Inspire 10: Still sucks

I guess I'm never going to get to write a self-congratulatory post about how I got a shout-out in Inspire, because I still don't have anything much good to say about it.

Issue No. 10 of the English-language vehicle for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula just came out, and while it's crawled back from the precipice of copy-editing collapse hinted at in its last issue, it's still a sad little effort that gets taken awfully seriously.

The "hit list" of targets named by Al Qaeda and friends repeatedly over the years is neither fresh nor surprising. The recycled content remains recycled, the original content remains uninspired. The flashy graphics remain flashy.

The part of the publication that most concerns U.S. counterterrorism officials is, of course, "Open-Source Jihad," AQAP's how-to guide for "lone wolf" terrorists. Regular readers will recall that this feature was self-parody from the beginning, and it's descended further into absurdity with this issue's advice that Western mujahideen should try to cause traffic accidents and carry out ninja-style assassinations. And no, I'm not joking, that's really their advice.

Certainly, one can kill people even using absurd methods, but Inspire's readers have so far been distinguished by a lack of competence using tactics of more reliable lethality than lubricating highways so cars will slide and crash (again, not joking).

Look, lone wolf terrorism is a legitimate concern, even if it's generally far less common and less effective than people would have you think. And sure, it would be better if there wasn't this magazine goading idiots into attempting violence. I'm in favor of talking about these things, and I have specific concerns about them. But let's also keep it real. Inspire is ridiculous, and hyping its potency (about halfway into the clip) only elevates its status. Inspire remains unoriginal and largely ineffective. By all means, let's talk about it, but let's not forget to keep it in context.

For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Review: The Last Refuge

Check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Yemen

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Anwar Awlaki Killed

The most wanted American in Al Qaeda, Anwar Al Awlaki, was reportedly killed in Yemen.

The details of his death are uncertain, and this is not the first time he has been reported killed.

So far, three claims have surfaced. First, that Awlaki was killed in a drone strike. Second, that he was killed by a Special Operations raid of some sort. Third, that he was killed by air strikes by either the Yemeni or U.S. governments.

J.M. Berger for Foreign Policy: Gone But Not Forgotten, Awlaki's Legacy

Awlaki was, in many ways, a unique figure in the jihadist pantheon. Born in the United States and raised mostly in Yemen, he was fluent in both English and Arabic. He rose to prominence as a mainstream Muslim speaker, winning substantial acclaim for his translation and commentary on stories from the Quran and hadith.

Awlaki was rightfully praised for his command of American idiom and ability to process Islamic content for Western audiences by drawing on his knowledge of Western pop culture. But his real strength as a preacher was storytelling. Awlaki took stories from ancient sources and embellished them, breathing live into tales that had often been passed down only in skeletal form.

His mainstream success accentuated the danger created by his public shift to extremism. Awlaki was widely loved by English-speaking Muslims around the world. The evidence strongly suggests that he was involved in extremist networks even as a young man, but to the public, he was the very face of devotional Islam. He was cited in U.S. media for his moderate statements even as he made much more radical statements behind closed doors.

In 2000 and 2001, Awlaki and his followers provided significant assistance to at least three of the September 11 hijackers, helping them find apartments, drive around the country and obtain IDs suitable for use in boarding an airplane. The evidence suggests this help was provided knowing that the men were Al Qaeda operatives, if not with specific knowledge of the plot. One of the hijackers described Awlaki as "a great man" and his "spiritual leader."

From 2002 on, Awlaki became a case study for how not to handle a suspected terrorist. Misstep after misstep from both government and media helped catapult Awlaki into global prominence as an extremist.

In October 2002, the U.S. arrested Awlaki while he was entering the country after traveling overseas but released him almost immediately under murky circumstances. Had he been arrested and prosecuted then, it might have saved American lives.

Awlaki left the country immediately after this near miss. His lectures became more and more overtly radical. Followers who had joined him for stories of the Islamic prophets could follow him as he "thought aloud" about the relationship between the West and Islam and concluded that they were fatally incompatible.

In 2004, Awlaki returned to Yemen, issuing his most famous extremist work, "Constants on the Path of Jihad." Although Constants is often attributed to Awlaki, it was not his original work. Based on an Arabic essay by one of the founders of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the six hour lecture series outlined a strong argument in favor of jihad. Although Awlaki presented himself only as the translator, he extensively expanded on the original text, making it significantly more accessible and emotional. At least dozens of arrested extremists have listened to the lectures for inspiration.

Awlaki was arrested by Yemeni authorities in 2007 on the pretext of having given a fatwa approving a kidnapping by local militants. By most accounts, he emerged from prison even more heavily radicalized. Soon after, Awlaki created a blog where he praised jihadist groups such as Al Shabab. In 2009, he praised American military officer Nidal Hassan for killing American soldiers in a shooting spree at Fort Hood. Soon after, Awlaki was implicated as the teacher and guide to Omar Farouk Abdulmuttallab, who tried to bomb a Detroit-bound plane at Christmas with explosives smuggled on board in his underwear.

Awlaki also used e-mail to inspire and sometimes direct plots. He was among the most accessible and Internet-savvy extremists, personally corresponding with several suspects who were later arrested on various charges of terrorism.

A number of things happened after that. The United States leaked that Awlaki had been added to the CIA's authorized list of targets for assassination. That immediately led Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to issue a statement that the organization would defend Awlaki to the death. Soon after, AQAP issued a video interview with Awlaki in which he openly embraced Al Qaeda and its ideology, and soon after that, Awlaki issued an explicit call for Muslims living in the West to kill Americans under any circumstance.

Awlaki's standing in the jihadist world exploded in the wake of these developments, which were at least accelerated (if not wholly provoked) by the leak about Awlaki's targeting. Prior to the leak, Awlaki was someone with wide influence among Western extremists but without clear credibility among hardcore jihadists.

After the leak, Awlaki became public enemy number one. The media anointed Awlaki a "senior leader" or even "the top leader" of AQAP, a claim which was presented without evidence and which flew in the face of established reporting on AQAP's leadership.

Although some were skeptical of Awlaki having any role at all with AQAP, credible reports did support the view that Awlaki had become part of the group. Abdulmutallab reported being trained by Awlaki and the bomb in his underwear matched those created by AQAP's senior explosive expert. A subsequent bomb plot linked to Awlaki, the UPS bomb plot of 2010, also carried the technical hallmarks of AQAP. Reports from Australian media also described sightings of Awlaki at AQAP training camps.

On being adopted by AQAP, Awlaki stopped issuing audio and video in English, abandoning his most effective tool for inspiring violence, but he continued to issue statements in Arabic. More importantly, he oversaw the production of Inspire magazine, an English-language propaganda publication distributed online.

Inspire was the brainchild of American extremist Samir Khan (reportedly killed alongside Awlaki), who started it as a hobby project while living in the United States, then moved to Yemen and began publishing the magazine under the flag of AQAP, with exclusive content and oversight from Awlaki.

At the time of his alleged death, Awlaki was planning to issue a video answering questions from email correspondents. The most recent issue of Inspire, which did not feature any original content from Awlaki, also promised a forthcoming piece on the legitimacy of targeting civilians living in the West.

Both of these pieces could still surface, even if Awlaki is dead, and of course, his 100-plus hours of audio and video lectures will survive his death, likely becoming even more popular. It's worth remembering that Abdullah Azzam, killed more than 20 years ago, is still one of the most popular jihadist ideologues, whose videos still provide vast inspiration.

That "if" is an important consideration. If it turns out these reports are premature, Awlaki is uniquely positioned to capitalize. Inspire has already published articles touting Awlaki having survived a painfully close call with a drone strike in May 2011.

Inspire often employs mockery in the service of its propaganda, and Awlaki himself has a sharp sense of humor. If we have buried Awlaki too soon, we'll hear about it, and once again, our own missteps will make his legend grow.

Full story from CBS News

Intelwire coverage of Awlaki

The Atlantic: Awlaki and September 11

Foreign Policy: The Awlaki Myth

Letter from UK jihadist describes contacts with Awlaki

Is Inspire Magazine Uninspired?

For much more about Awlaki, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Journalists seeking more information or comment on Awlaki can contact J.M. Berger here.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, American-Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Samir-Khan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Is Al Qaeda's Inspire Magazine Uninspired?

I have a slideshow up on the Huffington Post which offers side-by-side comparisons of pages from Inspire Magazine, the new English-language project from Anwar Awlaki and Samir Khan, two Americans associated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

"Inspire" is only the latest in a long line of jihadist and terrorist magazines in English and Arabic. While it does break some ground, its originality has been vastly overstated. Here's a look at some of its venerable but less celebrated predecessors.

View the slideshow

For more about Inspire, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Samir-Khan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

What Is Al Qaeda, Part 2

Part one
| Part two | Part three

In the first part of the "What is Al Qaeda" survey, we looked at textbook definitions for the kinds of people and organizations that experts consider to included in Al Qaeda. Click here to read the results.

In the second part, we're looking at what specific organizations those same experts consider to be part of the U.S. government's mandate to wage war against Al Qaeda. The answers are, again, interesting, showing a lack of consensus on key groups, and they do not always sync with the definitions identified in the first question. The bar charts below are once again thanks to Clint Watts of SelectedWisdom.com who also set up the survey page and collected and coded its results.

The survey asked respondents to comment on the following groups. The percentage of "yes" answers is given for each organization. Questions which did not achieve a two-thirds consensus are marked in yellow, questions which were close to a 50-50 split are marked in red.

Organization	Yes votes
Al Qaeda in Afghanistan	96.3%
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	94.5%
Al Qaeda in Iraq	92.7%
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	81.5%
Al Shabab	58.2%
Lashkar e Tayyibah	48.1%
Afghan Taliban	50.4%
Tehrik e Taliban	50.9%
Haqqani Network	53.7
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group	31.7
Revolution Muslim	26.7

Once you get past the groups with Al Qaeda in the name, consensus rapidly fell apart in this segment of the survey.



Responses on whether the Taliban should be considered part of Al Qaeda split almost perfectly down the middle, with different groups of respondents coming in all over the map. Academics voted no by two-thirds, while their students voted yes by the same amount. I find that disconnect pretty interesting. Government employees voted yes by just 55.5 percent. Media voted yes by 57.1 percent, and private sector voted no by 54.3 percent.

The status of the Taliban is a crucial question in the wsr in Afghanistan, as the U.S. considers negotiations with the Taliban as part of its withdrawal from Afghanistan. The differences among the various sectors of respondents are less important than the fact that no more than two-thirds of any given segment could agree on the question. Given that no one in government has ever seriously broached the idea that the U.S. could negotiate with Al Qaeda, the question is not a light one.



Pakistani militant group Lashkar e Tayyiba has shared facilities with Al Qaeda Central and provided support to AQC personnel. It would seem to qualify (at best) under "nominally independent extremist networks that provide significant services used in Al Qaeda operations,such as training camps or money laundering." Voters on Question One split 50-50 on whether that description could be considered part of Al Qaeda.

About the same percentage of respondents were willing to include LeT in the U.S. mandate to wage war on Al Qaeda than the Afghan Taliban, whose overt alliance with Al Qaeda was responsible for the invasion of Afghanistan in the first place.

Academics voted "no" by 71.4 percent, while government and media voted no by two-thirds and 62.5 percent respectively. Students and the private sector voted yes by 65.7 percent and 75 percent respectively. Government and academics as a combined group voted no by 68.7 percent, suggesting that there is more agreement among those in a position to know than the overall number might indicate.

Similar numbers were seen on the Haqqani network, within academics voting no by 65 percent, government almost evenly split, and media, private and student groups all voting yes by varying margins. I'd be interested to revisit this question in light of the CTC at West Point paper published this week by Dan Rassler and Vahid Brown on the Haqqani network's interconnections with Al Qaeda.

Outside of Af-Pak, Al Shabab is certainly one of the more pressing questions in counterterrorism at the moment. The Question One category best fitting Al Shabab based on open-source data at the time the survey was taken was "organizations whose leaders have publicly expressed loyalty to AQ or its emir," for which respondents could not come to a consensus, splitting 60-40 in favor of inclusion. Academics split on the question 61 percent against inclusion, while government responders could only muster a slim 52 percent support.

The survey was conducted prior to recent allegations of operational links between Al Shabab and AQAP and a corresponding uptick in U.S. strikes in Somalia. As the American CT effort in Shabab grows, the question of its classification also grows. The breakdown among professions shows very sharp divisions among different groups as to whether Shabab should be part of the U.S. war against Al Qaeda:



Academics voted "no" by a strong majority of 71.5 percent, while government employees voted "yes" by a less convincing 59.2 percent. The government vote is particularly interesting since, individual views aside, the Obama administration has made it crystal clear over the last several days that Shabab is on its targeting list. With votes from both groups taken together, 54.2 percent voted "yes," indicating a massive lack of consensus.

Once you get past those two key demographics, media respondents split 50-50 on the question of Shabab, whereas students and the private sector relatively strongly voted to include the Somali militant group, by 76.5%.

The next post on the survey, probably next week some time, will look at individual people and whether they are considered part of Al Qaeda. These results are all over the map and the most erratic of all three polls when evaluated on a factual basis and in comparison to the principles outlined in Question One, so be sure to check back.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda-In-Iraq, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Al-Shabab, AQAP, AQIM, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Survey, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Inspire's Ode to the Not-So-Lone Wolves

Previous: Inspire Issue 5 Aims For Rapid Repositioning

Some counterterrorism-oriented notes from the fifth issue of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's Inspire magazine:

In the "Ask Inspire" section, a writer (presumably Awlaki) encourages Americans to stay at home and carry out lone-wolf terrorist attacks rather than travel to the fields of jihad. Interestingly, it pushes the lone-wolf concept even further than previous issues, pointing out that the FBI has diverted would-be mujahideen who reached out to others for help. Probably-Awlaki argues that success is more likely if the aspiring mujahid acts without consulting ANYONE.

But there are virtually no documented cases in which an American with clear jihadist motivations has acted totally in a vacuum. Jihadism is a social movement typically carried out because the participant has an overly strong sense of community. Lone actors are exactly the opposite.

Awlaki cites Nidal Hasan and Stockholm bomber Taimour Abdulwahab as examples of "lone wolves," but in reality, Hasan had contact with Awlaki directly, and Abdulwahab may have had accomplices. Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab is cited elsewhere in the magazine as another example of lone wolfism, but he hardly qualifies, having been trained at an AQAP camp and assigned his mission by Awlaki personally.

AQAP's military commander Abu Hurairah also praises the not-so-lone wolves in an interview segment. He calls for a homegrown operation after every Western operation targeting mujahideen.

An extract from the writings of Abu Musab Al Suri calls for assassinations of Western military and civilian leaders. Al Suri writes that assassination is good enough for the CIA, so it's good enough for Al Qaeda.

Given that assassins are much more likely to be lone actors than other kinds of terrorists, this is probably something counterterrorism officials should be looking at. This message is reinforced by Awlaki's celebration of the assassination of Anwar Sadat later in the magazine.

It's also reinforced by repeated references throughout the magazine to Roshonara Choudhry, the British Muslim who attempted to assassinate British parliament member Stephen Timms as revenge for his vote in favor of the Iraq War.

Of all the examples cited, Choudhry is the only one who really fits the profile of a lone wolf in the purest sense. If any case study recommends itself out of Inspire No. 5, it's Choudhry. Unfortunately, her case also highlights the one redeeming characteristic of the otherwise weak lone-wolf model -- she didn't give herself away until it was too late.

For more about Awlaki and other American jihadists, pre-order "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam," the first comprehensive look at the phenomenon of American jihadists from the 1970s to the present.

Labels: Abu-Musab-Al-Suri, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Jihad-Joe, Nidal-Malik-Hasan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New Issue of Al Qaeda's Inspire Magazine Aims For Rapid Repositioning

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has released the latest issue of Inspire, and it's a 70-page behemoth devoted to the Middle East uprisings.

LATEST: We've Killed Bin Laden, What Happens Next?

There are two important dimensions to this issue's theme. First, it seeks to refute a wave of media coverage that deemed Al Qaeda irrelevant to the Middle Eastern protests. Second, it seeks to fundamentally reinterpret Al Qaeda's core principles in order to give the global AQ movement a foothold in the evolving political process.

PLEASE DON'T CALL US IRRELEVANT

Inspire's writers take strong exception to the idea that secular, nonviolent revolutions have made Al Qaeda obsolete and irrelevant.

In a prominent opening position, we get an introductory piece by Yahya Ibrahim, whose previous claim to fame was the invention of the Ultimate Mowing Machine. Ibrahim argues that the uprisings are opening the door to globalized jihad in Palestine by removing the U.S. allies who previously protected Israel.

The key to making this argument stick is, of course, combining words with action. There is no shortage of AQ rhetoric on Palestine, but neither the network nor the movement have managed to breach Israel's borders in a very effective manner.

Ibrahim's piece makes two more very important points related to the uprisings, which represent a significant shift in AQ rhetoric and even its philosophy. First, he argues that Al Qaeda is entirely in favor of "freedom" in the Middle East, because that gives people the freedom to learn about and understand AQ's goals. In a pointed jab against the West, he writes:

Why would the freedoms being granted to the people be bad for al Qaeda? If freedom is so bad for al Qaeda, how come the West has been practicing a restriction on the freedoms of expression when it comes to the message of the mujahidin? Why does the West ban the spread of books and talks of the al Qaeda leadership and in some countries consider it to be a crime to be in possession of such material? Why did the U.S. request from a site such as YouTube to take off lectures by Shaykh Anwar al-Awlaki?

Even more significantly, Ibrahim writes that Al Qaeda is not opposed to regime change through peaceful means. While Ibrahim's status as an Islamic authority figure in the movement is unclear at best, this represents a pretty significant shift away from a long argument that military jihad is the only acceptable means to achieve Al Qaeda's long term political goals.

One of Inspire's predecessors, an English-language newsletter published in Boston during the 1990s, summed up nonviolent political action in the following terms:

[Y]ou find that the first thing mentioned is “He took part in all of the attacks.” It does not say “He gave a hundred speeches” or that “he wrote such and such a book,” or “he had a lot of money.” It says “He took part in all of the attacks.” This is the greatest virtue, excellence, or merit of the friends of the Messenger. The value of someone in Islam is measured by the “number of battles he took part in.”

Today when they write about our dead, what do they say? Do they mention how many attacks they took part in? No. If they are truthful they will write “This famous scientist, this matchless preacher did not shoot one bullet for Allah’s cause in all of his life.”

This echoes a line of thought going all the way back to Abdullah Azzam, the emir of the Arab-Afghan jihad, who famously said, during a lecture in Brooklyn in the 1980s:

Whenever jihad is mentioned in the [Quran], it means the obligation to fight. It does not mean to fight with the pen or to write books or articles in the press, or to fight by holding lectures.

In contrast, Ibrahim makes a very important qualification which, if truly adopted by the broad Al Qaeda movement, could be a game-changer (emphasis below added by me):

Another line that is being pushed by Western leaders is that because the protests in Egypt and Tunisia were peaceful, they proved al Qaeda – which calls for armed struggle – to be wrong. That is another fallacy. Al Qaeda is not against regime changes through protests but it is against the idea that the change should be only through peaceful means to the exclusion of the use of force.

The accuracy of this view is proven by the turn of events in Libya. If the protesters in Libya did not have the flexibility to use force when needed, the uprising would have been crushed.

There is a galaxy of distance between arguing that Al Qaeda believes military jihad is a mandatory sixth pillar of Islam and arguing that Al Qaeda believes that peaceful regime change is appropriate as long as the use of force is permitted under the right circumstances. Yet Ibrahim is planting that seed squarely in the soil of what is arguably Al Qaeda's most important messaging platform.

It will be very interesting indeed to see whether this thread is taken up by other Al Qaeda figures. Although Ibrahim correctly points out that this principle is implied in recent statements by Al Qaeda leadership on the protests, most notably Zawahiri, I don't recall seeing it stated so starkly.

This could be seen a bold effort to fundamentally redefine Al Qaeda as a political movement that sometimes uses violence rather than as a violent movement whose goals are political. But it is certainly possible that this will be read simply as an effort to jump on somebody else's bandwagon. We'll see how that develops.

AWLAKI'S TAKE

The cover story in Inspire No. 5 is an article on the protests by Anwar Awlaki. Over the last year, Awlaki's messages in print and in A/V communiques have become increasingly concerned with local events in Yemen and Islamic rulings. Here, he returns to his best form with a piece that is political and accessible.

Awlaki far exceeds Ayman Zawahiri's recent messages about the protests by keeping his comments short and to the point. Awlaki argues that the uprisings have fundamentally changed the outlook of the Muslim Ummah by proving that the totalitarian regimes of the Middle East can be defied.

He then launches into an extended attack on CNN's Peter Bergen, who argued that the uprisings were bad news for Al Qaeda, with an amusingly discordant jab at Fareed Zakaria, whom Awlaki inexplicably characterizes as a "neoconservative."

Awlaki argues that Bergen is thinking too much in the short-term and that the uprisings will benefit Al Qaeda over time. Mubarak, he says, did not defeat the jihad movement in Egypt. Rather, by driving it out of Egypt, he spread it all over the world, where it is now thriving and from whence it will return.

Peter Bergen believes that al Qaeda is viewing the events with glee and despair. Glee yes, but not despair. The mujahidin around the world are going through a moment of elation and I wonder whether the West is aware of the upsurge of mujahidin activity in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco? Is the West aware of what is happening or are they asleep with drapes covering their eyes?

Notably, Awlaki does not advance the "peaceful change" argument made by Ibrahim, but instead takes the approach that the fall of American allies in the region cannot help but be good for Al Qaeda.

America, since 9-11, has been focused on the fight with the mujahidin in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and now Yemen. It has devoted its resources and intelligence for the “fight on terror”. But with what is happening now in the Arab world, America would no doubt have to divert some of its attention to the unexpected avalanche that is burying its dear friends. America has depended on these men for the dirty work of protecting the American imperial interests. They acted as point men that saved America the effort of doing it themselves but now with their fall, America would have to divert huge amounts of effort and money to cultivate a new breed of collaborators. This would force America, which is already an exhausted empire, to spread itself thin, which in turn would be a great benefit for the mujahidin. Even without this wave of change in the Muslim world, the jihad movement was on the rise. With the new developments in the area, one can only expect that the great doors of opportunity would open up for the mujahidin all over the world.

Although Awlaki did not seem to embrace the kinder, gentler Al Qaeda in the main piece of the protests, there are some interesting comments in the "Inspire Responses" section where readers can write in with questions. The column is not attributed to Awlaki but it ends with an invitation for readers to send Awlaki questions, and the style of the writing matches the Yemeni-American's voice.

The main letter to Awlaki challenges is a multi-part question challenging the methods and beliefs of Al Qaeda generally and Inspire specifically. The early parts of the question challenge a number of points in AQ propaganda before getting to the red meat:

In terms of your personal ideology, how do you account for the fact that your legitimacy within the Islamic community is not only called into question but nearly non-existent. Most Muslims condemn the actions that you commit, Alĥamdulillâh. I understand your takfîri ideology but what gives you the right to judge the rest, even Muslims? It seems to me that you enjoy the power of playing God and determining who is good and evil. Nowhere in the Koran does it give authority to man to judge and determine the life of a man.

I cannot overstate how awesomely great this question is in this context. Back before 9/11, Awlaki gave a khutba at his mosque in San Diego on this exact subject and the questioner has almost certainly listened to at least part of that lecture.

Takfir means excommunication, and in this context it refers to the Al Qaeda practice of declaring that its Muslim enemies are not Muslims, have become apostates and are therefore legitimate targets for murder.

In San Diego, Awlaki argued against the practice of takfir, saying:

[If] you tell your brother that he is [an apostate], if he is not, it will come back on you. [ . . . ] We do not know what is in the hearts of people. [If we think] this man is saying with his tongue what he doesn’t mean in his heart, [the hadith] tells us we are not ordered to open up and seek what is in the hearts of people. He is not ordered clearly [ . . . ] I am not told by Allah to seek what’s in the hearts of people. Meaning that we call people to Islam, but we are not judges over them. We do not judge the people. We leave the judgment to Allah, [glory to him].

The questioner is clearly trying to catch Awlaki in a contradiction, and to some extent, he is successful. The Awlaki of 2011 squirms in his response, first suggesting that his correspondent google takfir for more guidance, then writing:

We don’t just assume someone is an apostate without clear evidence. The other thing is who can implement the ruling once one is determined to be an apostate. In today’s world, there is no Caliph nor Islamic Caliphate to properly pass the judgment. So within that we find a whole other topic in fiqh concerning the implementation of [mandatory Islamic capital punishment] without a state. In brief, if the individual has apostatized publicly, and his apostasy is clear, then this person’s blood and wealth is not protected from the Muslims due to the hadith narrated by al-Bukhari, “Whoever changed his Islamic religion, then kill him.”

Our ideology is not takfîri; the non-Muslims as well as their puppet governments made that up to make the people condemn us. [...] We are openly against extremism in takfîr and seek a balance.

Awlaki is sensitive to his dilemma here. His choice is either to renounce his previous statements and risk being called a hypocrite (a serious slam in his world) or to alienate some of his core supporters in the jihadist movement. So his response is an artful dodge, but it's still a dodge, and no one who is familiar with his earlier arguments on takfir is likely to see it otherwise.

For the full issue of Inspire, check out Jihadology.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Jihad-Joe

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Awlaki Breaks Silence In New Issue Of Inspire, Builds Links To History Of Jihad

SUMMARY: American cleric and Al Qaeda leader Anwar Awlaki today issued his first communication since November. The statement is a religious ruling allowing Muslims to steal money from non-Muslims if the proceeds are used for jihad.

Awlaki's statement was published in the latest issue of Inspire Magazine, an English-language online publication that aims to radicalize Western Muslims. The magazine also features an article from American citizen jihadist Samir Khan, who produces the magazine on behalf of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a Yemen-based branch of the terrorist network.

The magazine suggests that American Muslims blow up apartment buildings using a technique designed by September 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

Click here for a large image suitable for broadcast. Mandatory credit for INTELWIRE.

ANALYSIS: Anwar Awlaki reappeared this morning for the first time since November with the cover story of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's Inspire Magazine, Issue 4. The new issue of Inspire reaches into the past, using past jihadist precedents in ways both subtle and overt to highlight AQAP's ideological and operational linkages to major figures such as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Omar Abdel Rahman and Abdullah Azzam.

The latest issue features Awlaki's "ruling on dispossessing the disbelievers' wealth," which revives at some length an argument used by Omar Abdel Rahman and other jihadist clerics in the West during the 1980s and early 1990s to justify bank robberies if the proceeds are used for jihad. The ruling -- which authorizes taking infidels' money by "force or deception" -- could also be used to justify credit card fraud and other scams.

The article is a departure from AQAP's previously announced jihad to cripple Western economies in that Awlaki is primarily concerned with whether Muslims can use funds seized from non-Muslims rather than simply waging war against their economies.

Inspire's regular feature on homemade terrorist attacks includes an interesting article that revives a scheme invented by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and assigned to American Al Qaeda member Jose Padilla -- blowing up buildings by renting an apartment and filling it with combustible gas.

An article by American Al Qaeda member Samir Khan delves into the jihadist justifications of Abdullah Azzam, the father of the modern global jihad movement. Twenty years after his death, Azzam is still one of the most influential figures in jihad.

Khan's piece reviews several of Azzam's key themes, including the defense of historically Muslim lands under attack or occupation, but also expands this idea with Omar Abdel Rahman's definition of inadequate Muslim leaders as apostates who should be considered occupiers.

Khan also cites -- in his article and elsewhere in the magazine -- injunctions against spying on Muslims, which must be a sore subject for AQAP after its UPS bombing was thwarted by a Saudi turncoat.

Interestingly, Khan dials back on takfirism, arguing that takfir (excommunication from Islam, punishable by death) is not applicable to individual sinners but only to Muslim rulers who permit major sin under their rule. Another article in Inspire, discussing recent AQAP actions against the Shi'a Houthi movement in Yemen, takes great pains to specify which sects have been targeted and to specifically exclude members of the Zaydi Shi'a sect, in an apparent effort to avoid the appearance of all-out sectarian war most famously promulgated by Abu Musab Zarqawi in Iraq.

The issue also shed some light on the operational security around Khan and Awlaki, asking readers to bundle news stories into PDFs and compressed archives and e-mail them to Inspire's editors because, "due to security reasons, we do not log on to the net frequently." It's useful to know that attachments are Inspire's best friends.

For more about American jihadists, including Awlaki and Samir Khan, check out my new book, "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam," the first comprehensive look at the phenomenon of American jihadists from the 1970s to the present. The book is scheduled to be released in April/May 2011. Pre-orders are available now. For information about review copies or for media interviews on American jihadists, contact me here.

Labels: Abdullah-Azzam, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Omar-Abdel-Rahman, Samir-Khan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New Issue of Al Qaeda English-Language Magazine Inspire Focuses On UPS Bomb

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula released a new issue of its English-language magazine "Inspire" devoted exclusively to the UPS bomb plot.

The magazine features a photograph of the device prior to its being mailed. According to the magazine, the book "Great Expectations" was included to reflect AQAP's high hopes for the plot.



Inspire claims the plot was an "operation of leverage" designed to cost the U.S. money through increased security precautions.

"Our objective is not maximum kill but to cause a hemorrhage in the aviation industry," wrote Yahya Ibrahim, who in the previous issue of Inspire proposed that would-be mujahideen weld lawnmower blades to trucks and drive into crowds of people.

In another article, an AQAP "explosives department" member named "Ikrimah Al Muhajir" says that the organization has developed five detonators which do not use any metal components, in order to evade security measures such as metal detectors.

"Inspire" No. 3 is notably lacking in any content from Anwar Awlaki, the Yemeni-American cleric who is believed to oversee the magazine. An Awlaki video was released earlier this month without the distinctive logo of AQAP's media division. While I would hesitate to draw a conclusion based on two pieces of data, these are both curious omissions and worth keeping an eye on.

In the "Contact Us" section of the magazine, a message states: "Due to technical difficulties, we have been unable to check our e-mails for some time."

The PDF of Inspire was rendered on Nov. 16, 2010, and released today, indicating a four-day lag time between the completion of the magazine and its availablity to the public.

The issue comes more than 20 days after the actual UPS bomb plot, in which explosives devices were shipped from Yemen and addressed to Chicago synagogues. The devices were detected, intercepted and disarmed before reaching U.S. soil.

Follow INTELWIRE on Twitter for instant analysis of breaking news related to the War on Terror. INTELWIRE coverage of this release began at 7:44 p.m. Eastern and included the first reported images and details of the magazine's content.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Samir-Khan, Yahya-Ibrahim, Yemen

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Awlaki, Gadahn, Truthiness And Al Qaeda's War On Scholarship

Anwar Awlaki's new video reinforces a message recently sent out by Al Qaeda Central by his fellow American, Adam Gadahn. When Islamic scholarship does not support jihad, the scholars must go.

According to a translation of Awlaki's message from Flashpoint Partners:

[T]he role of fatwas is to protect Islam and not the Americans. The role of the fatwa is to protect the Sharia principles and not the governmental principles. And the person of jurisprudence, his role is to speak the truth, and not patch for the rulers and search for them for an exit every time they fall in a ditch. So if the jurist cannot speak the truth due to being forced, then we call upon the Muslims to follow behind the Ulama who do not fear in Allah the accusation of the accusers. But those who agree with the rulers on everything and are disagreeing with the Mujahideen in everything, then those are the apostate Ulama, and be aware of them.

This parallels a message from Adam Gadahn last month:

[T]he Mujahideen who have gone out to defend their religion, brothers and countries against the campaign and its agents, haven't relied on one fatwa from one Alim (learned man), but rather, have depended on numerous fatwas, and moreover, on numerous proven consensuses about the obligatory nature of Jihad on individual Muslims in a number of scenarios most or all of which have occurred not just in our day, but starting from a number of decades ago at the very least.

This is why anyone who wants to debate the legal basis for the contemporary Jihad must refute all those fatwas and reject all those proven consensus and not just make do with relying to one fatwa or Alim.

Both Gadahn and Awlaki are keenly focused here on discrediting Muslim voices who use religious scholarship to oppose Al Qaeda's brand of military jihad. If you count Awlaki's article on the Mardin Declaration in the most recent issue of AQAP's magazine, that's three messages in two months on this subject.

In addition to the similar messaging, both Gadahn and Awlaki released their messages in Arabic rather than English, despite the fact that both are famous mostly for their English-language content speaking to American Muslims.

Although they may be trying to expand their respective followings in the Arabic-jihadi world, I would suggest this tactic is probably an effort to make them look more credible as they go after credible scholars.

Gadahn's video also featured clips of Awlaki, although Gadahn did not refer to him by name.

So what does it all mean? Here are the possibilities:

1) Awlaki and Gadahn are reacting to the same public events (the Mardin declaration) and not coordinating their messages.

2) Awlaki and Gadahn are echoing each other's messages after seeing them posted to the Web.

3) Awlaki and Gadahn are coordinating their messaging, most likely through a third party.

Obviously, options 1 and 2 are the stronger possibilities. But as I noted previously, the insertion of Awlaki clips into Gadahn's last video was a development which could point to option 3. In this context, it's worth noting that information embedded in the video file suggests Awlaki's latest message may have been recorded as early as July.

Either way, as a journalist I know that three of anything is a trend. Al Qaeda, which once tried to market itself as a home to scholars, is now running away from scholarship in a uniquely American fashion.

There is a longstanding tradition in American politics of rejecting intellectualism, scholarship and even scientific fact in favor of gut-feelings and "truthiness." So it's also fascinating that Al Qaeda's most prominent Americans are leading the charge to dumb down jihad. Who better?

FOLLOW-UP: More Ruminations on Al Qaeda's War Against Scholarship

Labels: Adam-Gadahn, Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Azzam-the-American

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New Awlaki Video Released, But Not By Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

Updated 11/9/2010

Anwar Awlaki has released the full version of a video that was previewed online last week. The new release raises a number of questions with no immediately obvious answers.

The new video is entirely in Arabic, without English subtitles, and was not released by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Everything we've heard from Awlaki over the last couple of months has come from AQAP, so this is a very curious development, the meaning of which is not yet clear.

Despite the lack of official branding, the video received massive play on the Al Shamikh forum -- with a bigger banner ad than Osama bin Laden's recent audio release. Al Shamikh is an Arabic forum.

The video is a wide-ranging assault on the political and religious establishments of the Muslim world in general and Yemen in particular, according to a translation by Flashpoint Partners. In addition to the usual calls to kill Americans, Awlaki makes a particularly pointed attack on Islamic scholars who support the status quo or offer any kind of ideological cover to those who would ally with the West against the mujahideen.

Until recently, there was little evidence to suggest that Awlaki had made much of an impression on the Arabic-speaking jihadist community. It's possible that this means he has finally broken through. However, it's also worth noting that bin Laden's release came with several different sizes and shapes of banner ad, while Awlaki's patron on Al Shamikh submitted only one massive banner. So while this might just be a case of smart marketing, I suspect it represents a real breakthrough.

Other notes:

* The video is already available on YouTube. So much for that crackdown.

* The person who posted the video to jihadist forums, "Terrorist 093," asked jihadist forum members to voluntarily translate the video into English and post their results. This is also unusual, since Awlaki could have easily translated it himself or tasked the job to one of his lackeys at "Inspire," AQAP's English-language magazine.

* Aaron Zelin at Jihadology has some interesting notes on the title of the video, "To make it known and clear to mankind, and not to hide it," a quote from the Quran.

* The video was released in as a regular file but also in a massive 1.6 gig HQ version, which is also odd because the video is not in the standard 16x9 aspect ration used for HD. What I suspect this means is that no one from AQAP worked on it. I've speculated in the past that American Al Qaeda Samir Khan has been producing AQAP's videos, and Khan is closely aligned to Awlaki, so add that to the list of questions. (I'm stringing together a lot of guesses here, so caveat emptor.)

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Yemen

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Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Mowing Machines And Other Circus Acts

The second issue of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's Inspire magazine has been released, and it's much like the first -- a mix of amateurish and questionable advice, predictable tracts from terrorist leaders like Anwar Awlaki and overproduced graphics.

The issue's major emphasis is on "lone wolf" style terrorism, suggesting that readers attack Americans in their hometowns without openly espousing jihad or doing anything which might alert authorities, such as reading jihadi websites. It's not clear how these readers are supposed to keep up with Inspire if they don't look at jihadi websites, but never mind that for now.

Thomas Hegghammer at Jihadica accurately diagnoses the major flaw in this approach.

Khan’s strategy presupposes that individuals can aquire the motivation to die for the cause almost in a vacuum. However, in most historical cases, individuals only acquired this motivation after interacting with other radicals, going abroad for jihad, or accessing jihadi propaganda - all of which are activities discouraged by Samir Khan. Of course there have been exceptions, such as the Fort Hood shooter Nidal Malik Hassan, but even he was not completely “clean”, as evidenced by his email correspondence with Anwar al-Awlaki. Decentralized jihad is indeed a scary concept, but it does not necessarily work.

The biggest concern for those fighting terrorism today is whether or not the paragraph above is true. I tend to think it is, although we could certainly see some borderline personalities acting out based on Khan's advice, and anyone familiar with Western media and politics knows that two or three lone lunatics can make a significant impact on this country's national dialogue.

Aside from the obvious issue that, as Hegghammer points out, almost no one engaging in explicitly jihadist violence is totally clean, the Inspire approach to jihadism has a few more noteworthy problems.

First, and foremost, it is apparent from reading the operational advice in Inspire that its writers and editors have no direct experience of violence. They have not dirtied their hands -- fired guns at the enemy, blown up buildings, executed prisoners. Their advice on committing violence is completely speculative and often childishly stupid, as in last issue's "Build a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom" and this issue's "Ultimate Mowing Machine" in which aspiring terrorists are advised to weld lawnmower blades to the bumper of a truck and drive it into a crowd.

This leads to the second problem with Inspire. Jihadism is a social movement. It's trying to create social change in Islamic countries, within Islam writ large, and in the West. Lone-wolfism is the Unabomber, a pathological narcissist hurling bombs from a remote cabin in the woods. There is a meaningful distinction between jihadism and lone-wolfism (albeit sometimes a distinction without a difference).

A procession of individual lemmings driving their mowing machines off a bridge without community context is ultimately a very limited tool for Al Qaeda, which is built on a fraternity of experienced fighters whose most effective recruiting tools are credibility and commitment, both as soldiers and as religious figures. Awlaki aside, history shows us that the most effective terrorist recruiters are those who have fought in traditional conflicts in "defense" of Muslims overseas.

Mowing-machinists, on the other hand, will be flavors of the month, at best, laughingstocks at worst. They won't become recruiters or elder statesmen. The smart ones won't even sit behind mowing machines. They will aspire to be like Samir Khan himself, all talk and no action.

I'd love to tell you that the broad Al Qaeda movement will degenerate into this kind of absurd circus act, but I don't think Inspire as it currently exists has real legs. Eventually, someone will decide that Samir Khan needs some experience on the front lines. He probably won't come back from that experience, but if he does, he won't be churning out the same crap.

Labels: Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Samir-Khan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Inspire, Abu Talha and More...

A couple of short notes on recent buzz around the Web:

OVERESTIMATING INSPIRE

Coverage of AQAP's Inspire continues to disappoint, although it's improved since the full issue was posted. I continue to think this is not as much of a quantum leap forward as its reception might indicate. I suspect aspiring jihadists are more likely to burn down their moms' kitchens than create a successful bomb with the recipe provided in the magazine, and beyond that, there isn't much about Inspire that is groundbreaking.

The magazine's graphic design has been praised by various reporters and analysts. Personally, I found it rather busy and distracting, not to mention undercutting the alleged serious-mindedness of the content. One thing is certain -- all the rave reviews guarantee we'll be getting a second issue, which was far from certain given the fiasco around its release.

THE NEW BIN LADEN

Inspire has also kicked off a minor flurry of attention for Awlaki including some retreads of the premise that has been kicking around for a while: Is Awlaki the new bin Laden?

The answer to that is pretty easy. "No."

First off, Awlaki's never seen actual combat, and frankly, I don't think he's the type. Bin Laden's military exploits may be greatly exaggerated, but they do, in fact, exist. Unless and until Awlaki gets out there with a machine gun, he's not likely to become the leader of what is essentially a military organization. He can be the spiritual head or a senior advisor, up to a point, but he's not blind, so he has no excuse for not fighting.

Secondly, while everyone generally agrees Awlaki has become "operational," there is no evidence he has a head for operational details or tactics. Bin Laden is quite the opposite. He understands the value of planning, and he has been hands-on supervisor for some of Al Qaeda's greatest triumphs. He notoriously pointed out the weak points in the U.S. embassy in Nairobi during the planning of the East African Embassy bombings. Awlaki, so far, has directed a college student to set his pants on fire.

Thirdly, he's American. Whether due to the local angle or unconscious bias, the fact of his American citizenship automatically causes the media to inflate his dangerousness.

Of course, I am not saying Awlaki isn't dangerous or important. He's both of those things. But we need to keep him in perspective.

ABU TALHA SPEAKS

Speaking of people whose status benefits from media coverage, the always engrossing Al Maktaba blog has an interview with Abu Talha Al Amriki, aka Zach Chesser. Turns out the heat from the South Park death threat has driven the American jihad supporter into radio silence, at least as far as using his own name. When reading, keep in mind that Abu Talha has advised pro-jihad Muslims only to talk to us "counterterrorism analysts" in order to "feed them outright lies."

Labels: Abu-Talha-Al-Amreeki, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Osama-Bin-Laden, Revolution-Muslim, Zach-Chesser

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Full AQAP Inspire Issue Posted Online

I am fighting deadlines today, but I wanted to make a couple of quick observations following on my earlier pieces.

Coverage of AQ's "New English Magazine," 1 of 2

Coverage of AQ's "New English Magazine," 2 of 2

First, and most important, if the editors of Inspire are to be believed, then Anwar Awlaki did play a direct role in the creation and production of Inspire. There is at least one article by Awlaki which is characterized as an original piece written for the magazine.

So clarifying some earlier questions, the magazine is, at the least, formally endorsed by Awalki. I suspect we're still looking at a jihobbyist production, but as I noted earlier, Awlaki and AQAP's active role in the magazine does open the door to a "material support of terrorism" charge for any Americans who helped produce it.

The most important article in AQAP Inspire is not Awlaki's fairly pedestrian article on the Danish cartoons, but a guide for aspiring Westerners about what to expect and how to prepare when you go to jihad overseas.

The format still strongly resembles Jihad Recollections, but it seems to me the content is a bit more sophisticated and a bit more activist in terms of what it expects its readers to do after perusing the issue.

Overall, I'm sticking with much of my earlier analysis of the magazine as cited above. I will say that the magazine is, in some ways, a step up from Al-Hussam in terms of its sophistication as a magazine. It's probably also an upgrade in terms of content, except for the impression that its main participants (writers of original articles and editors) appear to the reader's eye to be mostly noncombatants -- a category that includes Awlaki, I might add. Al-Hussam had tremendous credibility for its unpretentious style and links to actual fighters. In contrast, Inspire is a bit effete.

That's all for now, but I may ring in with some additional thoughts later.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Weblog

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

AQAP Inspire Magazine Is Nothing New

All this has happened before, and it will happen again. Despite the fact that so many in the media and government are only just discovering that jihadists are trying to recruit Westerners, these programs have been going on -- successfully -- for decades. There is nothing new about what AQAP Inspire is trying to do.

Earlier examples, like the Al-Hussam newsletter shown below, were produced the legitimate successor to Abdullah Azzam's Services Office, which stage-managed the Arab jihad against the Soviets. I've spent a lot of time with Al-Hussam and its modern counterparts as research for my forthcoming book on American jihadists.




The difference between the 1980s, the 1990s and today is not so much a change in the jihadists. It's a change in media technology. Jihadists in the '80s and '90s distributed propaganda on videotape and paper newsletters.

Jihadists today have access to sophisticated publishing software that can be purchased off the shelf, relatively inexpensive, and they don't need to print their product on paper (despite what NPR would have you think).

More importantly, jihadists today have access to the Internet for distribution. This, more than anything, opens the door for products like Inspire. Al-Hussam, in contrast, was put out by professional jihadists.

Another difference, and an extremely important one, is that Al-Hussam had to be printed (which cost money), mailed (which cost money), or handed out at mosques, which cost money and also required approval from the mosque. Even 15 years ago, some mosques refused to allow this content and banned Al-Hussam from being distributed on their grounds. It would be an even tougher sell today.

The total bill for printing and mailing Al-Hussam was significantly north of $1,000 per issue, and its reach was limited by the number of copies that were printed. The total bill for an issue of Inspire was probably zero dollars, and if not for the drama around its release, it could have reached an unlimited number of people.

The Internet has served as a platform for jihadists for more than a decade, and while its use is ever-growing, it's not new. Inspire isn't new. None of this is new, and it's not really news.

Now don't get me wrong. I am all in favor of using incremental developments like the release of the magazine to discuss the overall issue of jihadist propaganda in English and otherwise. And I am happy to do so, whether here or in interviews.

But it should be an educated discussion, and not "Watch Out, Condé Nast: Al-Qaida Launches English-Language Lifestyle Mag." (Sorry, Danger Room.)

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, AQAP, Weblog

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Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Awlaki: Finally One of the Cool Kids

American-born cleric Anwar Awlaki is the star of a new video release from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

The release, which is in Arabic , represents a fundamental shift in status for Awlaki, who has not thus far attracted much of an audience among the Arabic-speaking jihadis online. This also marks the first time Awlaki has been featured in an official Al Qaeda-branded media event.

Awlaki's previous lectures, sermons and pronouncements have been in English. To my knowledge, they have not been translated or posted by the admins of the major Arabic-language jihad message boards. By way of comparison, media releases featuring American jihadists Adam Gadahn and Omar Hammami almost always get splashy banner ads and wide distribution.

Since openly embracing the dark side, Awlaki's following has consisted mostly of English-speaking jihadists, who have so far been the boy sidekicks of the global jihadist community. Holy asymmetric warfare, Batman!

Awlaki's recent activities clearly indicated how much he craved the approval of the real terrorists. His cultivation of Omar Mutallab was an effort to show he could get involved with terrorism on purpose (rather than by accident, as he characterized his interaction with Nidal Hassan). And his March declaration of obligatory jihad against the United States was a by-the-books emulation of Al Qaeda's theological talking points, the jihadist equivalent of trying on Dad's shoes.

So this Arabic release isn't just a matter of language, it's a matter of status. This video is Awlaki's worldwide premiere. He's been invited to join the ranks of the cool kids. Will they accept him? Will he get a giant banner at the top of the page, a sticky, or just a fleeting post in the AQAP section? Stay tuned for dtails...

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink