The Content and Context of Anwar Awlaki's E-mails with Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Hasan

Probably the most difficult, bedeviling problem in combating terrorism through law enforcement is interpreting the words of suspects to divine their real intentions, then to build a case from that interpretation.

It seems to me that this issue is exemplified by the long-withheld e-mail exchange between the radical American cleric Anwar Awlaki and the Fort Hood shooter, Major Nidal Hasan.

My friend Daveed Gartenstein-Ross has a new entry over at Gunpowder and Lead, with Lauren Morgan, outlining the case for rating the e-mail exchange as a high threat and arguing that it should have prompted more aggressive investigative action. The post was prompted by a question from Charles Cameron.

I waited for this post before ringing in, because I wanted to see if I would be swayed by Daveed's argument, which he broadly telegraphed on Twitter last week. While we ultimately reach the same conclusion -- that the FBI and Defense Department should have investigated Hasan more aggressively -- we get there by a different path and with somewhat different areas of emphasis.

I'm not going to summarize the G&L post, which you should read before proceeding, precisely because it so thorough in its treatment of the question. But therein lies the rub. We're scrutinizing these emails and how they were handled. Why? Because we now know one person involved carried out a horrific act of terrorism and the other became a top Al Qaeda propagandist.

Nothing in Daveed's argument is wrong and it all falls within the scope of what he and Lauren set out to examine. There are clearly markers of concern in these e-mails, and the fact they involve an active duty military officer and a known radicalizer with links to September 11 is alone sufficient reason for the Washington Field Office to have escalated the case, at least to the point of an interview with Hasan and his immediate superiors.

But I think there are distractions lurking here, which move us away from what actually went wrong and what lessons we should learn.

I want to raise two key issues in this respect, because I think it's hard to really understand the case without them. This doesn't negate the points raised by Daveed and Lauren, but I feel that the context here is so important that it's misleading to consider the issue without acknowledging them.

The first issue has to do with the relationship between the FBI's San Diego and Washington Field Offices. If you read the more thorough Senate Homeland Security Committee report, the more telling Webster Commission Report, and records released by the 9/11 Commission, you don't have to squint very hard between the lines to see there were political tensions between the two offices, which I have also heard from multiple sources with knowledge of the situation.

Much of this tension specifically revolved around Awlaki and long preceded the Hasan emails. The Awlaki investigation ping-ponged back and forth between the two offices like a hot potato since 2001. These tensions resulted in strained and often inadequate communication between the two branches, which creates inertia and resistance and obstacles to effective, objective functioning.

This doesn't excuse the handling of the case. If anything, an institutional management failure is more damnable than a simple oversight or misinterpretation. But the testy relationship between the offices, clearly illuminated in the Webster report, has little to do with the content of the investigation.

When we're looking for lessons learned, it's my opinion (based on what we know today) that the will to analyze may have been a larger issue than the approach to analysis.

The characterization of the e-mails by unnamed officials as "fairly benign," which Daveed rightly attacks, was an after-the-fact effort at spin. It deserves to be refuted but also points to the second issue.

Anyone who has spent time with raw intelligence knows that you have to triage leads. For every intercept that states "I've bought the fertilizer and I'm loading it in the truck tonight down by the lake," there are literally thousands and thousands that say "I hate America," "I love Al Qaeda," "I'd like to kill those bastards," "I swear to God it's time for action and not words," "If I was James Holmes, here's how I would have done it better," "You need to start mentally preparing now to kill your neighbors when the revolution comes," and "Would you consider someone like Hasan Akbar to be fighting jihad, and if he died would he be a martyr?" (All of the above are paraphrases of actual extremist content I've reviewed.)

The words of suspects -- whether recounted in e-mails, phone intercepts, informant reports, or online postings -- must be interpreted and prioritized relative to dozens or hundreds or thousands of other leads. This can be a science if you're a trained FBI profiler, but it's strictly an art if you're anyone else. Zach Chesser's online output, to the layman, was pretty alarming and seemed to indicate he might try to act out violently on U.S. soil, but he never did. And even profilers cannot read intent from most verbal and written content with absolute reliability.

Based on who Hasan was (a military officer), who he was talking to (a suspected 9/11 accomplice), and the fact he repeatedly tried to get Awlaki's attention using a variety of stratagems, the case should have been escalated and Hasan's superiors should have been informed.

But when you place the content of Hasan's messages alongside all the other raw intelligence that counterterrorism investigations generate, it's extremely hard to argue from a subjective, non-psychoanalytical reading that they represented a red flag.

Even putting aside the broad universe of raw intelligence, consider just the workload generated by the Awlaki Web site intercept and what we don't know about the nature of that content.

If you get 60 leads per day featuring people writing to Awlaki, are half asking what concrete steps they can take to participate in jihad? Are the other half are oblique in the same way Hasan was oblique? Which would you prioritize?

Hasan's e-mails didn't exist in a vacuum; they competed for attention with an unknown number of other e-mails featuring unknown content from Awlaki's Web site but also his email accounts as well as traffic from other investigations. The Webster report indicates that two San Diego analysts were processing an average of 65 to 70 electronic intercepts per day. Although it does not specify if all of those were related to Awlaki, other figures quoted in the report would be consistent with that conclusion. (H/T @emptywheel) The exact content distribution is unknown.

It's difficult to separate hindsight from our analysis. We approach these emails looking for evidence of Hasan's intentions, but we already know his actual intentions. If we read the thousands of e-mails generated during the period Hasan was corresponding with Awlaki, without any names attached, would we pick Hasan's messages as the most important? Would they even make the top 10 or the top 100? I suspect they would not.

It would be interesting to approach this subject from the perspective of a blind study, analyzing dozens of unlabeled intercepts -- some from people who went on to act violently, and some from people who did not. I'd bet serious money such an experiment would be a massive failure and would not reliably identify which subjects became violent and which did not.

Without such a study in hand (and if you have one, please send), we need to acknowledge the lack of hard data correlating different types of talk with physical action and the subjectivity of the exercise. The content certainly informs our understanding, but I don't think it leads to a "lesson learned" moment.

I don't disagree with the content markers noted by Daveed and Lauren, but I think it's a mistake to say those markers can be interpreted with much certainty without the benefit of hindsight. I'm not claiming this is their actual argument -- I think they're arguing to include context -- but I came away from reading the piece feeling that there was too much emphasis on the content and too much certainty about its significance.

It is, of course, important to understand and study content, but you can't point to a reference to Hasan Akbar in a vacuum and say it's significant, unless you've looked at a constellation of similar references and attempted to correlate them to action.

I don't think this particular example illustrates useful investigative triggers that are likely to result in improved screening, and I don't think it illustrates a systemic failure that requires correction. The "lesson learned" is that the context of the messages should have escalated the investigation (and prompted more attention to the content).

If the content of the Hasan e-mails represents a threshold for escalated investigative concern, we're going to need a whole lot more FBI agents. I see dozens of online postings and messages per day that are far more worrisome than these e-mails, yet it is extraordinarily rare for these posts to connect with terrorist acts in any way. We need more study of how talk correlates to action, but the art of textual interpretation is not simple and rarely leads to black-and-white answers.

For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.


This post was updated at 1:47 p.m. 

Labels: American-Al-Qaeda, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, Fort-Hood, Jihad-Joe, Nidal-Malik-Hasan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Anwar Awlaki E-Mail Exchange With Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Hasan

I listened to a lecture that made a parallel between Iblis and the People of the book and was wondering if it was consistent with what the Quran teaches. He basically stated that Allah (SWT) speaks the truth and should always be obeyed. He told the story of how Allah (SWT) told Adam (AS) to take Shaitan as an enemy and toldy him to stay away from the tree. Shaitan told Adam that he was his well wisher and the only reason the tree was denied him because it would make him an angel or live forever. So Adam listened to Shaitan and neglected the heedings of his lord. He goes on to say that Allah (SWT) warns us not to take the people of the book as protecting friends (aulia) and the lecturer stated that if we ignore Allah (SWT) like Adam we will have no exuse if we end up in hell fire because of the advice given by the people of the book. He explains that some of the people of the book are sincere in their advice but are ignorant and if you listen to sincere ignorant advice over Allah (SWT) you fall at your own peril. V/R Nidal


For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, Fort-Hood, lone-wolf, Nidal-Malik-Hasan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Al Qaeda and the U.S. Military: Resources For Journalists

On Wednesday, a joint Congressional Homeland Security hearing will examine the threat of Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism to America's military on U.S. soil. This is a very large and complex topic. I wanted to share some resources for journalists looking to cover the hearings and the topic more broadly. Please note that I will be in Washington on Wednesday afternoon if you're looking to book someone to discuss the issue.

There are two components to the terrorist threat against the military at home: Internal and external. The current external threat is, in some ways, the simpler one to understand.

Al Qaeda-inspired homegrown terrorists have shown a sharp preference for targeting military facilities in recent years, including Khalid Abdul Latif in Seattle, Yonathan Melaku in Virginia, the Fort Dix Six, Antonio Martinez in Baltimore, and Nidal Hasan and Naser Abdo, both at Fort Hood in Texas.

What's interesting about this is the fact that many of them choose military targets because of explicit discomfort about the morality targeting civilians. I wrote about this dichotomy for The Atlantic.

The internal threat is more complicated and less covered by the media. There's a baseline issue with military personnel who turn against their own, as in the cases of Melaku, Hasan, Abdo and Sgt. Hasan Akbar, all of whom were -- to a greater or lesser extent -- operating independently. They were people serving in the military who allegedly became caught up in the tension between serving in the U.S. military and feeling that they were religiously or morally unable to kill fellow Muslims in theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Beyond these cases, which seem to be on the rise inasmuch as a such statements based on the very small sample size, the military has been the subject of deliberate and often very successful infiltration efforts by Al Qaeda and related groups.

These efforts go back to the 1980s. One of the earliest examples is the case of Ali Mohamed, a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad who later became a key operational terrorist planner, trainer and security chief in Al Qaeda.

Mohamed's resume also included the position of Staff Sgt. in the U.S. Army, stationed at Fort Bragg. Current Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri tasked Mohamed to infiltrate U.S. intelligence during the early 1980s on behalf of EIJ, the group Zawahiri led at the time (this was before Al Qaeda even existed). After an unsuccessful run at the CIA abroad, Mohamed moved to the United States, joined the Army and became a U.S. citizen. He was in the Army for four years, during which time he stole military manuals and sensitive information from Fort Bragg, took part in active fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and conducted training for jihadists and terrorists both abroad and in the New York City area. Some of his trainees took part in the World Trade Center bombing and a thwarted plot to bomb New York landmarks and the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels.

Here are some INTELWIRE-exclusive resources on Mohamed:

Who Is Ali Mohamed?

Al Qaeda Spy Crafted 9/11 Network

New Link Between Ali Mohamed And 9/11

Who Masterminded 1993 WTC Bombing?

'Coleman Affidavit' on Ali Mohamed

Ali Mohamed Sourcebook

Nat Geo documentary, J.M. Berger Lead Researcher

Mohamed's case was not the only notable infiltration of the U.S. military by Al Qaeda. During the first Gulf War, an Al Qaeda operative named Tahir was part of a religious team dispatched to Riyadh by the Saudi government in a wildly successful effort to convert U.S. soldiers to Islam.

Tahir, a Vietnam vet who worked for Al Qaeda in Bosnia and Somalia, was one of several team members given wide-ranging access to U.S. personnel as part of an initiative presented by the Saudi government under the pretext of a cultural exchange. Another member of the team was Bilal Philips, an extremely controversial Islamic scholar who has been banned from entering Germany and the UK due to his preaching on such subjects as homosexuality and child marriage. At least hundreds of U.S. soldiers reportedly converted to Islam after the program.

After the war ended, Tahir and Philips attempted to recruit soldiers who had been exposed to the program as jihadist fighters in Bosnia. At least a dozen U.S. military vets went to Bosnia as "trainers" under this program and some stayed as fighters. The same program later recruited and trained the terrorists who attempted to carry out the Landmarks plot. The Bosnia program was funded by the Third World Relief Agency, an Al Qaeda-linked NGO which posed as a charity but in reality ran guns to Bosnia in defiance of a U.N. embargo and supported various terrorist causes.

As part of the recruiting program for trainers of the Bosnian mujahideen, Philips told me that he enlisted the help of Qaseem Uqdah, a vet then affiliated with the organization Muslim Military Matters, and for more than a decade after one of the key figures involved in certifying Muslim chaplains for the U.S. military. Uqdah refused repeated requests to discuss his involvement in the program with me.

For a very detailed account of this complex and nuanced program, which has never been fully exposed before, check out my new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Ali-Mohamed, Bilal-Philips, Bosnia, Egyptian-Islamic-Jihad, Fort-Hood, lone-wolf, Nasser-Abdo, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Third-World-Relief-Agency, Yonathan-Melaku

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Who Really Inspired Nasser Abdo?

New details continue to emerge regarding Nasser Abdo, the would-be terrorist who was arrested before he could carry out an attack on military personnel stationed at Fort Hood.

Abdo's own words indicate he was inspired by Nidal Hasan, the Army major and devotee of Anwar Awlaki who killed 13 people in a shooting spree in November 2009. And a search of his hotel room revealed he was also reading Inspire magazine, which is published by Awlaki and his followers and urges Americans to take up "individual jihad" by plotting solitary attacks.

But here's something else to consider. Abdo, it now appears, was planning to carry out a complex attack using a bomb, in combination with a shooting attack, while wearing a fake military uniform.

Just days earlier, Norwegian right-winger Anders Breivik had carried out a complex attack that combined a bomb with a shooting spree, employing a fake police uniform in the process.

Breivik's attack was carried out July 22. Abdo didn't purchase the guns and other supplies for his attack until July 27.

We don't know enough to draw any firm conclusions here, but I will be very curious to see how the timeline of Abdo's alleged attack plays out as his court case progresses.

One of the worrisome things about Breivik's spectacular terrorist attack is that its most successful features are relatively easy to emulate compared to the work of a bomb design genius like Ramzi Yousef, or expensive and complicated attacks like September 11 which require a robust support network.

My concern is that Breivik has provided a "proof of concept" not previously seen in the terrorist world, which shows terrorists of any ideology just how much impact one person can have. Could Abdo have been moved closer to action by this example? We don't have enough information to be certain, but it's a provocative -- and worrying -- question.

For much more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Anders-Behring-Breivik, Anwar-Awlaki, Fort-Hood, Inspire-Magazine, Nasser-Abdo, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Oslo

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New "Jihad Joe" Cases Develop On Both Coasts, Melaku, Abdul-Latif And Mujahidh

The Justice Department revealed details of three new "Jihad Joe" suspects today in coast-to-coast court filings and press releases.

Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif, 33, of Seattle, and Walli Mujahidh, 32, of Los Angeles, and Yonathan Melaku, 22, of Alexandria are all American citizens and all appear to fit the "individual jihad" terrorist model, acting independently and without contacting a formal terrorist network such as Al Qaeda.

Today's cases are notable as examples of radicalized American Muslims acting out with near total independence. Melaku in particular fits the lone wolf profile. In most of the previous "lone wolf" cases, foreign terrorists (or FBI agents posing as such) have played a significant role in motivating and training would-be attackers.

In both cases revealed today, firearms were an important part of the equation. There have been 17 deaths from clear cases of homegrown Islamic terrorism since September 11, and all of them were the result of gunfire.

In May, I wrote about this issue for the New York Daily News. Al Qaeda's English-language Inspire magazine has been focused on guns for some months, with articles encouraging lone shooters and tips on how to use and maintain assault rifles.

In June, American Al Qaeda member Adam Gadahn explicitly encouraged American Muslims to go buy weapons at gun shows and use them to shoot their fellow citizens, in an Al Qaeda video encouraging individual jihadists.

In the wake of bin Laden's death, federal authorities have closely monitored would-be individual jihadists who might carry out terrorist attacks without support from a formal terrorist network. Several American citizens have been arrested since May 1 for a variety of crimes related to Islamic extremism and terrorism.

For much more about American jihadists, check out my new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Journalists interested in discussing this issue can contact me here. For reviews and additional information about the book, click here.

ABDUL-LATIF AND MUJAHIDH

Arrested late last night in Seattle, Abdul-Latif is an African-American convert born Joseph Anthony Davis. Also arrested was Walli Mujahidh, born Frederick Domingue Jr., from Los Angeles.

Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh were charged with terrorism and firearms-related crimes today after they purchased machine guns and a grenade in an FBI undercover sting. The guns were rendered unusable before the sale.

The two men allegedly planned to use the weapons in an assault on a military processing facility in Seattle, after initially discussing an assault on Joint Base Lewis-McChord, on Puget Sound. Abdul-Latif, a felon previously convicted of robbery and assault, faces additional charges for illegal firearms possession.

A person in the community reported Abdul-Latif to Seattle police after being approached to help with the attack, according to a Justice Department press release and a criminal complaint filed today. The police brought the FBI into the case, and the person who made the tip became a paid informant. The informant also has previous felony convictions. In early June, the two men were allegedly recorded in video and audio surveillance discussing the planned assault.

The targeted building, where the military processes new enlistees, includes a daycare center and civilian personnel on the premises, although Abdul-Latify specified he wanted to kill military targets and not civilians. Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh discussed reconnaissance and practice runs for the attack. Abdul-Latif carried out the surveillance, noting the placement of security cameras and a guard, whom he said would be killed "first" in the attack, according to the criminal complaint.

Abdul-Latif said he wanted to die as a martyr in the attack, which he characterized as revenge for wrongdoing by U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. He later introduced the informant to Mujahidh, according to the complaint. Abdul-Latif described his admiration for Osama Bin Laden (at this point it was after bin Laden's death), as well as his admiration for the 2009 Fort Hood killing spree by Army Major Nidal Hasan.

"We're not only trying to kill people, we're trying to send a message," Abdul-Latif said in one surveillance recording. "We're trying to get something that's gonna be on CNN and all over the world."

The two men are charged with conspiracy to kill federal government personnel and violations pertaining to the grenades and guns, charges carrying the potential of life in prison. They were scheduled to appear in court this afternoon in Seattle.

Although the investigation is still at an early stage, it was not clear whether Abdul-Latif or Mujahidh were directly influenced by Inspire magazine or the recent Adam Gadahn video, or whether their primary inspiration was, as described in the complaint, Nidal Hasan's shooting spree.

YONATHAN MELAKU

An Ethiopian-American and Marine reservist facing indictment for grand larceny in a separate case, Melaku was arrested last week after he was seen behaving suspiciously at Arlington National Cemetery after hours. According to an affidavit released today, Melaku was carrying a backpack containing four five-pound baggies of ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer often employed in the construction of improvised explosives, such as the truck bomb used in the Oklahoma City bombing.

Subsequent investigation revealed that Melaku was responsible for a series of shootings targeting military buildings last year. In at least one of those attacks, which only caused property damage, Melaku videotaped himself shouting "Allahu Akbar" while firing at the U.S. Marine Corps museum building. Forensics showed Melaku was carrying shell casings at the time of his arrest which are consistent with the other attacks.

A search revealed that Melaku's computer and at least one notebook contained extensive information on jihadist figures and procedures for building improvised explosives. Melaku had not been suspected in the attacks prior to his arrest last week.

The Defense Department initiated separation proceedings against Melaku on Tuesday.

Prior to 9/11, U.S. military personnel and military vets formed the backbone of the American jihadist movement, although that trend has significantly reversed in recent years.

However, while the overall trend has shifted toward a higher concentration of civilian jihadists, there are a number of examples of active and former military members who have been involved in jihadist terrorism, including Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, and Hasan Akbar, who killed two fellow soldiers while serving in Iraq in 2003. Abdul-Latif, arrested today, was also reportedly a military veteran who served in the Navy during the 1990s.

OTHER POST-BIN LADEN CASES

Hundreds of American citizens have been arrested in relation to jihadist terrorism over the last 30 years, with more than 180 of those cases taking place after September 11. Several significant arrests have taken place since the death of Osama bin Laden on May 1, including:

Younus Abdullah Muhammad, the American co-founder of the radical Web site Revolution Muslim, was arrested in Morocco for extradition to the United States for his role in publicizing threats against the creators of "South Park" for an episode dealing with the controversy over depicting images of the Prophet Mohammed. Zach Chesser of Virginia was previously convicted of writing the threats and attempting to join the Al Shabab jihadist movement in Somalia.

Joseph Brice, a 20-year-old from Clarkston, Wash., was a skilled builder of improvised explosives who volunteered his services on jihadist online forums and eventually to an undercover FBI agent representing himself as a jihadist. Investigators are not ocnvinced Brice was a Muslim or ideologically committed to Islamic terrorist causes, but believe he may better fit the profile of a serial bomber. INTELWIRE will have more details about the Brice case later this week.

Three American citizens in Florida were arrested May 14 for raising money on behalf of Tehrik-e Taliban, the Pakistani group behind the attempted bombing of Times Square by American citizen Faisal Shahzad, includinjg Hafiz Muhammed Sher Ali Khan, 76, imam of the Miami Masjid; Hafiz Khan's son, Irfan Khan, 37, also of Miami, imam at the Jamaat Al-Mu’mineen Mosque in Margate, Fla.; and another son, Izhar Khan, 24, of North Lauderdale, Fla.

THE POST-BIN LADEN WAVE

In May, I spoke at George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute (video) about Jihad Joe. In response to a question about the threat picture going forward, I said the period after bin Laden's death would represent a key test of the "individual" or "leaderless" jihad concept championed by American jihadist ideologues such as Anwar Awlaki and Adam Gadahn.

Despite the serious cases represented above, we have yet to see a numerically significant surge in actual or attempted attacks by lone wolves and individual jihadists. Melaku was actively pursuing individual jihad prior to bin Laden's death, and whatever Brice was up to, he was up to before bin Laden. The charges against Younus are also old. The Florida Taliban cell was active before bin Laden's death and at any rate does not qualify as a lone wolf operation.

The lack of activity so far is extremely encouraging , although I don't think we're quite out of the woods yet. While lone wolves often act with minimal preparation, they do tend to prepare. And the June Al Qaeda video release I mentioned above represents one of the most serious investments to date by Al Qaeda Central in the concept of individual jihad. The video release has already sparked some alarming conversations on the jihadist Internet forums. History does not offer any clear examples of terrorist attacks being conceived on the forums and graduating to execution, but there's a first time for everything.

For much more about the history of American jihadism and its current incarnation, check out my new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Journalists interested in discussing this issue can contact me here. For reviews and additional information about the book, click here.

Labels: Adam-Gadahn, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, Guns, Jihad-Joe, Joseph-Brice, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Yonathan-Melaku, Younus-Abdullah-Mohammed

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Can "Lone Wolves" Travel In Packs?

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

The death of Osama bin Laden has a lot of people worried about Al Qaeda's revenge. How will the terrorist organization respond to the death of its leader? Will there be new attacks on America?

It's not a simple question. The central Al Qaeda organization -- the group of men based in Afghanistan and Pakistan who attacked us on September 11 -- was already under pressure before bin Laden's death, and it's going to be under a lot more pressure once U.S. intelligence finishes reading the computer hard drives they seized from bin Laden's house.

Then there are Al Qaeda's affiliates abroad, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al Shabab. These organizations may have better capacity for an attack, but they also have distractions -- namely revolutions in their backyards. Some or all of these groups are likely to attempt something, but the nature and timing of such attacks could take any number of forms.

The biggest question mark comes from the group uniquely positioned to avenge Osama bin Laden's death -- the homegrown American terrorists commonly referred to as "lone wolves."

Since September 11, U.S. authorities have become increasingly concerned about the terrorist threat from radicalized American Muslims who are willing and able to carry out acts of violence without institutional support from a formal terrorist network such as Al Qaeda. My new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, looks at the few successes and significant failures of the lone-wolf crowd.

In truth, most of the American lone wolves were not truly alone; they are loosely networked with each other and with various Al Qaeda franchises. Fort Hood gunman Nidal Hasan was guided by Anwar Awlaki, who is tied to Al Qaeda in Yemen. Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad was trained and financed by the Pakistani Taliban. The would-be Portland Christmas bomber Mohamed Mohamud thought he was being helped by al Qaeda Central, but his helpers turned out to be FBI agents. The same thing happened to Antonio Martinez, who hoped to bomb a U.S. military recruiting station near Baltimore.

Worries about these homegrown terrorists acting alone, or with minimal support and supervision, can be traced back to the writings of a jihadist ideologue whom not many Americans have heard of -- Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, better known by his nom de jihad, Abu Musab Al Suri.

Al Suri is an Al Qaeda member who produced massive amount of jihadist training material in video and in books. His works, which are currently being reprinted in serialized form by Al Qaeda in Yemen's English language magazine "Inspire," call for individual Muslims to take up the banner of jihad without waiting for support from a formal terrorist organization.

This is most commonly referred to today as "leaderless jihad," and it takes more than a few pages from a concept known as "leaderless resistance," which was championed by white supremacist Louis Beam for use in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s.

Thus far, leaderless jihad -- like leaderless resistance before it -- has been a perennial underachiever. While a fairly impressive number of radicals have attempted to act on their own, most have crafted terrorist attacks that were doomed to fail, and even the most successful "leaderless" events (like Hasan's shooting spree) have been small in comparison to September 11 or the Al Qaeda's 1998 East African embassy bombings.

There are a lot of factors holding back leaderless jihadists. For one thing, terrorism tends not to be easy, especially if you're trying to build a bomb or pull off a complicated stunt. Money and training -- of the sort provided by a formal terrorist organization -- exponentially increase the effectiveness of a would-be terrorist.

And the people most likely to have been influenced by Al Suri's ideas tend to be, well, let's call it "kinetically challenged." They spend a lot of time banging on keyboards in darkened rooms. They tend to be young. Very few have any real experience or training in fighting, unlike the American jihadists of the pre-9/11 era, who were often military veterans.

But the leaderless jihad has now arrived at a crossroads with the death of Osama bin Laden.

Louis Beam's "leaderless" followers shared a common conception. One day, they imagined, a pivotal event would cause all of the leaderless cells to step forward and take action, inspired by a common provocation, and sweep over the country, kicking ass, taking names and generally overthrowing the status quo.

The invasion of Panama was seen as such a precipitating event. When it happened, there was a lot of talk, but no one acted. The Oklahoma City bombing (inspired in part by Beam's philosophy) was exactly the sort of thing that was supposed to launch the revolution. When it happened, they didn't even talk. Virtually all of the racist and anti-government militia groups crawled into the deepest, darkest holes they could find and stayed there for about 10 years. The lesson learned is this: When you don't have a leader, it's pretty easy to stay home.

The death of Osama bin Laden has raised the specter of reprisals. Some sort of response from institutional Al Qaeda and its affiliates is a real possibility, but there are also compelling tactical arguments for them to keep their powder dry. And the culture of jihadist terrorist organizations skews toward long-term thinking. Such reprisals are a serious concern but not a fait accompli. And of course, these organizations are constantly planning terror attacks, with or without provocation, so to some extent, it's just business as usual for them.

The tactical arguments that might slow institutional terrorists don't apply to American "lone wolves," however. Their actions are simpler, and they lack the weight of Al Qaeda's not-insignificant bureaucracy on their shoulders. They are already living next to their targets; the logistics are much simpler.

And so we come to the day of reckoning, the killing by American forces of the global jihad's most important patron, Osama bin Laden. If the lone wolves are a force to contend with, this must be their moment. The opportunity cost for action is negligible. The affront to their sensibilities is enormous.

We really don't have a good handle on how many potential lone wolves might be out there. We know that the number of Americans who take part in jihadist online forums runs at least into the hundreds and most likely into the thousands. A 2007 survey of American Muslims by Pew found that 5 percent admitted to having a favorable view of Al Qaeda, which translates into tens of thousands of people.

But not all of those sympathetic people are likely to act out with violence. So far the number has been extraordinarily small, a fraction of one percent of the total U.S. Muslim population. The open question is how many of these are close to acting and just waiting for the right combination of considerations.

We're about to find out whether the threat from leaderless lone wolves is destined to remain a trickle of malcontents lashing out sporadically, or whether Abu Musab Al Suri's vision of an organically synchronized jihad without borders or affiliations has real legs to carry it into the 21st century.

If not now, when?

We don't know whether the lone wolves have what it takes to make a lasting impact, and that lack of knowledge is more unsettling than comforting. It might be time to try out that new terror alert system. It seems like the right moment for an ounce of prevention.

J.M. Berger is author of the new book, "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam," available from Amazon.com. For videos and documents related to the book, check out JihadJoeBook.com. Follow @intelwire on Twitter for updates about American jihadists.

Labels: Abu-Musab-Al-Suri, Al-Qaeda, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, Jihad-Joe, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Inspire's Ode to the Not-So-Lone Wolves

Previous: Inspire Issue 5 Aims For Rapid Repositioning

Some counterterrorism-oriented notes from the fifth issue of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's Inspire magazine:

In the "Ask Inspire" section, a writer (presumably Awlaki) encourages Americans to stay at home and carry out lone-wolf terrorist attacks rather than travel to the fields of jihad. Interestingly, it pushes the lone-wolf concept even further than previous issues, pointing out that the FBI has diverted would-be mujahideen who reached out to others for help. Probably-Awlaki argues that success is more likely if the aspiring mujahid acts without consulting ANYONE.

But there are virtually no documented cases in which an American with clear jihadist motivations has acted totally in a vacuum. Jihadism is a social movement typically carried out because the participant has an overly strong sense of community. Lone actors are exactly the opposite.

Awlaki cites Nidal Hasan and Stockholm bomber Taimour Abdulwahab as examples of "lone wolves," but in reality, Hasan had contact with Awlaki directly, and Abdulwahab may have had accomplices. Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab is cited elsewhere in the magazine as another example of lone wolfism, but he hardly qualifies, having been trained at an AQAP camp and assigned his mission by Awlaki personally.

AQAP's military commander Abu Hurairah also praises the not-so-lone wolves in an interview segment. He calls for a homegrown operation after every Western operation targeting mujahideen.

An extract from the writings of Abu Musab Al Suri calls for assassinations of Western military and civilian leaders. Al Suri writes that assassination is good enough for the CIA, so it's good enough for Al Qaeda.

Given that assassins are much more likely to be lone actors than other kinds of terrorists, this is probably something counterterrorism officials should be looking at. This message is reinforced by Awlaki's celebration of the assassination of Anwar Sadat later in the magazine.

It's also reinforced by repeated references throughout the magazine to Roshonara Choudhry, the British Muslim who attempted to assassinate British parliament member Stephen Timms as revenge for his vote in favor of the Iraq War.

Of all the examples cited, Choudhry is the only one who really fits the profile of a lone wolf in the purest sense. If any case study recommends itself out of Inspire No. 5, it's Choudhry. Unfortunately, her case also highlights the one redeeming characteristic of the otherwise weak lone-wolf model -- she didn't give herself away until it was too late.

For more about Awlaki and other American jihadists, pre-order "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam," the first comprehensive look at the phenomenon of American jihadists from the 1970s to the present.

Labels: Abu-Musab-Al-Suri, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Jihad-Joe, Nidal-Malik-Hasan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Mapping Awlaki's Current Social Network And Influence On Radical Actors

Click on image for full-size picture.

The image above is a map of Anwar Awlaki's current social and inspirational connections to terrorism, an effort to illustrate some of his reach and influence. For a map of Awlaki's connections to the September 11 plot and Al Qaeda, click here.

The blue figures on the left are terrorism suspects who have been explicitly inspired by Awlaki to a greater or lesser extent. The data about "inspiration" is incomplete, but all of the people linked here were followers of Awlaki's work to a greater or lesser extent. I've only included the best-documented cases here, so this list is only a sampling of Awlaki's influence on radical actors.

The green figures are so-called "lone wolves" who were in direct contact with Awlaki and in some cases taking explicit instructions from him.

Figures in red are Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula members to whom Awlaki has been clearly attached. Abu Basir al-Wuhayshi, AQAP's emir, has pledged to revenge Awlaki's death should the United States succeed in its stated intention to kill the Yemeni-American cleric.

Samir Khan is the editor of AQAP's Inspire Magazine, in which position he closely works with Awlaki. Omar Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day attempted bomber who set his underwear on fire in 2009, is listed here as part of AQAP because he was trained and equipped by them and was specifically directed by Awlaki. His bomb was designed by AQAP explosives expert Ibrahim al-Asiri, who also apparently designed the UPS cargo bombs deployed by AQAP in 2010, a plot which appears to have been tightly linked to Awlaki.

As you can see, Awlaki's disciples are largely independent from each other, although there is some measurable interconnection among various individuals, sometimes one or two people removed. One of Awlaki's strengths is that he can direct attacks through both organizational and "lone wolf" approaches.

So he's dangerously unpredictable, but on the bright side, he hasn't shown a real aptitude for planning terrorist attacks as of yet. Most attacks associated with him have been failures. His biggest success, Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan, received indoctrination from Awlaki that almost certainly contributed to his radicalization, but the best reports we have to date indicate Awlaki did not make any tactical/operation contribution to Hasan's attack.

Labels: American-Al-Qaeda, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, Jihad-Joe, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Revolution-Muslim, Samir-Khan, Zach-Chesser

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Measuring Awlaki's Influence

Joshua Foust commented today on Jihadology about this recent piece in Foreign Policy about Anwar Awlaki. You should read them first, although you'll probably get the gist if you plunge right in.

Foust raises a number of good points in his post, which questions the first article's thesis that Awlaki is "the most persuasive supporter of jihad for Muslims in the West," claiming it is impossible to show evidence of ideology's role in jihadism. Here's what I think is the key statement in Foust's commentary:

We react to our environment, we respond to peer pressures, to community norms and signals, to physical and social constraints on behavior, and so on. Ideology can, potentially, be one of those contributing factors — as a means of signaling and of establishing justification for certain behaviors. But to say that ideology causes behavior is difficult if not impossible to prove — not only can we never get inside someone’s head to say, conclusively, why they did something, but we know, from neuroscience, that people cannot explain their own behavior consistently. And still, you’re left with the lingering question of why this specific person reacted against ideology while the thousands of others who were exposed to it did not.

At best, ideology is a woefully incomplete explanation for why terrorists chose to commit terror. But to argue that it is so important requires a standard of evidence that is, in practical terms, impossible to achieve.

Persuasion, especially as an absolute, is not clearly quantifiable. People are extremely complicated and most bring pre-existing conditions to their decisions, as Foust points out here and as I explore in (shameless plug alert) my forthcoming book on American jihadists.

But I don't think we have to throw up our hands and surrender on the question of trying to understand or prioritize the role of ideology, or at least of ideologues, in shaping the behavior of jihadists (among other demographics).

"Influence" might be the better word. We see evidence of influence when we see that a person has a hard drive or iPod full of Awlaki lectures. That doesn't mean Awlaki is the sole reason for that person's behavior but it does mean that person has been consuming Awlaki's content.

If influence is too fuzzy, then we can further reduce the question to presence -- does Awlaki have a presence in the person's media consumption?

When you frame the question this way (and it's more than a semantic distinction), there is plenty of hard evidence to look at.

For American jihadists specifically, Western jihadists more generally, and now Arabic-speaking jihadists, Awlaki has an overwhelming presence and/or influence, as documented by the repeated appearance of his material on the hard drives of people arrested for terrorism offenses, the posting of his material on jihadist Web forums and its prominence, and the posting and re-posting and analysis of his material on pro-jihad blogs.

Terrorism suspects who kept copies of Awlaki's work lying around include Zach Chesser, Faisal Shahzad, "Jihad Jane" and her comrades in arms, Roshonara Choudhry, the Fort Dix Six, Samir Khan, Emerson Begolly, Paul and Nadia Rockwood, and many, many more. Some, such as underwear bomber Umar Abdulmutallab, Chesser and Choudhry, specifically said Awlaki influenced them. Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan reached out to Awlaki asking fo advice about the morality of his actions.

Ideologically, I think many would agree that Awlaki is not a trailblazer. He hasn't introduced anything particularly new or sophisticated to the genre. Most of his jihad-oriented work consists of condensing, translating and explaining the work of others, but also in making older works relevant to modern-day consumers.

There is a robust (and much-needed) debate in the terrorism studies community about exactly how important Awlaki is and why. Most observers would agree that Awlaki benefited greatly from inflated statements about his importance in 2009 and 2010, and he has clearly become more important in the last year because of U.S. government attention -- in the form of the "kill order" issued by the Obama administration. But none of that negates Awlaki's presence among jihadists.

Ultimately, Awlaki clearly commands a significant audience among jihadists, and it's hard to argue that he doesn't wield significant influence with this audience. Awlaki is not always be the trigger-man, as Foust might put it, but he clearly did serve in something like that role for Abdulmutallab and Hasan.

If virtually every Western jihadist is listening to Awlaki's lectures obsessively, then something significant is going on. Call it influence, persuasion or presence, but Awlaki is an increasingly important part of the jihadist movement, and there's plenty of evidence to support that notion.

AFTERTHOUGHT: With all the evidence we do have about Awlaki's presence, what we lack is a basis for comparison. We know Awlaki is on the hard drives of terrorists because the Justice Department tells us so. What they don't tell us (consistently) is what else those hard drives contain. Adam Gadahn videos? Abdullah El Faisal audios? Abu Mansour Al Amrikee? Omar Bakree Muhammad?

What about Yousef Qaradawi? Don't forget Awlaki's corpus of work is dominated by non-jihadist material which would be of interest to converts. Which lectures are they finding on these computers?

One would hope that the continual identification of Awlaki is due to the volume, content and frequency of his work appearing on drives, but certainly it's possible that a comparative study would show us something surprising. Hey, FBI, I'd sure be interested in seeing something like that!

Labels: American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, Jihad-Jane, Jihad-Joe, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Umar-Farouk-Abdulmutallab, Zach-Chesser

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Demilitarizing Jihad

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

This article first appeared in the October 2010 issue of Veterans Vision magazine.

Starting in 2008, the media and counterterrorism officials took note of a rising wave of American jihadists -- U.S. citizens who have adopted the ideology and methodology of Al Qaeda and its ilk.

In reality, these citizen extremists have been with us all along -- and in similar numbers to what we see today. Americans have taken part in the modern age of jihad from its very beginning in 1979, when two Americans joined a terrorist group that seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

I recently reviewed more than 250 documented stories of American jihadists from 1979 to the present, including both U.S. citizens and long-term legal residents. The list includes people who fought in foreign wars in the name of Islamic causes as well as people involved in terrorist networks.

Before September 11, no one in the U.S. government documented the number of Americans who had fought for jihadist causes. Even in the post-9/11 era, reliable numbers are hard to come by. But the data as it exists shows the number of American jihadists over the last 20 years has held steady or risen only modestly. The current "surge" seems larger than it is because people are paying more attention now.

But that doesn't mean it's a static field. There has been a dramatic evolution in the type of people who go to jihad. One of the most notable changes has been the increasing involvement of military amateurs.

In Afghanistan during the 1980s and in Bosnia during the 1990s, Americans were often first lured into Islamic extremist networks through idealism and good intentions. Both conflicts seemed like ethically clear situations in which innocent Muslims faced invasion and even extermination. And in both conflicts, the U.S. offered at least moral support to the Muslim side. In short, you could be a jihadist and still see yourself as a good American.

Because of this, it was relatively easy to recruit Muslim U.S. military veterans as jihadists. In Afghanistan, a number of Vietnam vets fought the Soviets. In Bosnia, a Saudi-backed program actively recruited Muslim veterans who had served in the Gulf War to assist the mujahideen. At least a dozen vets -- and probably more -- were recruited to Bosnia as either trainers or fighters.

Although activity in the U.S. provides a useful window on jihadist trends, this wasn't just an American phenomenon. For instance, commanders of the mujahideen in Afghanistan and Bosnia served in the Egyptian armed forces, as did several early members of Al Qaeda. Many of these figures had been purged from their military positions after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 by a cell of army members.

One important Al Qaeda figure -- Ali Abdelsaoud Mohamed -- had experience in both the Egyptian and U.S. armed forces. He served in the Egyptian military prior to the Sadat assassination. Later, he emigrated to the United States, becoming a U.S. citizen, enlisting in the Army and serving at Fort Bragg.

Mohamed's military experience didn't just enhance his own performance as a terrorist; he passed his skills to others as one of Al Qaeda's most important teachers, running basic and advanced training camps in Afghanistan. Mohamed also stole and translated U.S. Army training manuals into Arabic for use by Al Qaeda and other self-styled jihadists.

Mohamed helped professionalize a generation of terrorists and also used his military skills directly against the United States. Al Qaeda sent Mohamed and at least one other U.S. Army veteran to Somalia during U.S. humanitarian operations during the 1990s, and they likely played a role in the Blackhawk Down incident that resulted in the death of 18 American soldiers.

In addition to recruiting a relatively small number of people from the large pool of Muslim veterans, jihadists in the pre-9/11 era sought out professional criminals, such as illegal gun dealers and bank robbers, and a handful of police officers. The common denominator in all these fields is experience with violence, weapons and operational discipline -- important skills when fielding an army.

In the post-9/11 world, the calculus of jihadist recruitment in the U.S. has changed. It is no longer possible to act as a jihadist and still maintain one's self-image as a "good American." Although jihadists still seek to sway U.S. military members, individual actors like Nidal Hasan do not transmit military skills to jihadist networks. The vast majority of American jihadist recruits are now young men with very little direct experience of violence, let alone combat.

There are a couple of reasons for this change. Jihadists before 9/11 were often selected by recruiters who knew them personally and could afford to be discriminating. Recruits were targeted not just for enthusiasm but for useful skills and experience.

Today's jihadist networks prioritize warm bodies over skills, and they use the Internet to empower self-selection rather than seeking out known individuals. As a result, the new demographic skews toward young men who are more likely to have attended computer camp than JROTC.

The data set I examined for this piece was confined to American citizens and long-term legal residents. But there is some evidence to suggest a similar trend is taking place worldwide. A study of foreign fighters by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point found the vast majority of foreign jihadists entering Iraq had been students before they were fighters. Former military personnel represented significantly fewer than 10 percent of the cases examined, trailing behind teachers, professionals and skilled laborers.

The drop in the successful recruitment of American military veterans is particularly good news, since U.S. forces are among the world's most professional services. American vets also paid dividends to Al Qaeda and other jihadists since they could teach fighters how to counter specific tactics used by Americans (as they did in Somalia).

Foreign fighters are likely to field growing numbers of unprofessional soldiers, thanks to the change in America's political climate, continued vigilance about radicalism among foreign military services and the continued disruption of Al Qaeda training camps.

However, in specific locations, the risk continues and may even be heightened. Military members in Pakistan and Yemen are particularly at risk for terrorist infiltration, including outright defections and informal accommodations with jihadist networks.

Unprofessional forces present a decidedly mixed bag for U.S. strategists, especially when those forces are mixed with local insurgencies. Trained soldiers are more likely to professionalize their comrades. When untrained foreign fighters mix with local insurgencies, the results are unpredictable and nearly impossible to model, resulting in a constant flow of new and unexpected threats and challenges.

Another increasingly important consideration: Unprofessional soldiers are far more likely to put civilians at risk. Human shields and direct attacks on civilians aside, professional military training embeds the protection of innocent bystanders into its underlying assumptions.

U.S. forces have both explicit and implicit obligations to protect civilians. Unprofessional forces create situations that exacerbate such risks, sometimes intentionally and sometimes through ignorance of basic military practices. Collateral damage to civilians is a growing problem for U.S. forces trying to win the support of local populations. Unfortunately, that situation is likely to deteriorate for the foreseeable future.

J.M. Berger is a journalist and analyst covering terrorism for INTELWIRE.com. He has written for the Boston Globe and produced content on terrorism for National Public Radio, Public Radio International and the National Geographic Channel. Berger's book on American jihadists will be published in 2011.

Labels: Ali-Mohamed, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, Nidal-Malik-Hasan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Awlaki's Path

Anwar Awlaki is talking again, in an audio message attributed to SITE but being pushed on Al Qaeda-linked forums by the American jihad-supporters at Revolution Muslim. In fact, RM has branded the short snippet currently available with its own logo.

Whether truthfully or not, Awlaki addresses a question that has been posed to me by both Muslims and journalists: "When did Awlaki become a radical?"

Some background is in order. Aside from his employment as imam at mosques in San Diego and Washington, D.C., Awlaki was the author/artist of a series of quite popular and passionate audio lectures on subjects such as the lives of the prophets, the hereafter and the companions of Mohammed. For this work, he attracted a fairly large following among mainstream Muslims, many of whom were floored to hear his name surface in connection to Nidal Hasan and Christmas-bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

So when we talk about Awlaki, a key question is when did he become a radical. There are three possible answers to this question:

• He was always a radical, but didn't always show it.
  
• He became a radical some time before leaving the U.S.
  
• He became a radical after leaving the U.S. (possibly after being arrested and interrogated in Yemen).

Awlaki claims, in this new video, that he became radicalized after the invasion of Iraq, which would place the change after he left the U.S. but before he went to Yemen. He was in the U.K. at the time of the invasion. According to Awlaki's new audio:

"However, with the American invasion of Iraq and continued U.S. aggression against Muslims, I could not reconcile between living in the U.S. and being a Muslim. And I eventually came to the conclusion that jihad against America is binding on myself, just as it binding on every other able Muslim. [...]

"To the Muslims in America, I have this to say: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters? How can you hand your loyalty to the government that is leading the war against Islam and Muslims?"

While it makes a convenient talking point for Awlaki to have become suddenly radicalized by Iraq, the evidence suggests it happened much earlier. For one thing, there is Awlaki's well-publicized association with 9/11 hijackers in San Diego and Washington, D.C. I'll have more to say about that in my book, but it sure looks to me like this association was not entirely innocent (although there is currently no evidence that Awlaki knew specifics about the 9/11 plot).

More to the point, here's an excerpt from a 2002 sermon that Awlaki gave at the Dar El Hijra mosque -- before the invasion of Iraq and before he left the U.S. for good. He's railing in hysterical tones against the government after a series of raids on Islamic charities suspected of financing terrorism:

So this is not now a war on terrorism. We need to all be clear about this. This is a war against Muslims. It is a war against Muslim and Islam. Not only is it happening worldwide but it’s happening right here in America, that is claiming to be fighting this war for the sake of freedom, while it’s infringing on the freedom of its own citizens just because they’re Muslims. For no other reason.

And as Muslims, if we allow this to continue, if we do not stop it it ain’t gonna stop! It’s not gonna stop. If you don’t stand up in this struggle and make your voices heard and unite and make it clear to the authorities that you’re not going to allow your necks to be stepped over and your rights to be infringed upon. If you do not do that, then only Allah knows where it’s going to stop. Maybe the next day the Congress will pass a bill that Islam is illegal in America.

So while we have to acknowledge Awlaki's version of these events, we don't have to accept his version blindly. Whatever the details of Anwar Awlaki's path to the jihad, it started long before Iraq.

Here's the new audio. Please credit INTELWIRE.com if you broadcast or link the clip. The 2002 audio is also available. Broadcast journalists can contact me for a copy.

Labels: American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Umar-Farouk-Abdulmutallab

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Mobley Linked To Awlaki

Well, I called it...

A New Jersey nuclear plant laborer arrested in Yemen with 10 other suspected al Qaeda members was in contact with the same radical Yemeni-American cleric tied to Fort Hood shooting suspect Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, federal law enforcement officials told ABC News.

Source: ABC News

Labels: Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Sharif-Mobley

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Full Text of Today's Adam Gadahn Video

Adam Gadahn's latest video, released today

Please credit INTELWIRE.com if reporting from this transcript.

A Call To Arms
Brother Adam Yahiye Gadahn
Muharram 1431

I seek refuge in Allah from Satan the Accursed. In the Name of Allah, Most Compassionate, Most Merciful:

"O you who believe! Fight the unbelievers who are closest in proximity to you and let them find harshness in you; and know that Allah is with those who fear Him." (9:123)

Muslim brothers everywhere, as-Salaamu 'Alaykum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakaatuh [peace be upon you and the mercy of Allah and His blessings]. Wa B'ad:

The year 2009, the inaugural year of a new administration in Washington, ended in a truly miserable fashion for the Crusader West and its intelligence organs, who suffered a series of moral and material blows which culminated in the bloody deaths of at least 8 CIA operatives in a masterfully-planned and executed martyrdom operation inside their clandestine base in Afghanistan. This crushing blow came just a few days after the compromising of America's supposedly airtight security in a valiant attempt by a heroic soldier of al-Qaida to bring down an American airliner over Detroit. But I would like here to take you back to an earlier event, one whose hero wasn't a member of al-Qaida or any other Islamic group, but was in fact, a ranking officer of the United States Army, Major Nidal Malik Hasan, who, this past autumn, opened fire on a group of American soldiers preparing to deploy to Afghanistan deep within the army's largest domestic base, Fort Hood, Texas. According to official army figures, at least 13 Crusaders were killed and more than 30 wounded in this surprise attack. Major Nidal Malik Hasan himself was shot, wounded and captured, and has had charges filed against him in a Crusader military court of inquisition in preparation for a summary show trial whose outcome is not in question.

America may let the thugs of Blackwater off the hook, and may give the depraved guards of Abu Ghraib and the homicidal gang-rapists of al-Miqdadiyah slaps on the wrist, but it goes without saying that such concessions don't extend to defiant Muslim heroes like Major Nidal Malik Hasan. The fact is, the heroic Fort Hood operation opens up a host of new opportunities for discussion of the hypocrisy, hubris and less-than-wholesome aspects of the Western Crusader culture which bestows peace prizes on war presidents and condemns Christmas messages from captured American soldiers as cruel, even as it continues to torture and humiliate the Muslims and other prisoners in its own custody. However, in the interest of brevity, I will leave such topics for another day in favor of shining further light on the nature and motivations of the man behind this historic and trend-setting operation, our Mujahid brother Nidal Malik Hasan - Nahsabuhu Min as-Saaliheen wa La Nuzakeehi Ala Allah: We consider him to be a righteous man and we don't purify him before Allah.

The Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan has shown us what one righteous Muslim with an assault rifle can do for his religion and brothers in faith, and has reminded us of how much pride and joy a single act of resistance and courage can instill in the hearts of Muslims everywhere. The Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan, by the grace of Allah and with a single 30-minute battle, singlehandedly brought the morale of the American military and public to its lowest point in years. The Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan, lightly armed but with a big heart, a strong will and a confident step, again brought into sharp focus the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of America, and again proved wrong those who claim America cannot be hit where it hurts. And most significantly, the Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan is a pioneer, a trailblazer and a role-model who has opened a door, lit a path and shown the way forward for every Muslim who finds himself among the unbelievers and yearns to discharge his duty to Allah and play a part in the defense of Islam and Muslims against the savage, heartless and bloody Zionist Crusader assault on our religion, sacred places and homelands.

Just as significant and just as deserving of contemplation and emulation as what the defiant Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan did is what he didn't do. Courageous Brother Nidal didn't give the orders of men priority over the orders of Allah, nor did he fear the wrath of men more than the wrath of Allah. Nahsabahu wa Allahu Haseebuh [We reckon him so and Allah is his Reckoner]. And defiant Brother Nidal didn't make the youthful mistake he made in joining the American army an excuse for making the mistake of a lifetime and taking part in the fighting and killing of Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq or anywhere else. This is why I believe that defiant Brother Nidal is the ideal role-model for every repentant Muslim in the armies of the unbelievers and apostate regimes who, like him, has come to the correct collusion that true Islam isn't in a name or a set of rituals but in fact is in total submission and obedience to Allah and total disobedience to and disassociation from the unbelievers. When Brother Nidal was issued orders which conflicted with Islamic doctrine and values, he resisted them until the last bullet and thereby broke the mold of the mindlessly obedient soldier, a mold preferred and cultivated by the militaries of the world but totally rejected by Islam, which says loudly and clearly: La Ta'ata Li Makhlooqin Fi Ma'siyat al-Khaaliq - Obedience to a Created Being in Disobedience to the Creator is Impermissible.

Not only did defiant Brother Nidal break free of the influence of the unbelievers he had grown up and worked with and served under, he also broke free of the evil influence of the anti-Jihad, pro-Crusade Shaykhs and Muftis who attempt to legitimize the killing of Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere using the flimsiest pretexts and excuses imaginable. Defiant Brother Nidal didn't try to silence his conscience or justify obeying his commanders and remaining in the ranks of the unbelievers with those Shaykhs' scandalous Fatwas which permit the impermissible, prohibit the obligatory and condone the murder of Muslims in the name of fighting terrorism, or in the name of protecting salary and position, or in the name of preserving the good reputation of American Muslims and dispelling any doubts about their patriotism and loyalty to America. Brother Nidal didn't try to hide behind such ridiculous excuses because he knew that - however many famous signatures it might carry and whatever fancy title it might have - no Fatwa in this world can possibly justify breaking the clear, unambiguous and agreed-upon laws of the Shari'ah, like the law forbidding the killing of Muslims or the law ordering loyalty to the believers and disloyalty to the unbelievers, and he knew that on the day of Judgement, all the Ulama, Mullas, Muftis and Imams of this world put together would be incapable of saving him from divine retribution were he to have blindly followed their permissions and prohibitions in contravention of what he knew - in his heart of hearts and through honest research and careful study - to be Allah's ruling and decree.

I believe that Brother Nidal realized that the insults, accusations, imprisonment, loneliness and other difficulties that one might face during or after one's mission are insignificant when compared to the punishment Allah has threatened - in numerous places in the Quran and Hadeeth - for those who abandon compulsory Hijra and Jihad despite them having access to the necessary ways and means. But at the same time, I believe Brother Nidal realized that Islam neither calls for nor approves of hasty, reckless and poorly planned actions, and that's why he acted with caution and took the necessary steps in order to avoid repeating the mistakes others have made in operational and procedural matters. For example, Brother Nidal didn't - as far as we know - discuss his plans over government-monitored-and-controlled telephone and computer systems, nor did he confide his secrets to recent acquaintances - or even long-time acquaintances - whose professed loyalty to Islam and Muslims and apparent eagerness to defend their faith and brethren may or may not be as strong or as genuine as it appears. Brother Nidal wasn't taken in by the provocateurs who infiltrate the Masjids and Muslim communities of America with hidden microphones in order to entrap Muslims eager to perform the duty of Jihad. And Brother Nidal didn't unnecessarily raise his security profile or waste money better spent on the operation itself by traveling abroad to acquire skills and instructions which could easily be acquired at home, or indeed, deduced by using one's own powers of logic and reasoning.

For example, the first thing many people often ask is: "What weapon should I use in my operation?" But the answer to this question - and it's an important question - is not as difficult as it may seem. The Mujahid Brother Nidal Hasan used firearms in his assault on Fort Hood, but the fact is, today's Mujahid is no longer limited to bullets and bombs when it comes to his choice of a weapon. As the blessed operations of September 11th showed, a little imagination and planning and a minimal budget can turn almost anything into a deadly, effective and convenient weapon which can take the enemy by surprise and deprive him of sleep for years on end.

Another important and often intimidating stage of preparation for any operation is the targeting phase. When the time came to pick his target, the Mujahid Brother Nidal chose carefully, looking for a target with which he was well acquainted, a target which was feasible and a target whose hitting would have a major impact on the enemy. In Brother Nidal's case, these three important qualities came together in Fort Hood, but as you start to make your plans, you shouldn't make the mistake of thinking that military bases are the only high-value targets in America and the West. On the contrary, there are countless other strategic places, institutions and installations which, by striking, the Muslim can do major damage to the Crusader West and further our global agenda and long-range strategic objectives.

We must look to further undermine the West's already-struggling economies with carefully-timed-and-targeted attacks on symbols of capitalism which will again shake consumer confidence and stifle spending. We must keep in mind how even apparently unsuccessful attacks on Western mass transportation systems can bring major cities to a halt, cost the enemy billions and send his corporations into bankruptcy. We must erode our cowardly enemy's will to fight by killing and capturing leading Crusaders and Zionists in government, industry and media who talk the talk but don't walk the walk and are only interested in prosecuting their profitable wars as long as it's other people who are in the line of fire and not them. We should look for targets which epitomize Western decadence, depravity, immorality and atheism, targets which the enemy and his mouthpieces will have trouble trying to pass off to the conservative Muslim majority as illegitimate targets full of innocent people. And finally, we mustn't allow our lawless enemies to provoke us with their evil, sadistic and murderous crimes into crossing the boundaries laid down by Allah and His Prophet or doing anything which may have negative repercussions on the image of the Jihad and reputation of the Mujahideen.

We must always remember that our role models aren't our enemies: our role models are the Prophet, His Companions and the righteous and God-fearing Mujahideen. We must always remember that we are different than the Zionists and Crusaders with whom we are locked in combat: We are not outlaws. We are not gangsters. We are not hypocrites. We are not barbarians. We are not opportunists and mercenaries. We are not enemies of freedom and civilization. We are not cowards who wage wars from behind the controls of pilotless aircraft. In other words, everything our enemies are, we are not, and everything we are, they are not. We are people of courage, honor, decency, chivalry and ethics who selflessly sacrifice themselves for the noblest cause on earth, and that is why every Muslim and every Mujahid must continue to take the high road and protect the moral high ground which we have fought so long and hard to secure.

My dear brothers in Islam: with America and 25 of its NATO allies beginning to deploy a further 37,000 occupation troops to Afghanistan, and with armed American drones now violating Islamic airspace and terrorizing Muslim populaces from Miran Shah to Mogadishu, and with the American war president and his rabid British poodle plotting fresh aggression against the Yemen, and with the United States consolidating its cruel treatment of our brothers in Islam at new or newly expanded Muslim-only concentration camps in Illinois, Bagram and elsewhere, it is rapidly becoming clear that this already hot global battle is about to get even hotter.

This is a war which knows no international borders and no single battleground, and that's why I am calling on every honest and vigilant Muslim in the countries of the Zionist-Crusader alliance in general and America, Britain and Israel in particular to prepare to play his due role in responding to and repelling the aggression of the enemies of Islam. This is the golden, once in a lifetime opportunity to reap the rewards of Jihad and martyrdom we have been waiting for, so unsheathe your sharpened sword and rush to take your rightful place among defiant champions of Islam like Mir Aimal Kansi, Muhammad Bouyeri, Nidal Malik Hasan and many others like them: "Men who have been true to their covenant with Allah; of them some have been martyred and some are still waiting; but they have never changed in the least." (33:23)

My Muslim brother: Jihad is neither the personal property nor the exclusive responsibility of any single group, organization or individual. Instead, it is the personal duty of every able-bodied Muslim on the face of this earth, until the last Muslim captive is freed and the last piece of occupied Islamic land is recovered and until Muslims live in safety and security in the benevolent shadow of the Islamic state. Allah subhaanahu wa ta'ala has given you faculties of reason, judgement and choice within the guidelines of Islam, and it is for you - like your heroic Mujahid brother Nidal Hasan - to decide how, when and where you discharge this duty. But whatever you do, don't wait for tomorrow to do what can be done today, and don't wait for others to do what you can do yourself:"So fight (O Muhammad Sallallahu Alayhi Wa Sallam) in Allah's Cause - you are held responsible only for yourself - and rouse the believers. Allah will restrain the might of the unbelievers. And Allah is strongest in might and strongest in punishment." (4:84)

Thank you for watching, and may Allah guide your steps. Wa as-Salaam 'Alaykum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakaatuh.

Labels: Adam-Gadahn, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Azzam-the-American, Nidal-Malik-Hasan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

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