) Usama by publicly and unequivocally condemning his actions and taking the necessary legal steps to ensure that all connections have been severed."

10/8/1998: Designation of Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization

12/14/1999: Secret Memo, Saudis on US Warning to Taliban re: UBL

The Saudis agree that Bin Laden is a threat to the Kingdom.

Labels: INTELFILES, Osama-Bin-Laden, State-Department, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

State Department Documents Cited in 9/11 Commission Report, Part 1 of 2

The following documents are State Department cables which were referenced in the footnotes of the 9/11 Commission Report. A second batch will be posted within the next few weeks.

5/21/1996: Communique from Sudan re: Osama bin Laden

Notification to U.S. government that Bin Laden and "Egyptian terrorist elements" have left the Sudan.

8/6/1996: Major Usama Bin Laden Asset Deregistered

Bin Laden's Taba Investments (Tabba For Investment) deregistered by Sudanese government. Four Bin Laden firms are also discussed -- Wadi-Alageeg Construction Company, Tabba For Investment, El-Thimar Al-Mobark Agricultural Company, and the Khartoum Tannery.

9/14/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban Official Abdul Hakim Mujahid

Taliban warned that harboring Osama bin Laden has put "the Taliban and the U.S. on a collision course." Taliban reported that they had "warned
him once again not to engage in political or press activities."

10/12/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban official Maulawi Wakil Ahmed

Suggests "the Taliban are wrestling with the Bin Ladin issue and that their heretofore hard-line stance on this issue may be in some, sort of flux."

2/16/1999: Secret Memo, The Saudi Binladin Group, Builders to the King

Claims company "has sought to make clear that it has no links with the Islamist fanatic (and half brother) Usama by publicly and unequivocally condemning his actions and taking the necessary legal steps to ensure that all connections have been severed."

10/8/1998: Designation of Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization

12/14/1999: Secret Memo, Saudis on US Warning to Taliban re: UBL

The Saudis agree that Bin Laden is a threat to the Kingdom.

Labels: INTELFILES, Osama-Bin-Laden, State-Department, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

June 2001: U.S. Warned Of Impending Terrorist Attack Coming From Afghanistan

New 9/11 documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act reveal: Less than three months before September 11, Secretary of State Colin Powell warned the Taliban that American intelligence had "high confidence" that "Afghan-based and other operatives are now planning on carrying out attacks against Americans." Powell's warning was conveyed to the Taliban by U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William B. Milam, who specifically discussed Osama bin Laden with the Taliban's representative Abdul Salam Zaeef.

Full Story

6/27/2001: State Dept. cable, threats to U.S. by Bin Laden

6/29/2001: State Dept. cable, threats to U.S. by Bin Laden

7/5/2001: State Dept. cable, meeting with Saudi Prince Abdullah

Labels: 9-11, Afghanistan, INTELFILES, Osama-Bin-Laden, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

June 2001: U.S. Warned Of Impending Terrorist Attack Coming From Afghanistan

New 9/11 documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act reveal: Less than three months before September 11, Secretary of State Colin Powell warned the Taliban that American intelligence had "high confidence" that "Afghan-based and other operatives are now planning on carrying out attacks against Americans." Powell's warning was conveyed to the Taliban by U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William B. Milam, who specifically discussed Osama bin Laden with the Taliban's representative Abdul Salam Zaeef.

Full Story

6/27/2001: State Dept. cable, threats to U.S. by Bin Laden

6/29/2001: State Dept. cable, threats to U.S. by Bin Laden

7/5/2001: State Dept. cable, meeting with Saudi Prince Abdullah

Labels: 9-11, Afghanistan, INTELFILES, Osama-Bin-Laden, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink