INTELWIRE releases Awlaki FOIA Files; Hijacker Travel Questions

INTELWIRE has obtained almost 2,000 pages of files related to Anwar Awlaki under the Freedom of Information Act.

Awlaki FOIA (256MB PDF, right click on link and save locally, do not open in browser)

The files released are heavily redacted and light on new information regarding Awlaki's ties to terrorism, although they provide minute entries from the FBI's surveillance of Awlaki after 9/11 and lavish details of his encounters with prostitutes.

The focus of the released documents is disappointing at best. Among the many omissions, perhaps the most notable is the transcript of the FBI's September 2007 interview with Awlaki when he was being held in a Yemeni prison. Documents relating to the interview are included, but the results of the interview remain a mystery.

The documents also provide no new information regarding Awlaki's post-9/11 terrorist career, although they do make small but significant additions to the chronology of his interactions with the 9/11 hijackers.

If you find something noteworthy, feel free to discuss it with me on Twitter at @intelwire.

TRAVEL CORRELATIONS

Some interesting data points emerge relating to travel by Awlaki and the hijackers, but the documents raise many more questions than they answer.

According to the documents, Awlaki and someone named "Dr." Mohamed Atta flew out of the Frankfurt airport on the same United Airlines schedule, two days and two rows apart, in October 2000.


One possible explanation for this is that someone with the same name as Atta could have traveled on that date. There is no record in the 9/11 Commission report of a trip to Germany in this time frame, and an FBI chronology places Atta in the United States during the same period.

There is no record of Awlaki flying to Frankfurt, but he had traveled to Yemen in summer of 2000. The documents provide no further insight into the travel. The flight data only covers United Airlines, so it could have omitted a connecting flight for Awlaki from Yemen or elsewhere.

Hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar had traveled to Yemen some weeks prior to Awlaki, and Al Qaeda coordinator Ramzi Binalshibh was in Yemen at the same time. On September 15 in Yemen, Binalshibh applied for a visa to visit the United States, which was refused.

On October 23, Awlaki flew to the United States out of Frankfurt. On October 25, Binalshibh -- now in Germany -- again applied for a visa to travel to the U.S., which was again refused.

Given the conflicting information about Atta's location, the correlations to Binalshibh's movements are likely to be a more fruitful line of inquiry.

On August 23, 2001, Awlaki and Saeed Al Ghamdi, another hijacker, flew out of Dulles airport on the same day to different destinations.


As has been previously reported, Awlaki was on a plane from San Francisco to Washington, D.C. on the morning of September 11, 2001.

Buy J.M. Berger's book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Labels: 9-11, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, FBI, FOIA, Hijackers

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

NYC pipe bomb suspect Pimentel posted on Revolution Muslim

Jose Pimentel, a devotee of American Al Qaeda propagandist Anwar Awlaki arrested in New York this weekend for building a pipe bomb described in Al Qaeda's Inspire magazine, posted entries at least twice on Islam Policy, the radical Web site previously known as Revolution Muslim.

Pimentel was a prolific blogger and highly connected social media user. He ran his own Web site, TrueIslam1, and at least twice cross-posted material to Islam Policy.

Revolution Muslim, a pro-Al Qaeda website founded by American radicals, was suspended briefly after one of its writers threatened the creators of South Park for depicting the Prophet Mohammed.

But the site soon returned, voluntarily changing its name to Islam Policy. The current leader of Islam Policy, Younus Abdullah Mohammed, was recently arrested and is now facing charges in relation to those threats. Another American, Zachary Chesser, was arrested in July 2010 and subsequently convicted for the same threats.

Pimentel posted on Revolution Muslim as "M. Yusuf" at least twice, one on "Rape in the U.S. Army," and once on the Arab Spring. Both posts were made in April 2011 and linked back to TrueIslam1.

"I say to the brothers and sisters in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and the rest of the Muslim world that establishing the Islamic laws is an obligation upon us that cannot be overlooked, the Day of Judgment is near, and Allah is quick in accountability and severe in punishment," Pimentel wrote.

Another post, also apparently by Pimentel, was titled "How Can I Train Myself For Jihad" and was later deleted from Islam Policy, but reposted to the Al Jahad extremist Web forum. The post was dated July 2011, but the content was dated 2008, suggesting Pimentel may not have written but simply reposted it.

The article encouraged firearms training and the use of U.S. military training materials available online to prepare for violent jihad.

"The majority of the time spent in Jihad is learning to cope with harsh, physically and mentally demanding living conditions. It is not about fighting glamorous battles for your pictures to appear on the Internet. Jihad is tough and difficult, which is why the rewards for it are so great," the post read.

In a section on firearms training, the post read: "Useful courses to learn are sniping, general shooting and other rifle courses. Handgun courses are useful but only after you have mastered rifles."

For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS:

CTC Sentinel: Awlaki's 'Constants of Jihad'

Foreign Policy: Awlaki's Legacy

The Atlantic: Awlaki and September 11

Foreign Policy: The Awlaki Myth

Video: Lessons Learned, 10 Years After 9/11

INTELWIRE: Interview With An Online Jihadist

Book Review: Bin Laden's Legacy | Buy

Huffington Post: Is AQ's Inspire Uninspired?

INTELWIRE: The Five Ds of CVE

INTELWIRE: How Terrorists Use The Internet

INTELWIRE: Hyping the Terrorist Internet

The Atlantic: Why Johnny Jihad Doesn't Listen

Foreign Policy: The Zawahiri Era Begins

New York Daily News: Al Qaeda's Gun Fixation

Fox News: J.M. Berger seen in "Secrets of 9/11"

Video: 'Jihad Joe' book event at GWU

INTELWIRE: What is Al Qaeda? Survey Results

CTC Sentinel: Baltimore's Jamaat Al Muslimeen

INTELWIRE: Interview About Jihad With Controversial Cleric Bilal Philips

Video Clip: Sarajevo Ricochet

Potomac Books: Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam

Labels: American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, Inspire-Magazine, Islam-Policy, Jose-Pimentel, Revolution-Muslim, South-Park

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Anwar Awlaki Killed

The most wanted American in Al Qaeda, Anwar Al Awlaki, was reportedly killed in Yemen.

The details of his death are uncertain, and this is not the first time he has been reported killed.

So far, three claims have surfaced. First, that Awlaki was killed in a drone strike. Second, that he was killed by a Special Operations raid of some sort. Third, that he was killed by air strikes by either the Yemeni or U.S. governments.

J.M. Berger for Foreign Policy: Gone But Not Forgotten, Awlaki's Legacy

Awlaki was, in many ways, a unique figure in the jihadist pantheon. Born in the United States and raised mostly in Yemen, he was fluent in both English and Arabic. He rose to prominence as a mainstream Muslim speaker, winning substantial acclaim for his translation and commentary on stories from the Quran and hadith.

Awlaki was rightfully praised for his command of American idiom and ability to process Islamic content for Western audiences by drawing on his knowledge of Western pop culture. But his real strength as a preacher was storytelling. Awlaki took stories from ancient sources and embellished them, breathing live into tales that had often been passed down only in skeletal form.

His mainstream success accentuated the danger created by his public shift to extremism. Awlaki was widely loved by English-speaking Muslims around the world. The evidence strongly suggests that he was involved in extremist networks even as a young man, but to the public, he was the very face of devotional Islam. He was cited in U.S. media for his moderate statements even as he made much more radical statements behind closed doors.

In 2000 and 2001, Awlaki and his followers provided significant assistance to at least three of the September 11 hijackers, helping them find apartments, drive around the country and obtain IDs suitable for use in boarding an airplane. The evidence suggests this help was provided knowing that the men were Al Qaeda operatives, if not with specific knowledge of the plot. One of the hijackers described Awlaki as "a great man" and his "spiritual leader."

From 2002 on, Awlaki became a case study for how not to handle a suspected terrorist. Misstep after misstep from both government and media helped catapult Awlaki into global prominence as an extremist.

In October 2002, the U.S. arrested Awlaki while he was entering the country after traveling overseas but released him almost immediately under murky circumstances. Had he been arrested and prosecuted then, it might have saved American lives.

Awlaki left the country immediately after this near miss. His lectures became more and more overtly radical. Followers who had joined him for stories of the Islamic prophets could follow him as he "thought aloud" about the relationship between the West and Islam and concluded that they were fatally incompatible.

In 2004, Awlaki returned to Yemen, issuing his most famous extremist work, "Constants on the Path of Jihad." Although Constants is often attributed to Awlaki, it was not his original work. Based on an Arabic essay by one of the founders of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the six hour lecture series outlined a strong argument in favor of jihad. Although Awlaki presented himself only as the translator, he extensively expanded on the original text, making it significantly more accessible and emotional. At least dozens of arrested extremists have listened to the lectures for inspiration.

Awlaki was arrested by Yemeni authorities in 2007 on the pretext of having given a fatwa approving a kidnapping by local militants. By most accounts, he emerged from prison even more heavily radicalized. Soon after, Awlaki created a blog where he praised jihadist groups such as Al Shabab. In 2009, he praised American military officer Nidal Hassan for killing American soldiers in a shooting spree at Fort Hood. Soon after, Awlaki was implicated as the teacher and guide to Omar Farouk Abdulmuttallab, who tried to bomb a Detroit-bound plane at Christmas with explosives smuggled on board in his underwear.

Awlaki also used e-mail to inspire and sometimes direct plots. He was among the most accessible and Internet-savvy extremists, personally corresponding with several suspects who were later arrested on various charges of terrorism.

A number of things happened after that. The United States leaked that Awlaki had been added to the CIA's authorized list of targets for assassination. That immediately led Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to issue a statement that the organization would defend Awlaki to the death. Soon after, AQAP issued a video interview with Awlaki in which he openly embraced Al Qaeda and its ideology, and soon after that, Awlaki issued an explicit call for Muslims living in the West to kill Americans under any circumstance.

Awlaki's standing in the jihadist world exploded in the wake of these developments, which were at least accelerated (if not wholly provoked) by the leak about Awlaki's targeting. Prior to the leak, Awlaki was someone with wide influence among Western extremists but without clear credibility among hardcore jihadists.

After the leak, Awlaki became public enemy number one. The media anointed Awlaki a "senior leader" or even "the top leader" of AQAP, a claim which was presented without evidence and which flew in the face of established reporting on AQAP's leadership.

Although some were skeptical of Awlaki having any role at all with AQAP, credible reports did support the view that Awlaki had become part of the group. Abdulmutallab reported being trained by Awlaki and the bomb in his underwear matched those created by AQAP's senior explosive expert. A subsequent bomb plot linked to Awlaki, the UPS bomb plot of 2010, also carried the technical hallmarks of AQAP. Reports from Australian media also described sightings of Awlaki at AQAP training camps.

On being adopted by AQAP, Awlaki stopped issuing audio and video in English, abandoning his most effective tool for inspiring violence, but he continued to issue statements in Arabic. More importantly, he oversaw the production of Inspire magazine, an English-language propaganda publication distributed online.

Inspire was the brainchild of American extremist Samir Khan (reportedly killed alongside Awlaki), who started it as a hobby project while living in the United States, then moved to Yemen and began publishing the magazine under the flag of AQAP, with exclusive content and oversight from Awlaki.

At the time of his alleged death, Awlaki was planning to issue a video answering questions from email correspondents. The most recent issue of Inspire, which did not feature any original content from Awlaki, also promised a forthcoming piece on the legitimacy of targeting civilians living in the West.

Both of these pieces could still surface, even if Awlaki is dead, and of course, his 100-plus hours of audio and video lectures will survive his death, likely becoming even more popular. It's worth remembering that Abdullah Azzam, killed more than 20 years ago, is still one of the most popular jihadist ideologues, whose videos still provide vast inspiration.

That "if" is an important consideration. If it turns out these reports are premature, Awlaki is uniquely positioned to capitalize. Inspire has already published articles touting Awlaki having survived a painfully close call with a drone strike in May 2011.

Inspire often employs mockery in the service of its propaganda, and Awlaki himself has a sharp sense of humor. If we have buried Awlaki too soon, we'll hear about it, and once again, our own missteps will make his legend grow.

Full story from CBS News

Intelwire coverage of Awlaki

The Atlantic: Awlaki and September 11

Foreign Policy: The Awlaki Myth

Letter from UK jihadist describes contacts with Awlaki

Is Inspire Magazine Uninspired?

For much more about Awlaki, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Journalists seeking more information or comment on Awlaki can contact J.M. Berger here.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, American-Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Samir-Khan

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

So We've Killed Osama Bin Laden;
What Happens Next Matters

Osama bin Laden is dead. So what happens now?

There have been a number of pieces outlining what should be (but isn't) the obvious fact that the war on terrorism is far from over. Check out the following piece by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross for an exhaustive review and a more concise but still very good version from Eric Schmitt of the New York Times.

The big picture analysis and commentary will be flowing all day and for some time to come. I want to talk about a couple of high-stakes questions about what happens next.

NO PICTURES PLEASE

When Abu Musab Zarqawi was killed, the U.S. government trotted out pictures of the body almost immediately and within hours, jihadists online had transformed those pictures into online shrines to Zarqawi's martyrdom. As I noted in a post last year, it would be a tremendous mistake to do the same thing with bin Laden. Jihadist propaganda thrives on pictures of dead martyrs -- and there's no bigger martyr than Osama bin Laden. It's probably inevitable that the pictures will come out, but hopefully it will be months or years later, when passions and interests have diminished somewhat. It will still be a big deal even later, but it's better not to give the jihadis a rallying image at this critical moment.

MESSAGING AND OPERATIONS

This is arguably the most critical moment in the history of Al Qaeda Central. While the war on terrorism, and the Al Qaeda movement, is far from over, Al Qaeda's core operation -- Al Qaeda 1.0, the organization that carried out September 11 -- has suffered a series of challenges over the last several months.

Al Qaeda has always been more about narrative than capabilities. It didn't militarily defeat the Soviets and it was never going to militarily defeat the United States. The question was whether it could create a compelling narrative claim of victory, as it did with the Soviets. Truth is not what's important here, perception is. And that's a two-edged sword.

The Arab uprisings have created a new and growing narrative about Al Qaeda's irrelevance. If Ayman Al-Zawahiri is too slow in issuing a messaging response and a military (i.e., terrorist) response to bin Laden's death, that narrative is going to snowball, and it's going to be a big challenge for Al Qaeda Central to recover.

Zawahiri critically fumbled the ball on the Arab uprisings by issuing a tedious, multipart history lesson that seemed to have been half-written before the protests even started. If he doesn't come out with a strong and relevant statement within the next couple of days, he's going to look even more out of touch and irrelevant, and risks appearing to cower in the face of American threats. And I will wager good money that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will have an issue of Inspire on "newsstands" before Zawahri speaks, further boosting the status of AQAP against AQ Central.

Similarly, the uprisings created significant narrative pressure on the broad Al Qaeda movement to carry out terrorist or other military operations. The narrative question here is: If Al Qaeda can't strike in the middle of rampant chaos, can it really do anything outside of Afghanistan? Again, the truth is less important than the perception. Al Qaeda can't afford to look toothless, because teeth are really the only thing that the terrorist organization has to offer. Unlike Hamas, Al Qaeda offers no social services. Its religious scholarship is questionable at best. Despite recent tentative efforts, it has no coherent political platform. If Al Qaeda doesn't have a military capability, it doesn't have much of anything. If AQC cannot carry out a credible strike in revenge for bin Laden's death, it's going to be left behind by its more vigorous children in Yemen and Somalia, among others.

Of course, the franchises will also be under pressure to act, and whoever acts first is going to get a big boost. If absolutely none of Al Qaeda's franchises even manage to carry out a serious strike in the near to mid-term future, we're going to have to revisit a whole lot of assumptions. Unfortunately, I expect we don't have to worry about that problem.

One can argue, of course, that Al Qaeda and its affiliates are patient, long-term planners, which is absolutely true, and that they can afford to wait this out, which may be true. But the fact is that we live in a world where the rate of change is phenomenal and accelerating, and Arab spring shows that the culture of speed is not just a Western affectation. In order to be a force on the world stage, jihadism has to make some concessions to the tempo of the modern world.

Of course, if Al Qaeda does act quickly, it will expose Ayman Al-Zawahiri and its most important operatives to an unprecedented level of risk, given the intelligence that was most certainly acquired during the bin Laden strike. To win the battle, Zawahiri should be hiking out into the wilderness for a long camping trip with just a couple close friends. To stay in the war, he's going to have to take risks. And if we capture or kill Zawahiri within weeks of capturing or killing bin Laden, the narrative of Al Qaeda Central is likely to suffer a catastrophic collapse.

And hitting Awlaki at the same time... Well, I'll save that for another day, but a trifecta here would really create some fundamental change on the battlefield. Not because Awlaki's a particularly good or necessarily vital operational leader. Again, it's the narrative.

TEST FOR THE LONE WOLVES

The stakes are also high for those who argue that Abu Musab Al Suri has revolutionized the terrorist world through his concept of "leaderless jihad." If lone-wolfism has truly arrived on the world stage, we should expect to see a series of lone actors striking out over the next several days. If not now, then when?

There's been a lot of talk about leaderless jihad, and I think that analysts have, so far, given Al Suri credit for a lot more influence and efficacy than he has, so far, deserved. This is Al Suri's moment. If leaderless jihad is the wave of the future, we're going to see dozens of individual actors carry out small attacks to avenge bin Laden over the next few days. If leaderless jihad is a lot of hot air, the lone-wolves will stay home and try to score "rep points" on the forums with their clever posts about bin Laden's death.

Let me be perfectly honest here and say I don't know which way this will go. Leaderless jihad has largely underwhelmed over the last few years. The attacks have been truly small and most (but not all) have lacked serious impact. They also haven't been truly leaderless as most (but not all) of the terrorists who have been classified as lone wolves had (or thought they had) contacts with formal terrorist networks including Al Qaeda Central.

We need to watch this situation closely because it's the real proof of concept. If we don't see a significantly large series of individual actors spontaneously rise to violence in response to this news, I'm inclined to think that "leaderless jihad" (like Louis Beam's earlier "leaderless resistance") will be a perennial underachiever and should be demoted in terms of national security priorities.

If the lone wolves do rise up en masse, we need to start having some new national conversations. Stay tuned.

J.M. Berger is the author of "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam," hitting bookstands in less than two weeks. Order today!

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Aulaqi, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Osama-Bin-Laden

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New Issue of Al Qaeda's Inspire Magazine Aims For Rapid Repositioning

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has released the latest issue of Inspire, and it's a 70-page behemoth devoted to the Middle East uprisings.

LATEST: We've Killed Bin Laden, What Happens Next?

There are two important dimensions to this issue's theme. First, it seeks to refute a wave of media coverage that deemed Al Qaeda irrelevant to the Middle Eastern protests. Second, it seeks to fundamentally reinterpret Al Qaeda's core principles in order to give the global AQ movement a foothold in the evolving political process.

PLEASE DON'T CALL US IRRELEVANT

Inspire's writers take strong exception to the idea that secular, nonviolent revolutions have made Al Qaeda obsolete and irrelevant.

In a prominent opening position, we get an introductory piece by Yahya Ibrahim, whose previous claim to fame was the invention of the Ultimate Mowing Machine. Ibrahim argues that the uprisings are opening the door to globalized jihad in Palestine by removing the U.S. allies who previously protected Israel.

The key to making this argument stick is, of course, combining words with action. There is no shortage of AQ rhetoric on Palestine, but neither the network nor the movement have managed to breach Israel's borders in a very effective manner.

Ibrahim's piece makes two more very important points related to the uprisings, which represent a significant shift in AQ rhetoric and even its philosophy. First, he argues that Al Qaeda is entirely in favor of "freedom" in the Middle East, because that gives people the freedom to learn about and understand AQ's goals. In a pointed jab against the West, he writes:

Why would the freedoms being granted to the people be bad for al Qaeda? If freedom is so bad for al Qaeda, how come the West has been practicing a restriction on the freedoms of expression when it comes to the message of the mujahidin? Why does the West ban the spread of books and talks of the al Qaeda leadership and in some countries consider it to be a crime to be in possession of such material? Why did the U.S. request from a site such as YouTube to take off lectures by Shaykh Anwar al-Awlaki?

Even more significantly, Ibrahim writes that Al Qaeda is not opposed to regime change through peaceful means. While Ibrahim's status as an Islamic authority figure in the movement is unclear at best, this represents a pretty significant shift away from a long argument that military jihad is the only acceptable means to achieve Al Qaeda's long term political goals.

One of Inspire's predecessors, an English-language newsletter published in Boston during the 1990s, summed up nonviolent political action in the following terms:

[Y]ou find that the first thing mentioned is “He took part in all of the attacks.” It does not say “He gave a hundred speeches” or that “he wrote such and such a book,” or “he had a lot of money.” It says “He took part in all of the attacks.” This is the greatest virtue, excellence, or merit of the friends of the Messenger. The value of someone in Islam is measured by the “number of battles he took part in.”

Today when they write about our dead, what do they say? Do they mention how many attacks they took part in? No. If they are truthful they will write “This famous scientist, this matchless preacher did not shoot one bullet for Allah’s cause in all of his life.”

This echoes a line of thought going all the way back to Abdullah Azzam, the emir of the Arab-Afghan jihad, who famously said, during a lecture in Brooklyn in the 1980s:

Whenever jihad is mentioned in the [Quran], it means the obligation to fight. It does not mean to fight with the pen or to write books or articles in the press, or to fight by holding lectures.

In contrast, Ibrahim makes a very important qualification which, if truly adopted by the broad Al Qaeda movement, could be a game-changer (emphasis below added by me):

Another line that is being pushed by Western leaders is that because the protests in Egypt and Tunisia were peaceful, they proved al Qaeda – which calls for armed struggle – to be wrong. That is another fallacy. Al Qaeda is not against regime changes through protests but it is against the idea that the change should be only through peaceful means to the exclusion of the use of force.

The accuracy of this view is proven by the turn of events in Libya. If the protesters in Libya did not have the flexibility to use force when needed, the uprising would have been crushed.

There is a galaxy of distance between arguing that Al Qaeda believes military jihad is a mandatory sixth pillar of Islam and arguing that Al Qaeda believes that peaceful regime change is appropriate as long as the use of force is permitted under the right circumstances. Yet Ibrahim is planting that seed squarely in the soil of what is arguably Al Qaeda's most important messaging platform.

It will be very interesting indeed to see whether this thread is taken up by other Al Qaeda figures. Although Ibrahim correctly points out that this principle is implied in recent statements by Al Qaeda leadership on the protests, most notably Zawahiri, I don't recall seeing it stated so starkly.

This could be seen a bold effort to fundamentally redefine Al Qaeda as a political movement that sometimes uses violence rather than as a violent movement whose goals are political. But it is certainly possible that this will be read simply as an effort to jump on somebody else's bandwagon. We'll see how that develops.

AWLAKI'S TAKE

The cover story in Inspire No. 5 is an article on the protests by Anwar Awlaki. Over the last year, Awlaki's messages in print and in A/V communiques have become increasingly concerned with local events in Yemen and Islamic rulings. Here, he returns to his best form with a piece that is political and accessible.

Awlaki far exceeds Ayman Zawahiri's recent messages about the protests by keeping his comments short and to the point. Awlaki argues that the uprisings have fundamentally changed the outlook of the Muslim Ummah by proving that the totalitarian regimes of the Middle East can be defied.

He then launches into an extended attack on CNN's Peter Bergen, who argued that the uprisings were bad news for Al Qaeda, with an amusingly discordant jab at Fareed Zakaria, whom Awlaki inexplicably characterizes as a "neoconservative."

Awlaki argues that Bergen is thinking too much in the short-term and that the uprisings will benefit Al Qaeda over time. Mubarak, he says, did not defeat the jihad movement in Egypt. Rather, by driving it out of Egypt, he spread it all over the world, where it is now thriving and from whence it will return.

Peter Bergen believes that al Qaeda is viewing the events with glee and despair. Glee yes, but not despair. The mujahidin around the world are going through a moment of elation and I wonder whether the West is aware of the upsurge of mujahidin activity in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco? Is the West aware of what is happening or are they asleep with drapes covering their eyes?

Notably, Awlaki does not advance the "peaceful change" argument made by Ibrahim, but instead takes the approach that the fall of American allies in the region cannot help but be good for Al Qaeda.

America, since 9-11, has been focused on the fight with the mujahidin in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and now Yemen. It has devoted its resources and intelligence for the “fight on terror”. But with what is happening now in the Arab world, America would no doubt have to divert some of its attention to the unexpected avalanche that is burying its dear friends. America has depended on these men for the dirty work of protecting the American imperial interests. They acted as point men that saved America the effort of doing it themselves but now with their fall, America would have to divert huge amounts of effort and money to cultivate a new breed of collaborators. This would force America, which is already an exhausted empire, to spread itself thin, which in turn would be a great benefit for the mujahidin. Even without this wave of change in the Muslim world, the jihad movement was on the rise. With the new developments in the area, one can only expect that the great doors of opportunity would open up for the mujahidin all over the world.

Although Awlaki did not seem to embrace the kinder, gentler Al Qaeda in the main piece of the protests, there are some interesting comments in the "Inspire Responses" section where readers can write in with questions. The column is not attributed to Awlaki but it ends with an invitation for readers to send Awlaki questions, and the style of the writing matches the Yemeni-American's voice.

The main letter to Awlaki challenges is a multi-part question challenging the methods and beliefs of Al Qaeda generally and Inspire specifically. The early parts of the question challenge a number of points in AQ propaganda before getting to the red meat:

In terms of your personal ideology, how do you account for the fact that your legitimacy within the Islamic community is not only called into question but nearly non-existent. Most Muslims condemn the actions that you commit, Alĥamdulillâh. I understand your takfîri ideology but what gives you the right to judge the rest, even Muslims? It seems to me that you enjoy the power of playing God and determining who is good and evil. Nowhere in the Koran does it give authority to man to judge and determine the life of a man.

I cannot overstate how awesomely great this question is in this context. Back before 9/11, Awlaki gave a khutba at his mosque in San Diego on this exact subject and the questioner has almost certainly listened to at least part of that lecture.

Takfir means excommunication, and in this context it refers to the Al Qaeda practice of declaring that its Muslim enemies are not Muslims, have become apostates and are therefore legitimate targets for murder.

In San Diego, Awlaki argued against the practice of takfir, saying:

[If] you tell your brother that he is [an apostate], if he is not, it will come back on you. [ . . . ] We do not know what is in the hearts of people. [If we think] this man is saying with his tongue what he doesn’t mean in his heart, [the hadith] tells us we are not ordered to open up and seek what is in the hearts of people. He is not ordered clearly [ . . . ] I am not told by Allah to seek what’s in the hearts of people. Meaning that we call people to Islam, but we are not judges over them. We do not judge the people. We leave the judgment to Allah, [glory to him].

The questioner is clearly trying to catch Awlaki in a contradiction, and to some extent, he is successful. The Awlaki of 2011 squirms in his response, first suggesting that his correspondent google takfir for more guidance, then writing:

We don’t just assume someone is an apostate without clear evidence. The other thing is who can implement the ruling once one is determined to be an apostate. In today’s world, there is no Caliph nor Islamic Caliphate to properly pass the judgment. So within that we find a whole other topic in fiqh concerning the implementation of [mandatory Islamic capital punishment] without a state. In brief, if the individual has apostatized publicly, and his apostasy is clear, then this person’s blood and wealth is not protected from the Muslims due to the hadith narrated by al-Bukhari, “Whoever changed his Islamic religion, then kill him.”

Our ideology is not takfîri; the non-Muslims as well as their puppet governments made that up to make the people condemn us. [...] We are openly against extremism in takfîr and seek a balance.

Awlaki is sensitive to his dilemma here. His choice is either to renounce his previous statements and risk being called a hypocrite (a serious slam in his world) or to alienate some of his core supporters in the jihadist movement. So his response is an artful dodge, but it's still a dodge, and no one who is familiar with his earlier arguments on takfir is likely to see it otherwise.

For the full issue of Inspire, check out Jihadology.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Jihad-Joe

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Awlaki, Gadahn, Truthiness And Al Qaeda's War On Scholarship

Anwar Awlaki's new video reinforces a message recently sent out by Al Qaeda Central by his fellow American, Adam Gadahn. When Islamic scholarship does not support jihad, the scholars must go.

According to a translation of Awlaki's message from Flashpoint Partners:

[T]he role of fatwas is to protect Islam and not the Americans. The role of the fatwa is to protect the Sharia principles and not the governmental principles. And the person of jurisprudence, his role is to speak the truth, and not patch for the rulers and search for them for an exit every time they fall in a ditch. So if the jurist cannot speak the truth due to being forced, then we call upon the Muslims to follow behind the Ulama who do not fear in Allah the accusation of the accusers. But those who agree with the rulers on everything and are disagreeing with the Mujahideen in everything, then those are the apostate Ulama, and be aware of them.

This parallels a message from Adam Gadahn last month:

[T]he Mujahideen who have gone out to defend their religion, brothers and countries against the campaign and its agents, haven't relied on one fatwa from one Alim (learned man), but rather, have depended on numerous fatwas, and moreover, on numerous proven consensuses about the obligatory nature of Jihad on individual Muslims in a number of scenarios most or all of which have occurred not just in our day, but starting from a number of decades ago at the very least.

This is why anyone who wants to debate the legal basis for the contemporary Jihad must refute all those fatwas and reject all those proven consensus and not just make do with relying to one fatwa or Alim.

Both Gadahn and Awlaki are keenly focused here on discrediting Muslim voices who use religious scholarship to oppose Al Qaeda's brand of military jihad. If you count Awlaki's article on the Mardin Declaration in the most recent issue of AQAP's magazine, that's three messages in two months on this subject.

In addition to the similar messaging, both Gadahn and Awlaki released their messages in Arabic rather than English, despite the fact that both are famous mostly for their English-language content speaking to American Muslims.

Although they may be trying to expand their respective followings in the Arabic-jihadi world, I would suggest this tactic is probably an effort to make them look more credible as they go after credible scholars.

Gadahn's video also featured clips of Awlaki, although Gadahn did not refer to him by name.

So what does it all mean? Here are the possibilities:

1) Awlaki and Gadahn are reacting to the same public events (the Mardin declaration) and not coordinating their messages.

2) Awlaki and Gadahn are echoing each other's messages after seeing them posted to the Web.

3) Awlaki and Gadahn are coordinating their messaging, most likely through a third party.

Obviously, options 1 and 2 are the stronger possibilities. But as I noted previously, the insertion of Awlaki clips into Gadahn's last video was a development which could point to option 3. In this context, it's worth noting that information embedded in the video file suggests Awlaki's latest message may have been recorded as early as July.

Either way, as a journalist I know that three of anything is a trend. Al Qaeda, which once tried to market itself as a home to scholars, is now running away from scholarship in a uniquely American fashion.

There is a longstanding tradition in American politics of rejecting intellectualism, scholarship and even scientific fact in favor of gut-feelings and "truthiness." So it's also fascinating that Al Qaeda's most prominent Americans are leading the charge to dumb down jihad. Who better?

FOLLOW-UP: More Ruminations on Al Qaeda's War Against Scholarship

Labels: Adam-Gadahn, Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Azzam-the-American

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New Awlaki Video Released, But Not By Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

Updated 11/9/2010

Anwar Awlaki has released the full version of a video that was previewed online last week. The new release raises a number of questions with no immediately obvious answers.

The new video is entirely in Arabic, without English subtitles, and was not released by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Everything we've heard from Awlaki over the last couple of months has come from AQAP, so this is a very curious development, the meaning of which is not yet clear.

Despite the lack of official branding, the video received massive play on the Al Shamikh forum -- with a bigger banner ad than Osama bin Laden's recent audio release. Al Shamikh is an Arabic forum.

The video is a wide-ranging assault on the political and religious establishments of the Muslim world in general and Yemen in particular, according to a translation by Flashpoint Partners. In addition to the usual calls to kill Americans, Awlaki makes a particularly pointed attack on Islamic scholars who support the status quo or offer any kind of ideological cover to those who would ally with the West against the mujahideen.

Until recently, there was little evidence to suggest that Awlaki had made much of an impression on the Arabic-speaking jihadist community. It's possible that this means he has finally broken through. However, it's also worth noting that bin Laden's release came with several different sizes and shapes of banner ad, while Awlaki's patron on Al Shamikh submitted only one massive banner. So while this might just be a case of smart marketing, I suspect it represents a real breakthrough.

Other notes:

* The video is already available on YouTube. So much for that crackdown.

* The person who posted the video to jihadist forums, "Terrorist 093," asked jihadist forum members to voluntarily translate the video into English and post their results. This is also unusual, since Awlaki could have easily translated it himself or tasked the job to one of his lackeys at "Inspire," AQAP's English-language magazine.

* Aaron Zelin at Jihadology has some interesting notes on the title of the video, "To make it known and clear to mankind, and not to hide it," a quote from the Quran.

* The video was released in as a regular file but also in a massive 1.6 gig HQ version, which is also odd because the video is not in the standard 16x9 aspect ration used for HD. What I suspect this means is that no one from AQAP worked on it. I've speculated in the past that American Al Qaeda Samir Khan has been producing AQAP's videos, and Khan is closely aligned to Awlaki, so add that to the list of questions. (I'm stringing together a lot of guesses here, so caveat emptor.)

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Yemen

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Gadahn and Awlaki, Together At Last?

A slimmed-down Adam Gadahn is out with a new video that is just loaded with interesting elements (it can be seen here). Here's a somewhat hasty review.

The main focus of the video deals with the Mardin Conference, a gathering of Islamic scholars in Turkey earlier this year that sought to undercut much of the ideological basis of Al Qaeda's globalized declarations of war against the West.

Gadahn betrays the weakness of his position right at the start, saying that the young often realize the truth before the old and that laymen often recognize the truth ahead of the scholars.

Al Qaeda's leaders, including "Shaykh" Gadahn, have often sought to position themselves as the leading scholars of the day, diminishing competing messages on the basis that their own scholarship is superior. Saying that the laymen have outsmarted the scholars is a tacit admission that Al Qaeda's scholarship is lacking.

Gadahn seems to throw out a lot of the book here as far as conventional views of the ideological underpinnings of jihadist movements, saying that jihadists have "their own books of fiqh" (jurisprudence), and arguing the Mardin declaration is irrelevant to them since it's refuting a school of thought he claims is not used by Al Qaeda. (For more on this, check out Aaron Zelin's analysis on Jihadology.)

The graphics for this latest video are quite similar to recent Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula releases, and the attack on the Mardin conference echoes Anwar Awlaki's recent article in AQAP's Inspire magazine. The video also featured clips of Awlaki from a recent AQAP release. All of this reflects the rising prominence of AQAP's operation and perhaps hints at coordination of media operations.

Awlaki clips were inserted into the speech without preamble -- i.e., Gadahn doesn't introduce the clip. It is possible someone from AQAP, or simply someone other than Gadahn, produced the video from raw footage of the speech and that additional clips were added by the video's editor, without Gadahn's knowledge.

Clips of AQAP's "underwear bomber" were also featured in the same manner. However, Omar Abdulmutallab was named by Gadhan in the video, and Awlaki wasn't.

In my opinion, and maybe it's a reach, these considerations muddy the impact of Awalki's Al Qaeda Central debut. Is this a strong endorsement by AQ Central? I don't think so. It feels like someone tacked the Awlaki material on as an afterthought.

Whatever the case, Gadahn's message is markedly similar to Awlaki's. Gadahn ends with an apparent endorsement of lone-wolfism, the strategic approach to jihad promulgated first by Abu Musab Al Suri and now promoted by Awlaki and his crew at Inspire. If Al Qaeda is really adopting the leaderless approach to jihad, there's no question that this is a losing strategy for them in the long run (if not sooner).

Labels: Abu-Musab-Al-Suri, Adam-Gadahn, Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, Azzam-the-American, Leaderless-Jihad

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Inspire, Abu Talha and More...

A couple of short notes on recent buzz around the Web:

OVERESTIMATING INSPIRE

Coverage of AQAP's Inspire continues to disappoint, although it's improved since the full issue was posted. I continue to think this is not as much of a quantum leap forward as its reception might indicate. I suspect aspiring jihadists are more likely to burn down their moms' kitchens than create a successful bomb with the recipe provided in the magazine, and beyond that, there isn't much about Inspire that is groundbreaking.

The magazine's graphic design has been praised by various reporters and analysts. Personally, I found it rather busy and distracting, not to mention undercutting the alleged serious-mindedness of the content. One thing is certain -- all the rave reviews guarantee we'll be getting a second issue, which was far from certain given the fiasco around its release.

THE NEW BIN LADEN

Inspire has also kicked off a minor flurry of attention for Awlaki including some retreads of the premise that has been kicking around for a while: Is Awlaki the new bin Laden?

The answer to that is pretty easy. "No."

First off, Awlaki's never seen actual combat, and frankly, I don't think he's the type. Bin Laden's military exploits may be greatly exaggerated, but they do, in fact, exist. Unless and until Awlaki gets out there with a machine gun, he's not likely to become the leader of what is essentially a military organization. He can be the spiritual head or a senior advisor, up to a point, but he's not blind, so he has no excuse for not fighting.

Secondly, while everyone generally agrees Awlaki has become "operational," there is no evidence he has a head for operational details or tactics. Bin Laden is quite the opposite. He understands the value of planning, and he has been hands-on supervisor for some of Al Qaeda's greatest triumphs. He notoriously pointed out the weak points in the U.S. embassy in Nairobi during the planning of the East African Embassy bombings. Awlaki, so far, has directed a college student to set his pants on fire.

Thirdly, he's American. Whether due to the local angle or unconscious bias, the fact of his American citizenship automatically causes the media to inflate his dangerousness.

Of course, I am not saying Awlaki isn't dangerous or important. He's both of those things. But we need to keep him in perspective.

ABU TALHA SPEAKS

Speaking of people whose status benefits from media coverage, the always engrossing Al Maktaba blog has an interview with Abu Talha Al Amriki, aka Zach Chesser. Turns out the heat from the South Park death threat has driven the American jihad supporter into radio silence, at least as far as using his own name. When reading, keep in mind that Abu Talha has advised pro-jihad Muslims only to talk to us "counterterrorism analysts" in order to "feed them outright lies."

Labels: Abu-Talha-Al-Amreeki, Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Osama-Bin-Laden, Revolution-Muslim, Zach-Chesser

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Full AQAP Inspire Issue Posted Online

I am fighting deadlines today, but I wanted to make a couple of quick observations following on my earlier pieces.

Coverage of AQ's "New English Magazine," 1 of 2

Coverage of AQ's "New English Magazine," 2 of 2

First, and most important, if the editors of Inspire are to be believed, then Anwar Awlaki did play a direct role in the creation and production of Inspire. There is at least one article by Awlaki which is characterized as an original piece written for the magazine.

So clarifying some earlier questions, the magazine is, at the least, formally endorsed by Awalki. I suspect we're still looking at a jihobbyist production, but as I noted earlier, Awlaki and AQAP's active role in the magazine does open the door to a "material support of terrorism" charge for any Americans who helped produce it.

The most important article in AQAP Inspire is not Awlaki's fairly pedestrian article on the Danish cartoons, but a guide for aspiring Westerners about what to expect and how to prepare when you go to jihad overseas.

The format still strongly resembles Jihad Recollections, but it seems to me the content is a bit more sophisticated and a bit more activist in terms of what it expects its readers to do after perusing the issue.

Overall, I'm sticking with much of my earlier analysis of the magazine as cited above. I will say that the magazine is, in some ways, a step up from Al-Hussam in terms of its sophistication as a magazine. It's probably also an upgrade in terms of content, except for the impression that its main participants (writers of original articles and editors) appear to the reader's eye to be mostly noncombatants -- a category that includes Awlaki, I might add. Al-Hussam had tremendous credibility for its unpretentious style and links to actual fighters. In contrast, Inspire is a bit effete.

That's all for now, but I may ring in with some additional thoughts later.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Weblog

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New Evidence On Terror Links Of Yemen Charity That Received U.S. Grant

I've completely overhauled the original story on the Department of Labor's $3.5 million grant to a partnership that includes the Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW), a Yemen charity accused of wide-ranging links to terrorism. The update includes denials from CSSW and extensive new evidence suggesting those denials are unfounded. Many thanks to Evan Kohlmann of the NEFA Foundation and Flashpoint Partners for additional evidence of CSSW's links to Anwar Awlaki.

Click here for the updated story.

Labels: Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, Charitable-Society-for-Social-Welfare, Yemen

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Charity That Received Millions From U.S. Denies Terrorism Links; INTELWIRE Responds With Documentation

Yemeni government official Hamoud Hattar, left, and Al Qaeda-linked cleric Abdul Majid Zindani at an October 2009 Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) event in Yemen. Hattar on June 7 announced that Yemen will not extradite Awlaki to the United States.

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Updated June 23, 2010

The U.S. Department of Labor gave millions of dollars to a joint venture that included a Yemeni charity with extensive links to Al Qaeda.

At least $3.5 million was allocated by the Labor Department to fund a three-year partnership between the Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW), based in Yemen, and CHF International, a Maryland-based foundation, to fight child labor and child trafficking starting in fiscal year 2008.

The money was provided through a grant by the Labor Department's Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking (OCFT), according to a Labor Department press release, the agency's Web site and Middle Eastern news sources (link, link).

Wanted fugitive and radical Yemeni-American cleric Anwar Awlaki served as a vice president for the organization during the 1990s. Awlaki is also believed to be associated with Al Qaeda (link). Awlaki's name is listed on an IRS Form 990 filed by the Charitable Society for Social Welfare for an now-defunct U.S. branch of the organization. Click here to read the CSSW tax form, which is a public record. Awlaki is listed as vice president on page 4 of the document.

CSSW spokesman Jamal Al-Haddi denied that the organization was connected to the Yemeni CSSW and denied that Awlaki ever worked for the Yemen branch of the organization. He told INTELWIRE in an e-mail that "CSSW has no branches outside Republic of Yemen. No official or unofficial branch of CSSW in the United States."

However CSSW's own Web site, in an archived page found on Archive.org, shows that in 2003 CSSW listed contact information for branches in Brooklyn, Detroit and San Diego. The 990 form shows that CSSW had directors in all three cities, including Awlaki in San Diego, whose listed address is the Ar-Ribat mosque. Two of the September 11 hijackers attended that mosque while Awlaki was imam there. The archived link was provided by Evan Kohlmann, a senior investigator with the NEFA Foundation.

The U.S.-based organization claims on its tax form that it provides services and support for orphans in Yemen, just as the Sana-based CSSW does. According to additional tax documents obtained by the NEFA Foundation, CSSW intitially claimed it was not related to CSSW in Yemen in an IRS 1023 filing. But the charity's attorney, Ronald Rose, later admitted, in response to IRS questions, that the two organizations were closely linked. According to Rose:

In general, the distributions of funds raised by this charity will not go directly to individuals…to provide assistance for people who have been victimized by the civil wars in Yemen and Somalia… A similar charitable organization exists in the nation of Yemen, whose goals are the same. In many cases, application for benefits will be submitted through the organization in Yemen and contributed funds will be routed through this organization to the ultimate recipients. The role of the charitable organization in Yemen will be to act as an agent or facilitator for the distribution of benefits from the Society.

The Brooklyn branch of CSSW was the subject of an FBI terrorism financing investigation in 2003, five years prior to the Department of Labor grant approval. Al-Haddi did not respond to a question on this issue. The terrorism financing investigation was known as "Black Bear." Click here to read a court filing which provides some details of the investigation.

The filing was made by the defense team for Numan Maflahi, a Yemeni-born U.S. citizen who was convicted of lying to federal agents in a terrorism financing investigation. Click here for a New York Times story about the conviction. Click here for an Associated Press story on the investigation of CSSW.

The Washington Post reported in 2008 that CSSW was founded by Abdul Majid Al Zindani, a veteran of the jihad against the Soviet Union and its civil war aftermath. Zindani was an associate of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, according to published reports and exclusive documents obtained by INTELWIRE. Zindani has been designated as a member or associate of Al Qaeda by both the U.S. government and the United Nations.

Documents filed in a U.S. terrorism prosecution state that the Yemeni government considered the Al Iman University, run by Zindani, "as a 'nest for terrorism' that exports and propagates terrorism." Click here to read the document. Awlaki lectured at the University, according to the Washington Post and other sources.

Al-Haddi denied that Zindani had ever played any role in the organization. Neither Awlaki or Zindani has "never have been part of CSSW either as founders, members of Managerial Boards, employees, consultants volunteers or any position in CSSW," Al-Haddi wrote in an email. When asked if CSSW had requested a correction from Washington Post, he said that he had not but intended to.

However, the CSSW Web site again seems to contradict Al-Haddi's statement.

CSSW's Web site contains stories on a 2009 "Orphan's Festival" event featuring Zindani as a featured speaker in a central role. Zindani is named on the page, which also features a photograph of the cleric at the center dias of the event. Click here for the original page in Arabic, and click here for a cached copy of the the page. The event was also extensively covered in the organization's newsletter. A cached copy of the story may be viewed by clicking here.

When asked about the photos, Al-Haddi said that Zindani's presence at the 2009 festival was simply as an attendee due to Zindani's participation in the Yemeni government in 1990. He also suggested that Zindani was only one of 500 participants, and played no role at the conference.

However, photos of the event, found on an Arabic Web site Yemen-Sound.com, show Zindani seated prominently in the front row of the event and handing out awards from the stage. The CSSW Web site additionally describes Zindani as a speaker at the event.

In several photos, Zindani appears with another speaker at the event, Judge Hamoud Hattar, who in June announced that Yemen will not extradite Anwar Awlaki to the United States. Hattar, ironically, has gained a measure of fame for his "deradicalization" efforts with Yemeni extremists in prison.

Yemeni government official Hamoud Hattar, left, and Al Qaeda-linked cleric Abdul Majid Zindani at an October 2009 Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) event in Yemen.

Also at the event was Sheikh Aed Al Qarni, who can be seen in this video calling on Allah to "destroy the Jews" and praising jihadists attacking American forces in Iraq.

Sheikh Aed Al Qarni at an October 2009 Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) event in Yemen.

The CSSW Web site lists partner organizations including the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Qatar Charitable Society, both of which are believed by the U.S. government to be Al Qaeda financing vehicles. The U.S. alleges that IIRO helped finance the Manila-based Bojinka plot to blow up U.S. airliners in 1995. According to an Al Qaeda informant, Osama bin Laden has stated that Qatar Charitable Society funds were used to pay for an attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek, also in 1995.

This story has been substantially updated with CSSW denials and with additional documentation which supports the story.

Al-Haddi's letter to INTELWIRE is included below in its entirety. Based on the evidence laid out in detail above, INTELWIRE stands by its story. Additional documentation is being sought and will be posted when it becomes available.

Dear Mr. Berger,

First of all, I would like to introduce myself. I'm Dr. Jamal Al-Haddi, the Program Manager of ACCESS-Plus Program working for Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW).

ACCESS-Plus Program is the a program that receives US Department of Labor fund to combat Exploitive Child Labor, Worst Forms of Child Labor and Child Trafficking in Yemen. This Program is the program that you denoted in your article in the index page of your website; www.intelwire.com .

Herein, I would like to reveal some facts about Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW).

The Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) is a national non-faith, non-governmental organization (NGO) established in Sana'a, Yemen, in March 1990. CSSW works at the grassroots level, and seeks to provide an effective charity model to promote sustainable, economic and social development through relief and development programs, in addition to emergency relief. Its programs cover sustainable development, orphan care, education, health, family, social welfare, population, food security, poverty alleviation, environment, and working with certain groups, including those who are poor, and women, youth, children, refugees, the disabled and the elderly.

CSSW has a consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (Special Category). It is also an NGO member of United Nation Department of Public Information UN DPI. It also has a membership status in many national institutions, such as the Supreme Women Council, Mother & Childhood High Council, the National Population Council, Social Fund for Development, Social Care Fund, Public Works Project, Disaster Preparedness NGO Forum, Poverty Reduction Strategy for NGOs Network Group, and Yemeni NGOs Network. Meanwhile, CSSW partners with UN agencies, in particular, U.N. Capital Development Fund, International Committee of the Red Cross, WFP, UNDP, UNHCR, UNFPA, WHO and UNICEF, UNV in addition to international organizations such as CHF International, Futures Group International (American NGOs). It has also partnerships through group of projects and programs with, World Bank, Canada Embassy, Japanese Embassy, US Embassy, British Embassy, European Commission, Dutch Embassy, etc.

The current CSSW activities are developmental projects that target the poor and needy people in urban and rural communities. The projects aim to alleviate poverty. Within the NGO networking group on poverty reduction that sponsors poor families, CSSW is responsible for monthly food distribution.

CSSW also implements family development projects targeting poor women and families through micro-credit, handicraft projects, including work with leather products, orphan care and a sponsorship program. CSSW currently sponsors about 25,312 orphans and street children.

CSSW's Smart woman Centers in Sana'a and other governorates organize training courses all over the year in manual work and skills that might be particularly helpful for women. The courses span a wide range of topics that include computer technology, sewing, embroidering, and carpet weaving, in addition to literacy programs, educational sessions, English language courses, and first-aid courses. CSSW has ongoing programs in public health, reproductive health, family planning and health care for refugees, Combating Females Genitalia Malformation (FGM) Projects, Combating Early Marriage Project.

CSSW also provides its health services through 22 facilities in 13 governorates, outreach health activities, an onchocerciasis (River Blindness) control program in four governorates, and by conducting studies and field surveys, in cooperation with UN agencies and international relief organizations.
Regarding allegations stated in your article, here is the response for them:

CSSW is a non-faith based organization which provides its services to all categories regardless sex, ethnicity, color or religion inside and outside Yemen according its constitution. For example, CSSW provide services to Muslim and non Muslim Ethiopian Oromos refugees in addition to Somali refugees who displaced to Yemen. It also used to assist poor Jewish families in Raida Town- Amran Governorate.

All information in this article is baseless and fabricated.

According to official documents of registration and elections of CSSW which was established in March 1990, Abdulmajeed Al-Zendani or Anwar Al-Awlaki never have been part of CSSW either as founders, members of Managerial Boards, employees, consultants volunteers or any position in CSSW. (The official registration documents are available upon request and Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor keep the original copies of them).

CSSW since its foundation in 1990 used to work with local, regional and international partners. CSSW works with all UN agencies in Yemen including Unicef, UNDP, UNFPA, UNV, UNHCR it a member of United Nations Economic Council & Social Council (ECOSOC), it is also a member UN Department of Pubic Information (DPI). It has also partnerships with Japanese Embassy, Dutch Embassy, British Embassy, and many other partners.

One of the values that CSSW works in, is transparency. CSSW annual reports used to be disseminated through booklets and internet. The CSSW financial system was checked from international experts and then the NICRA was signed and approved United State Department of Labor.

If any one needs any information about CSSW, it can be provided simply through the official email at info@csswyemen.org.

According to media rules, we call upon posting CSSW response in the same page and in same area of your original article.

If you need any information related to CSSW, Please don't hesitate to contact me at my contacts below.

Best wishes,

Jamal Al-Haddi
ACCESS-Plus Program Manager
Alternative to Combat Child Labor through Education & Sustainable Services

UPDATE 6/23/2010: On June 23, Jamal Al-Haddi gave the following responses to the questions cited in the artice. After careful consideration of these responses relative to the documentation above, INTELWIRE still stands by its story. However, additional documentation is being sought in order to fully clarify any issue which remains disputed.

Q: Just so I understand, you are specifically denying that Anwar Awlaki worked for CSSW as reported by the Washington Post and other major media outlets?

A. Yes, Anwar Al-Awlaki had never been a part of CSSW as mentioned in my comments. He wasn't a member of CSSW General Assembly. And for your information, CSSW managerial board including it president and vice president are selected through direct secret election from the General Assembly under supervision of Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. Minutes of meetings, and names of elected members are kept with the ministry.

Q: I have viewed and intend to publish with your letter the United States government tax form for the CSSW branch in the United States listing Anwar Awlaki as a vice president. Are you certain you wish to maintain your denial against that document?

CSSW has no braches out side Republic of Yemen. No official or unofficial branch of CSSW in the United States. I don't know from what source they concluded that CSSW has a branch and has a vice president for it!!

There are some associations have same name of CSSW in different parts of the world. For example, Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) based in Midwest has the same name of Yemen's CSSW. This society or any other society has nothing to do with CSSW-Yemen.

CSSW used to receive any unconditional fund or grants to use them in development of Yemeni community.

Q:In your letter, you say that Abdul-Majid Zindani has no link to CSSW, not even as a volunteer or a consultant. Do you deny then that Zindani played a central role in CSSW’s October 2009 Seventh Orphans Festival?

CSSW has periodic Orphan Festivals since its establishment as it sponsors more than 25,000 orphans. ALL these Festival are conducted under the patronage of H.E. President Ali Abdulla Saleh, the President of the Republic of Yemen. More than (500) persons attend or participate in each festival. The attendance of these festival which includes different activities, is open for officials or dignities or personalities who would like to participate, regardless their political affiliation or any other considerations. Some of those festivals were partially sponsored by international agencies such as Unicef.

Zendani hasn't any role in the 7th festival. He only attended the festival as he was the member of Yemeni Presidency Council after unification of Yemen in 1990.

Q: The Washington Post first reported that CSSW was founded by Zindani and that it employed Awlaki. Have you written a similar letter to them? Did they print a correction?

No. not yet, however, we are intending to do so. And I'm sure that they will correct this false information.

Q: Do you deny that CSSW works as partners with the International Islamic Relief Organization and the Qatar Charitable Society?

CSSW used to deal only with organizations and entities that are recognized in their original countries and have good reputation regardless they are Islamic of non-Islamic. CSSW used to deal with Islamic Relief Organization and Qatar Charity like any other agency such as WFP, UNDP, UNHCR, UNFPA, WHO , UNICEF, UNV, World Bank, etc.

Labels: Abdul-Majid-Zindani, Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, Charitable-Society-for-Social-Welfare, Osama-Bin-Laden, Terrorist-Financing

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Anwar Awlaki Video Posted Online by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

A new Anwar Awlaki video has been posted online by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The 45-minute video is an interview format, entirely in Arabic, with no subtitles, and Awlaki is wearing a Yemeni-style dagger similar to the one worn by Osama bin Laden in earlier Al Qaeda videos. The video features extensive discussion of the U.S. and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.



Update: AP story

Labels: American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Fox News Reporting: The American Terrorist, Anwar Awlaki

A few INTELWIRE exclusive documents were referenced in tonight's special "Fox News Reporting: The American Terrorist." The program airs throughout the weekend. I will be featuring a chapter on Awalki in my forthcoming book on American jihadists.

The documentary also mentioned the Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW), a Yemeni charity which the FBI has investigated as a terrorist financing vehicle. Awlaki worked for the charity during the 1990s.

At least $3.5 million was allocated by the Labor Department to fund a three-year partnership between the Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW), based in Yemen, and CHF International, a Maryland-based foundation, to fight child labor and child trafficking starting in fiscal year 2008. Click here for full story.

Click here to look at documents exploring Awlaki's links to the September 11 hijackers, including documents featured on the program.

Click here for more stories and documents related to Awlaki.

See also:

Labels: Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, INTELWIRE-Exclusive, Weblog

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

AQAP Promises A New 9/11 If Anwar Awlaki Is Killed

UPDATED: 4:57 p.m.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula threatened a new 9/11 attack on the United States if American forces kill Yemeni-American cleric Anwar Awlaki.

The audio recording in support of Awalki was issued today by AQAP chief Abu Basir Nasir al-Wuhayshi.

"We are enamored with the attacks of September 11," Basir said, pledging to protect Awlaki from U.S. attacks, according to a translation by Reuters. President Barak Obama recently authorized U.S. forces to target and kill Awalki, an American citizen.

The recording, which is in Arabic, provides an interesting window into Awalki's current status among Arabic speaking jihadis.

Until recently, Awlaki might as well have been the invisible man on the Arabic jihadist forums. The reasons for this aren't totally clear to me, but it may have to do with him being perceived as an American first, and a Yemeni second. His releases were almost always in English, and while there is a cottage industry translating jihadist material from Arabic to English, that train doesn't often reverse direction.

When he released a video in Arabic through AQAP's Al Malahim production company, it looked to be a breakthrough for him. But the video appeared on Al Jazeera and the full-length version never surfaced on the forums. And the AJ video wasn't linked from the Arabic forums either, at least not prominently. When the people in charge of the forums like someone, it's hard to miss it -- the moderators post multiple banner ads and giant headlines.

Enter this new audio, a celebrity endorsement of Awalki -- landing before the actual Awlaki video has been posted. This suggests to me that AQAP feels that it needs to prepare the ground for our Anwar.

A banner ad promoting the audio release was posted second from the top by the mods on the Al Fallujah forum as of 5 p.m. ET. Typically about a dozen communiques from various terrorist groups are highlighted with banner ads and headlines at the top of each forum page. Upwards of 20 Al Fallujah posters had replied with positive comments about the video, endorsing the forum's endorsement of Awalki.

The Majahden forum posted the banner at the very top of the page, indicating a strong endorsement. Al-Qimmah, a Somali and Arabic forum, did use the banner but interestingly the English-language Al Ansar had not posted it, as of noon Sunday. By 1 p.m., Shaimkh was playing Awlaki fourth from the top, basically over the fold, but it looks to be a "slow news day."

All of this is probably a pre-show to the actual Awlaki video being released.

This post has been corrected.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, Weblog

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Exclusive: U.S. Gave Millions To Charity Linked To Al Qaeda, Anwar Awlaki

Yemeni government official Hamoud Hattar, left, and Al Qaeda-linked cleric Abdul Majid Zindani at an October 2009 Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) event in Yemen. Hattar on June 7 announced that Yemen will not extradite Awlaki to the United States.

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Updated June 23, 2010

The U.S. Department of Labor gave millions of dollars to a joint venture that included a Yemeni charity with extensive links to Al Qaeda.

   Tweet this story

At least $3.5 million was allocated by the Labor Department to fund a three-year partnership between the Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW), based in Yemen, and CHF International, a Maryland-based foundation, to fight child labor and child trafficking starting in fiscal year 2008.

The money was provided through a grant by the Labor Department's Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking (OCFT), according to a Labor Department press release, the agency's Web site and Middle Eastern news sources (link, link).

Wanted fugitive and radical Yemeni-American cleric Anwar Awlaki served as a vice president for the organization during the 1990s. Awlaki is also believed to be associated with Al Qaeda (link). Awlaki's name is listed on an IRS Form 990 filed by the Charitable Society for Social Welfare for an now-defunct U.S. branch of the organization. Click here to read the CSSW tax form, which is a public record. Awlaki is listed as vice president on page 4 of the document.

CSSW spokesman Jamal Al-Haddi denied that the organization was connected to the Yemeni CSSW and denied that Awlaki ever worked for the Yemen branch of the organization. He told INTELWIRE in an e-mail that "CSSW has no branches outside Republic of Yemen. No official or unofficial branch of CSSW in the United States."

However CSSW's own Web site, in an archived page found on Archive.org, shows that in 2003 CSSW listed contact information for branches in Brooklyn, Detroit and San Diego. The 990 form shows that CSSW had directors in all three cities, including Awlaki in San Diego, whose listed address is the Ar-Ribat mosque. Two of the September 11 hijackers attended that mosque while Awlaki was imam there. The archived link was provided by Evan Kohlmann, a senior investigator with the NEFA Foundation.

The U.S.-based organization claims on its tax form that it provides services and support for orphans in Yemen, just as the Sana-based CSSW does. According to additional tax documents obtained by the NEFA Foundation, CSSW intitially claimed it was not related to CSSW in Yemen in an IRS 1023 filing. But the charity's attorney, Ronald Rose, later admitted, in response to IRS questions, that the two organizations were closely linked.

The complete letter can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation Web site, which states, "Despite recent statements from CSSW's head office in Yemen strongly denying any link to al-Awlaki or the affiliate group in Kansas he helped manage, Mr. Rose's letter appears to paint a sharply contrasting picture." The letter states:

In general, the distributions of funds raised by this charity will not go directly to individuals…to provide assistance for people who have been victimized by the civil wars in Yemen and Somalia… A similar charitable organization exists in the nation of Yemen, whose goals are the same. In many cases, application for benefits will be submitted through the organization in Yemen and contributed funds will be routed through this organization to the ultimate recipients. The role of the charitable organization in Yemen will be to act as an agent or facilitator for the distribution of benefits from the Society.

The Brooklyn branch of CSSW was the subject of an FBI terrorism financing investigation in 2003, five years prior to the Department of Labor grant approval. Al-Haddi did not respond to a question on this issue. The terrorism financing investigation was known as "Black Bear." Click here to read a court filing which provides some details of the investigation.

The filing was made by the defense team for Numan Maflahi, a Yemeni-born U.S. citizen who was convicted of lying to federal agents in a terrorism financing investigation. Click here for a New York Times story about the conviction. Click here for an Associated Press story on the investigation of CSSW.

The Washington Post reported in 2008 that CSSW was founded by Abdul Majid Al Zindani, a veteran of the jihad against the Soviet Union and its civil war aftermath. Zindani was an associate of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, according to published reports and exclusive documents obtained by INTELWIRE. Zindani has been designated as a member or associate of Al Qaeda by both the U.S. government and the United Nations.

Documents filed in a U.S. terrorism prosecution state that the Yemeni government considered the Al Iman University, run by Zindani, "as a 'nest for terrorism' that exports and propagates terrorism." Click here to read the document. Awlaki lectured at the University, according to the Washington Post and other sources.

Al-Haddi denied that Zindani had ever played any role in the organization. Neither Awlaki or Zindani has "never have been part of CSSW either as founders, members of Managerial Boards, employees, consultants volunteers or any position in CSSW," Al-Haddi wrote in an email. When asked if CSSW had requested a correction from Washington Post, he said that he had not but intended to.

However, the CSSW Web site again seems to contradict Al-Haddi's statement.

CSSW's Web site contains stories on a 2009 "Orphan's Festival" event featuring Zindani as a featured speaker in a central role. Zindani is named on the page, which also features a photograph of the cleric at the center dias of the event. Click here for the original page in Arabic, and click here for a cached copy of the the page. The event was also extensively covered in the organization's newsletter. A cached copy of the story may be viewed by clicking here.

When asked about the photos, Al-Haddi said that Zindani's presence at the 2009 festival was simply as an attendee due to Zindani's participation in the Yemeni government in 1990. He also suggested that Zindani was only one of 500 participants, and played no role at the conference.

However, photos of the event, found on an Arabic Web site Yemen-Sound.com, show Zindani seated prominently in the front row of the event and handing out awards from the stage. The CSSW Web site additionally describes Zindani as a speaker at the event.

In several photos, Zindani appears with another speaker at the event, Judge Hamoud Hattar, who in June announced that Yemen will not extradite Anwar Awlaki to the United States. Hattar, ironically, has gained a measure of fame for his "deradicalization" efforts with Yemeni extremists in prison.

Yemeni government official Hamoud Hattar, left, and Al Qaeda-linked cleric Abdul Majid Zindani at an October 2009 Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) event in Yemen.

Also at the event was Sheikh Aed Al Qarni, who can be seen in this video calling on Allah to "destroy the Jews" and praising jihadists attacking American forces in Iraq.

Sheikh Aed Al Qarni at an October 2009 Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) event in Yemen.

The CSSW Web site lists partner organizations including the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Qatar Charitable Society, both of which are believed by the U.S. government to be Al Qaeda financing vehicles. The U.S. alleges that IIRO helped finance the Manila-based Bojinka plot to blow up U.S. airliners in 1995. According to an Al Qaeda informant, Osama bin Laden has stated that Qatar Charitable Society funds were used to pay for an attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek, also in 1995.

This story has been substantially updated with CSSW denials and with additional documentation which supports the story. For the full text of comments from CSSW's Al-Haddi, click here.

Labels: Abdul-Majid-Zindani, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, Charitable-Society-for-Social-Welfare, INTELWIRE-Exclusive, Weblog, Yemen

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Awlaki's Path

Anwar Awlaki is talking again, in an audio message attributed to SITE but being pushed on Al Qaeda-linked forums by the American jihad-supporters at Revolution Muslim. In fact, RM has branded the short snippet currently available with its own logo.

Whether truthfully or not, Awlaki addresses a question that has been posed to me by both Muslims and journalists: "When did Awlaki become a radical?"

Some background is in order. Aside from his employment as imam at mosques in San Diego and Washington, D.C., Awlaki was the author/artist of a series of quite popular and passionate audio lectures on subjects such as the lives of the prophets, the hereafter and the companions of Mohammed. For this work, he attracted a fairly large following among mainstream Muslims, many of whom were floored to hear his name surface in connection to Nidal Hasan and Christmas-bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

So when we talk about Awlaki, a key question is when did he become a radical. There are three possible answers to this question:

• He was always a radical, but didn't always show it.
  
• He became a radical some time before leaving the U.S.
  
• He became a radical after leaving the U.S. (possibly after being arrested and interrogated in Yemen).

Awlaki claims, in this new video, that he became radicalized after the invasion of Iraq, which would place the change after he left the U.S. but before he went to Yemen. He was in the U.K. at the time of the invasion. According to Awlaki's new audio:

"However, with the American invasion of Iraq and continued U.S. aggression against Muslims, I could not reconcile between living in the U.S. and being a Muslim. And I eventually came to the conclusion that jihad against America is binding on myself, just as it binding on every other able Muslim. [...]

"To the Muslims in America, I have this to say: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters? How can you hand your loyalty to the government that is leading the war against Islam and Muslims?"

While it makes a convenient talking point for Awlaki to have become suddenly radicalized by Iraq, the evidence suggests it happened much earlier. For one thing, there is Awlaki's well-publicized association with 9/11 hijackers in San Diego and Washington, D.C. I'll have more to say about that in my book, but it sure looks to me like this association was not entirely innocent (although there is currently no evidence that Awlaki knew specifics about the 9/11 plot).

More to the point, here's an excerpt from a 2002 sermon that Awlaki gave at the Dar El Hijra mosque -- before the invasion of Iraq and before he left the U.S. for good. He's railing in hysterical tones against the government after a series of raids on Islamic charities suspected of financing terrorism:

So this is not now a war on terrorism. We need to all be clear about this. This is a war against Muslims. It is a war against Muslim and Islam. Not only is it happening worldwide but it’s happening right here in America, that is claiming to be fighting this war for the sake of freedom, while it’s infringing on the freedom of its own citizens just because they’re Muslims. For no other reason.

And as Muslims, if we allow this to continue, if we do not stop it it ain’t gonna stop! It’s not gonna stop. If you don’t stand up in this struggle and make your voices heard and unite and make it clear to the authorities that you’re not going to allow your necks to be stepped over and your rights to be infringed upon. If you do not do that, then only Allah knows where it’s going to stop. Maybe the next day the Congress will pass a bill that Islam is illegal in America.

So while we have to acknowledge Awlaki's version of these events, we don't have to accept his version blindly. Whatever the details of Anwar Awlaki's path to the jihad, it started long before Iraq.

Here's the new audio. Please credit INTELWIRE.com if you broadcast or link the clip. The 2002 audio is also available. Broadcast journalists can contact me for a copy.

Labels: American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Umar-Farouk-Abdulmutallab

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink