Al Qaeda and the U.S. Military: Resources For Journalists

On Wednesday, a joint Congressional Homeland Security hearing will examine the threat of Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism to America's military on U.S. soil. This is a very large and complex topic. I wanted to share some resources for journalists looking to cover the hearings and the topic more broadly. Please note that I will be in Washington on Wednesday afternoon if you're looking to book someone to discuss the issue.

There are two components to the terrorist threat against the military at home: Internal and external. The current external threat is, in some ways, the simpler one to understand.

Al Qaeda-inspired homegrown terrorists have shown a sharp preference for targeting military facilities in recent years, including Khalid Abdul Latif in Seattle, Yonathan Melaku in Virginia, the Fort Dix Six, Antonio Martinez in Baltimore, and Nidal Hasan and Naser Abdo, both at Fort Hood in Texas.

What's interesting about this is the fact that many of them choose military targets because of explicit discomfort about the morality targeting civilians. I wrote about this dichotomy for The Atlantic.

The internal threat is more complicated and less covered by the media. There's a baseline issue with military personnel who turn against their own, as in the cases of Melaku, Hasan, Abdo and Sgt. Hasan Akbar, all of whom were -- to a greater or lesser extent -- operating independently. They were people serving in the military who allegedly became caught up in the tension between serving in the U.S. military and feeling that they were religiously or morally unable to kill fellow Muslims in theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Beyond these cases, which seem to be on the rise inasmuch as a such statements based on the very small sample size, the military has been the subject of deliberate and often very successful infiltration efforts by Al Qaeda and related groups.

These efforts go back to the 1980s. One of the earliest examples is the case of Ali Mohamed, a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad who later became a key operational terrorist planner, trainer and security chief in Al Qaeda.

Mohamed's resume also included the position of Staff Sgt. in the U.S. Army, stationed at Fort Bragg. Current Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri tasked Mohamed to infiltrate U.S. intelligence during the early 1980s on behalf of EIJ, the group Zawahiri led at the time (this was before Al Qaeda even existed). After an unsuccessful run at the CIA abroad, Mohamed moved to the United States, joined the Army and became a U.S. citizen. He was in the Army for four years, during which time he stole military manuals and sensitive information from Fort Bragg, took part in active fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and conducted training for jihadists and terrorists both abroad and in the New York City area. Some of his trainees took part in the World Trade Center bombing and a thwarted plot to bomb New York landmarks and the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels.

Here are some INTELWIRE-exclusive resources on Mohamed:

Who Is Ali Mohamed?

Al Qaeda Spy Crafted 9/11 Network

New Link Between Ali Mohamed And 9/11

Who Masterminded 1993 WTC Bombing?

'Coleman Affidavit' on Ali Mohamed

Ali Mohamed Sourcebook

Nat Geo documentary, J.M. Berger Lead Researcher

Mohamed's case was not the only notable infiltration of the U.S. military by Al Qaeda. During the first Gulf War, an Al Qaeda operative named Tahir was part of a religious team dispatched to Riyadh by the Saudi government in a wildly successful effort to convert U.S. soldiers to Islam.

Tahir, a Vietnam vet who worked for Al Qaeda in Bosnia and Somalia, was one of several team members given wide-ranging access to U.S. personnel as part of an initiative presented by the Saudi government under the pretext of a cultural exchange. Another member of the team was Bilal Philips, an extremely controversial Islamic scholar who has been banned from entering Germany and the UK due to his preaching on such subjects as homosexuality and child marriage. At least hundreds of U.S. soldiers reportedly converted to Islam after the program.

After the war ended, Tahir and Philips attempted to recruit soldiers who had been exposed to the program as jihadist fighters in Bosnia. At least a dozen U.S. military vets went to Bosnia as "trainers" under this program and some stayed as fighters. The same program later recruited and trained the terrorists who attempted to carry out the Landmarks plot. The Bosnia program was funded by the Third World Relief Agency, an Al Qaeda-linked NGO which posed as a charity but in reality ran guns to Bosnia in defiance of a U.N. embargo and supported various terrorist causes.

As part of the recruiting program for trainers of the Bosnian mujahideen, Philips told me that he enlisted the help of Qaseem Uqdah, a vet then affiliated with the organization Muslim Military Matters, and for more than a decade after one of the key figures involved in certifying Muslim chaplains for the U.S. military. Uqdah refused repeated requests to discuss his involvement in the program with me.

For a very detailed account of this complex and nuanced program, which has never been fully exposed before, check out my new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Ali-Mohamed, Bilal-Philips, Bosnia, Egyptian-Islamic-Jihad, Fort-Hood, lone-wolf, Nasser-Abdo, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Third-World-Relief-Agency, Yonathan-Melaku

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

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Zawahiri Calls For Release of American Jihadist El Sayyid Nosair

The latest audio communique from Al Qaeda's top leader Ayman Al Zawahiri calls for the release of one of the earliest American jihadists to carry out violence on U.S. soil, Egyptian-born American citizen El Sayyid Nosair.

From CNN:

Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has claimed responsibility for the capture in August of a 70-year-old American citizen in Pakistan, according to SITE, a website that monitors terrorist threats.

"Just as the Americans detain all whom they suspect of links to al Qaeda and the Taliban, even remotely, we detained this man who is neck-deep in American aid to Pakistan since the '70s," al-Zawahiri said, according to SITE.

The al Qaeda leader also listed demands that needed to be met before he would release Warren Weinstein. The demands included the ending of airstrikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. He also added that Muslim prisoners including Abu Musab al-Suri, the "Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdul Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, Sayyid Nosair, and the family of Osama bin Laden must also be released.

Nosair was a follower and sometimes rival of the "blind sheikh" Omar Abdel Rahman. Born in Egypt, he immigrated to the United States and became a citizen. In the waning years of the jihad against the Soviet Union, he helped organize training in Jersey City nominally intended to prepare people to fight in Afghanistan. In reality, many of his trainees used their new skills to carry out terrorism on American soil, including the World Trade Center bombing and a thwarted follow-up plot that targeted New York City landmarks and the Lincoln and Holland tunnels.

The training provided by Nosair was supplemented by Ali Mohamed, a follower of Zawahiri who later became closely affiliated with Al Qaeda. Mohamed was, at the time, an active duty sergeant in the U.S. Army. He brought with him military manuals and sensitive materials stolen from Fort Bragg, where he was stationed.

Jihadist violence was not unknown on U.S. soil prior to Nosair. Jamaat Al Fuqra, a mostly American radical group that originated in New York, had firebombed religious facilities used by Hindus, Hare Krishnas and Ahmadiyya Muslims (a sect they believed to be apostate). Members of Al Fuqra murdered a liberal Arizona Muslim imam in early 1990.

But Nosair was the first American jihadist to make national headlines. In November 1990, Nosair shot and killed Meir Kahane, a radical Jewish leader, during a public meeting. Although the shooting was witnessed by dozens, eyewitnesses could not identify Nosair at trial and he was convicted only on a firearms charge. After the World Trade Center bombing, Nosair was convicted of conspiracy alongside Abdel-Rahman for helping orchestrate a terrorist conspiracy before he was arrested and continuing even after his imprisonment, as several members of Rahman's terrorist cell visited Nosair in prison to received for advice and ideas.

Although Nosair was connected to Al Qaeda through Mohamed, there is no indication he was ever formally affiliated with the group. But Osama bin Laden personally donated $20,000 to Nosair's defense fund, illustrating the group's long interest in his case. A recent video by Al Qaeda urging "lone wolf" terrorist attacks in the United States specifically cited Nosair as a role model who should be emulated.

Although most Americans have long forgotten Nosair, Al Qaeda clearly has not, illustrating the importance of understanding the early development of the jihadist movement in the United States.

For more about Nosair, Al Fuqra and other early American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Al-Fuqra, Al-Qaeda, Ali-Mohamed, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Egyptian-Islamic-Jihad, El-Sayyid-Nosair, Omar-Abdel-Rahman, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

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Declassified State Department Cables On Al Qaeda-Linked Cell in California

State Department cables obtained by INTELWIRE describe Ayman Al Zawahiri's trip to California in 1995 and the activities of an Al Qaeda-linked terrorist cell in Northern California.

The general outline of the cell's activities has been previously reported in newspapers and in Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam.

The documents, obtained from the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act, detail the trial of a group of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operatives captured in Egypt and Albania, with the latter being deported to Egypt. Because of this, the trial became known as the "Returnees from Albania" case. One of those tried in the case was Khaled Abu El Dahab, a naturalized U.S. citizen who lived in California with the notorious Al Qaeda infiltrator Ali Mohamed. Dahab was arrested in Egypt.

Click here to read the full documents

According to the cables:

Zawahiri [who was at the time emir of Egyptian Islamic Jihad] visited the U.S. in early 1995 using a forged passport, primarily to collect contributions from Islamist circles. Abu ad-Dahhab placed Zawahiri at the Al-Nur mosque in Santa Clara, California. Three American citizens of Egyptian extraction who, per Abu ad-Dahhab, helped Zawahiri' s 1995 visit were Ali Abu al-Sa'ud Mustafa [Ali Mohamed] and two brothers, Ali and Hassan Zaki, all living in the San Franscisco area. Mustafa had served in the U.S. army for several years. [Egyptian newspaper] Al-Hayat of February 11 adds that Egyptian authorities may ask the U.S. to render Mustafa for trial in the "returnees" case, primarily for his EIJ fundraising. Mustafa apparently told Abu ad-Dahhab that the money that Mustafa had raised was used to plan the 1995 bomb attack on the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan. Mustafa is also wanted for helping to train EIJ operatives in bomb-making techniques, per Al-Hayat.

Mohamed and Zawahiri were convicted in absentia during the trial, however Mohamed was by this point under indictment in New York for his role in the 1998 East African Embassy bombings. Dahab was convicted and sentenced to prison. His current status is unknown, although according to some accounts he died in prison.

Although the cell was initially organized under the banner of EIJ, testimony from both Mohamed and Dahab, as well as other witnesses, indicated that both men took orders directly from Osama bin Laden at times, and both took part in highly sensitive Al Qaeda activities, including communications, security and the planning of terrorist attacks. For most meaningful purposes, the cell is considered an Al Qaeda operation.

Also convicted in absentia during the "Returnees" trial was Mohammed Al Islambouli, the brother of Sadat assassin Khaled Al Islambouli, who recently returned to Egypt after the fall of Mubarak and was promptly arrested. The cables state that "some observers [in Cairo] believe Muhammad Islambouli is connected with the EIJ defendants through setting up terrorist training camps in the Balkans."

If you see any interesting tidbits in this material not covered here, feel free to discuss them with me on Twitter.

For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Ali-Mohamed, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Terrorists, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Egypt, Egyptian-Islamic-Jihad, Jihad-Joe, Khaled-Al-Dahab

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Shadow of Ali Mohamed Hangs Over Nosair Appeal

The New York Times reports today that New York-area jihadist El Sayyid Nosair is appealing his sentence for terrorism-related conspiracy in the 1995 prosecution that brought down the "blind Sheikh" Omar Abdel Rahman.

The heart of Nosair's appeal revolves around Al Qaeda's mysterious spy, Ali Mohamed, who successfully infiltrated the U.S. Army during the 1980s, partially succeeded in infiltrating the FBI and was thwarted in a similar attempt against the CIA.

Nosair's argument, the kernel of which has been covered on this site and in my new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, is that prosecutors concealed Mohamed's location from the defense, which wanted to subpoena him as a witness.

First thing first: Mohamed's participation in the case would not have made a material difference in Nosair's verdict. His conviction was based on a raft of evidence pertaining to his assassination of radical rabbi Meir Kahane in November 1990 and his direction of other terrorist attempts from prison afterward.

Mohamed provided Nosair and others with training and support materials. Nosair's attorney wanted to argue that Mohamed (who was active duty Army at the time) was providing this support with the blessing of the U.S. government as training for the group to fight in Afghanistan alongside CIA-allied mujahideen.

The pertinence of this is pretty obviously flimsy, since Nosair never went to Afghanistan but instead worked on terrorist attacks in the greater New York area. Even if he had received training with government support, that wouldn't excuse his illegal actions any more than going through the police academy would excuse someone who later went on a shooting spree.

That said, the question of Mohamed's handling by federal officials, more broadly, has significant public interest outside of the context of Nosair.

Mohamed started acting as a double-agent informant for the FBI in 1991. He had been called back to the country by the FBI for questioning in the Nosair trial in late 1994 -- a very busy period for Al Qaeda and its affiliates, who were in the late stages of planning to bomb U.S. bound airliners (a plot soon to be disrupted) and in the early stages of the East African embassy bombing plot that would come to fruition in 1998. The details of Mohamed's relationship with the government is still murky.

The evidence suggests that some give and take took place during the Justice Department's 1994 meetings with Mohamed. In December 1994, according to court records, the lead prosecutor in the Nosair case, Andrew McCarthy, exchanged faxes with Mohamed concerning the subpoena issued by Nosair's attorney. McCarthy did not respond to my repeated requests for an interview about these faxes and other issues over the course of the last few years. The faxes may be explained by today's NYT report which states:

Far from keeping his whereabouts secret from the defense, the government has said in court papers that officials extracted an agreement from Mr. Mohamed, who met with the authorities in 1994, to be available for the trial, but that Mr. Nosair’s lawyers did not ask for help in securing his presence. “Mohamed simply was not suppressed,” prosecutors wrote.

I'd like to see exactly what those documents say, and they may turn up in the course of this case. I noted that while most of Nosair's filings in his appeal are available on PACER (and will eventually be posted here), none of the government's filings could be obtained as of this morning.

Finally, a note on the NYT's headline, it's not strictly accurate to refer to Nosair as a "convicted Al Qaeda agent." Even with a fairly loose definition of what it means to be an Al Qaeda agent (more on this in a day or two), it's a stretch to say Nosair was part of Al Qaeda in a meaningful sense -- based on the evidence as it currently stands. "Convicted Al Qaeda agent" also implies that he was convicted of being an Al Qaeda agent, which is flatly untrue. The story itself does not claim Nosair was a member or agent of Al Qaeda.

For much more about Ali Mohamed and Sayyid Nosair, buy J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, out now!

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Ali-Mohamed, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Terrorists, El-Sayyid-Nosair, Jihad-Joe

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Embassy Bombing Documents Offer Window Into Al Qaeda Operations

A flood of new details concerning Al Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan and Somalia during the 1990s were revealed Friday, when prosecutors unveiled a series of previously secret documents in the trial of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Guantanamo detainee convicted of conspiracy in Al Qaeda's bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

The documents, meant to support the maximum sentence for Ghailani, contain detailed transcripts of three interrogations:

A 1999 Justice Department interrogation of Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, in South Africa, where he had been detained by immigration officials. Mohamed was later convicted for his role in the embassy bombings. Interrogation of Khalfan Mohamed, Oct. 9, 1999 (PDF)

A 1998 Justice Department interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh, another convicted operative in the embassy bombings. Interrogation of Mohammed Odeh, Aug. 31, 1998 (PDF)

A summary of a Justice Department interrogation of Ghailani after he was captured and imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay. The summary is dated December 2008. Interrogation of Ahmed Ghailani, Dec. 12, 2008 (PDF)

Some of the more interesting details found in these interrogations include substantial information about Al Qaeda's operations in Somalia, more broadly in Africa and in Afghanistan. Some of the material below has been previously reported. These items only scratch the surface of the information contained in these documents, which includes a great deal of data on the logistics of the embassy bombings. Readers are encouraged to review the documents and discuss them with me on Twitter.

Odeh was ordered to Somalia by Saif Al Adel, one of the most senior surviving members of Al Qaeda still active in the organization and one of the most important figures in Al Qaeda's Somalia operations. The orders originated with Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda focused on one tribe, the Um Rehan, which was most ideologically compatible. (Much of this information came out during the first embassy bombings trial.)

Khalfan Mohamed went to Somalia twice in 1997 on behalf of Al Qaeda. He helped train members of Al Ittihad, a Somali Islamic group led by Hassan Dahir Aweys, who later helped found the Islamic Courts Union and is now a member of Al Shabab. Odeh also reported interacting with Al Ittihad.

According to Odeh, "Sheikh Hassan" (possibly Aweys) asked Al Qaeda's military commander, Mohammed Atef, aka Abu Hafs, for help. Atef brought five Al Qaeda trainers to Somalia and temporarily took over the operation from Saif Al Adel. Odeh reported that his group exchanged fire with UN officials during this period.

In June or July of 1998, a few months after bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring war on America, Sheikh Hassan from Somalia requested a meeting with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. It was not clear if the meeting ever took place, given the close proximity of the request to the embassy bombings.

A number of Al Qaeda members questioned the fatwa against America, worrying that Al Qaeda had become isolated from its former allies by 1998, but their loyalty to bin Laden outweighed their objections.

Odeh explained that Al Qaeda's core membership was small (he put the number at 150), but that the "friends of Al Qaeda" worked in close tandem with the organization without being sworn members.

During interrogation, Ghailani described meeting or interacting with a number of key players in the September 11 attacks, including several hijackers, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh and Zacarias Moussoui. The information here is mostly incidental, interesting but not necessarily significant.

New information about American Al Qaeda members also emerged in the transcripts.

A previously undocumented American jihadist, "Sulieman America [sic]," described by Khalfan Mohamed as a being tall and thin with curly brown hair and a medium complexion. The name is probably correctly transcribed as Suleiman Al Amriki. Suleiman attended basic training at Al Qaeda's Markaz Fath training camp in Afghanistan, then later received advanced training in the assembly of improvised explosives. Suleiman left the camp in 1995.

Abu Suleiman is one alias used by Ihab Ali, an Egyptian and naturalized U.S. citizen who lived in Florida and worked with Wadih El Hage and Ali Mohamed, two of the most American U.S. Al Qaeda members. It's not clear if this Abu Suleiman was Ihab Ali. Ali is in U.S. custody under unclear circumstances, much like Ali Mohamed, who pleaded guilty under a plea deal but was never sentenced.

Odeh reported that American citizen Al Qaeda member Wadih El Hage was visited by an Egyptian named "Nawi" who also lived in America. That person is almost certainly Ihab Ali, who also used the alias Nawawi. Odeh said Nawi was responsible for facilitating travel for Al Qaeda members. In an intriguing aside, Odeh said Nawi "was once jailed in Peshawar but was taken out of jail by an American."

Odeh also mentioned two American Al Qaeda trainers, "Abu Osama" and "Abdul Malek." From the aliases and descriptions, it's clear he is referring to known Al Qaeda members Ali Mohamed and Christopher Paul.

Labels: Ahmad-Khalfan-Ghailani, Al-Qaeda, Ali-Mohamed, American-Al-Qaeda, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, Ihab-Ali, Jihad-Joe, Khalfan-Mohamed, Mohammed-Sadeek-Odeh, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Demilitarizing Jihad

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

This article first appeared in the October 2010 issue of Veterans Vision magazine.

Starting in 2008, the media and counterterrorism officials took note of a rising wave of American jihadists -- U.S. citizens who have adopted the ideology and methodology of Al Qaeda and its ilk.

In reality, these citizen extremists have been with us all along -- and in similar numbers to what we see today. Americans have taken part in the modern age of jihad from its very beginning in 1979, when two Americans joined a terrorist group that seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

I recently reviewed more than 250 documented stories of American jihadists from 1979 to the present, including both U.S. citizens and long-term legal residents. The list includes people who fought in foreign wars in the name of Islamic causes as well as people involved in terrorist networks.

Before September 11, no one in the U.S. government documented the number of Americans who had fought for jihadist causes. Even in the post-9/11 era, reliable numbers are hard to come by. But the data as it exists shows the number of American jihadists over the last 20 years has held steady or risen only modestly. The current "surge" seems larger than it is because people are paying more attention now.

But that doesn't mean it's a static field. There has been a dramatic evolution in the type of people who go to jihad. One of the most notable changes has been the increasing involvement of military amateurs.

In Afghanistan during the 1980s and in Bosnia during the 1990s, Americans were often first lured into Islamic extremist networks through idealism and good intentions. Both conflicts seemed like ethically clear situations in which innocent Muslims faced invasion and even extermination. And in both conflicts, the U.S. offered at least moral support to the Muslim side. In short, you could be a jihadist and still see yourself as a good American.

Because of this, it was relatively easy to recruit Muslim U.S. military veterans as jihadists. In Afghanistan, a number of Vietnam vets fought the Soviets. In Bosnia, a Saudi-backed program actively recruited Muslim veterans who had served in the Gulf War to assist the mujahideen. At least a dozen vets -- and probably more -- were recruited to Bosnia as either trainers or fighters.

Although activity in the U.S. provides a useful window on jihadist trends, this wasn't just an American phenomenon. For instance, commanders of the mujahideen in Afghanistan and Bosnia served in the Egyptian armed forces, as did several early members of Al Qaeda. Many of these figures had been purged from their military positions after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 by a cell of army members.

One important Al Qaeda figure -- Ali Abdelsaoud Mohamed -- had experience in both the Egyptian and U.S. armed forces. He served in the Egyptian military prior to the Sadat assassination. Later, he emigrated to the United States, becoming a U.S. citizen, enlisting in the Army and serving at Fort Bragg.

Mohamed's military experience didn't just enhance his own performance as a terrorist; he passed his skills to others as one of Al Qaeda's most important teachers, running basic and advanced training camps in Afghanistan. Mohamed also stole and translated U.S. Army training manuals into Arabic for use by Al Qaeda and other self-styled jihadists.

Mohamed helped professionalize a generation of terrorists and also used his military skills directly against the United States. Al Qaeda sent Mohamed and at least one other U.S. Army veteran to Somalia during U.S. humanitarian operations during the 1990s, and they likely played a role in the Blackhawk Down incident that resulted in the death of 18 American soldiers.

In addition to recruiting a relatively small number of people from the large pool of Muslim veterans, jihadists in the pre-9/11 era sought out professional criminals, such as illegal gun dealers and bank robbers, and a handful of police officers. The common denominator in all these fields is experience with violence, weapons and operational discipline -- important skills when fielding an army.

In the post-9/11 world, the calculus of jihadist recruitment in the U.S. has changed. It is no longer possible to act as a jihadist and still maintain one's self-image as a "good American." Although jihadists still seek to sway U.S. military members, individual actors like Nidal Hasan do not transmit military skills to jihadist networks. The vast majority of American jihadist recruits are now young men with very little direct experience of violence, let alone combat.

There are a couple of reasons for this change. Jihadists before 9/11 were often selected by recruiters who knew them personally and could afford to be discriminating. Recruits were targeted not just for enthusiasm but for useful skills and experience.

Today's jihadist networks prioritize warm bodies over skills, and they use the Internet to empower self-selection rather than seeking out known individuals. As a result, the new demographic skews toward young men who are more likely to have attended computer camp than JROTC.

The data set I examined for this piece was confined to American citizens and long-term legal residents. But there is some evidence to suggest a similar trend is taking place worldwide. A study of foreign fighters by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point found the vast majority of foreign jihadists entering Iraq had been students before they were fighters. Former military personnel represented significantly fewer than 10 percent of the cases examined, trailing behind teachers, professionals and skilled laborers.

The drop in the successful recruitment of American military veterans is particularly good news, since U.S. forces are among the world's most professional services. American vets also paid dividends to Al Qaeda and other jihadists since they could teach fighters how to counter specific tactics used by Americans (as they did in Somalia).

Foreign fighters are likely to field growing numbers of unprofessional soldiers, thanks to the change in America's political climate, continued vigilance about radicalism among foreign military services and the continued disruption of Al Qaeda training camps.

However, in specific locations, the risk continues and may even be heightened. Military members in Pakistan and Yemen are particularly at risk for terrorist infiltration, including outright defections and informal accommodations with jihadist networks.

Unprofessional forces present a decidedly mixed bag for U.S. strategists, especially when those forces are mixed with local insurgencies. Trained soldiers are more likely to professionalize their comrades. When untrained foreign fighters mix with local insurgencies, the results are unpredictable and nearly impossible to model, resulting in a constant flow of new and unexpected threats and challenges.

Another increasingly important consideration: Unprofessional soldiers are far more likely to put civilians at risk. Human shields and direct attacks on civilians aside, professional military training embeds the protection of innocent bystanders into its underlying assumptions.

U.S. forces have both explicit and implicit obligations to protect civilians. Unprofessional forces create situations that exacerbate such risks, sometimes intentionally and sometimes through ignorance of basic military practices. Collateral damage to civilians is a growing problem for U.S. forces trying to win the support of local populations. Unfortunately, that situation is likely to deteriorate for the foreseeable future.

J.M. Berger is a journalist and analyst covering terrorism for INTELWIRE.com. He has written for the Boston Globe and produced content on terrorism for National Public Radio, Public Radio International and the National Geographic Channel. Berger's book on American jihadists will be published in 2011.

Labels: Ali-Mohamed, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, Nidal-Malik-Hasan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Who's Abu Yahya Mujahideen Al-Adam?

Now that early reports of the arrest of American Al Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn have, somewhat predictably, turned out to be wrong (I hope you all noted my big fat disclaimer yesterday), we're left with the question of exactly whom did the Pakistanis arrest?

Most reports are now naming the man in custody as Abu Yahya Mujahideen Al-Adam, aka Abu Yahya Majadin Adam or some variation therein. Everyone seems to agree that he's from Pennyslvania.

Beyond that, the most detailed information comes from Dawn, a Pakistani newspaper of uneven reliability.

According to Dawn, Al-Adam is a "close friend" of Osama bin Laden, which seems rather doubtful to me, but not impossible. It depends on the age of the man in question. Here's a little idle speculation to fill your time as we await more specific and verifiable information.

There was a jihadist during the late 1990s named Adam Mohammed Noor, who was an associate of Wadih El-Hage, an American who was actually a close associate of Bin Laden. There was also an American "Adam" who was a close friend of Ali Mohamed, another American who kept close company with Bin Laden. It's not clear if these two Adams were the same person. (Mohamed himself used the alias "Ahmed Bahaa Adam" occasionally.)

As more information comes out, I will post updates.

Labels: Abu-Yahya-Mujahdeen-al-Adam, Adam-Gadahn, Ali-Mohamed, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Fallout in the Military Over Nidal Hasan

It looks like there will changes in procedures and discipline for those who failed to spot problems that could have prevented the murder spree of Nidal Hasan, the Army major who shot and killed 13 people in November. The missed warning signs included Hasan's obsession with U.S. wars as "wars against Islam" and his contacts with radical Al Qaeda-linked cleric Anwar Awlaki.

Contrast that to the handling of Ali Mohamed, Al Qaeda's last big conquest within the military. Mohamed infiltrated the U.S. military on orders from Al Qaeda's No. 2 leader Ayman Al Zawahiri. Some of his commanding officers sent up alarm bells about Mohamed's radical leanings (including statements made on the video below which was distributed by the military to educate soldiers about the Middle East).

No one was disciplined and nothing was changed after Mohamed's spying on behalf of Al Qaeda was exposed, a failure that spanned both Republican and Democratic administrations. The Pentagon even stonewalled requests by the CIA for information about foreign nationals serving in the armed forces after Mohamed's duplicity was finally exposed in 1998.

Accountability is an important tool in dealing with terrorism, because accountability leads to adaptability, which is our enemy's greatest strength. It's a lesson that could be applied even more broadly in the U.S. government, but a good start is a good start.

Labels: Ali-Mohamed, American-Jihadists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, Nidal-Malik-Hasan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Ali A. Mohamed Documents

Ali Abdelsaoud Mohamed was an Egyptian soldier who became a U.S. citizen and served alongside the U.S. Special Forces at Fort Bragg. He was a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization and later a member of Al Qaeda, serving a top trainer and as Osama bin Laden's chief of security for some years. He attempted to infiltrate the CIA during the 1980s and successfully infiltrated the FBI during the 1990s, before finally being arrested for his role in the 1998 East African Embassy bombings.

Ali Mohamed Sourcebook

Nat Geo DVD, J.M. Berger Lead Researcher

Who Is Ali Mohamed?

Al Qaeda Spy Crafted 9/11 Network

New Link Between Ali Mohamed And 9/11

Who Masterminded 1993 WTC Bombing?

'Coleman Affidavit' on Ali Mohamed

Labels: Ali-Mohamed, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink