9/11 Commission Memorandum on Relations with the Taliban

The 9/11 Commission interviewed Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department analyst on Afghanistan and Pakistan, about the evolving understanding of the Taliban from their rise in the mid-1990s through September 11.

9/11 Commission Memorandum on Relations with the Taliban

Labels: 9-11-Commission, State-Department, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Declassified State Department Cables On Hezbollah's Imad Mughniyah

Declassified documents reveal that the Bush administration was prepared to deal with Hezbollah as a political party if it abandoned the use of violence.

The new documents were released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by INTELWIRE for State Department cables relating to Hezbollah's terrorist mastermind, Imad Mughniyah, reportedly killed in a car bombing in 2008.

Mughniyah is believed to have killed hundreds of Americans during his terrorist career and is believed to have been responsible for the 1983 terrorist bombings of U.S. targets in Lebanon, among many other attacks. A recent lawsuit also alleges Mughniyah helped facilitate the September 11 attacks (memorandum, PDF).

The new documents also point to Mughniyah's involvement in a host of attacks, including a March 12, 2002, bombing that killed six Israeli civilians in northern Israel, which had not previously been attributed to him.

The cables also seem to represent overtures toward Hezbollah made through diplomatic contacts with Syria in the wake of September 11, although Mughniyah remained a sticking point.

A February 2005 cable supporting an EU effort to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization stated:

[The] U.S. is opposed to Hizballah's use of terror and violence not Hizballah as social/political/religious party in Lebanon. But there should be no recognition of Hizballah as legitimate party until all involvement in violence ceases. There should also be no distinction between the so-called "military" and "political" wings of Hizballah.

The cable went on to indicate that Hezbollah could not be treated as a political party unless its popular leader, Hassan Nasrallah, were to step down and the organization were to cut ties Mughniyah.

Another cable dated May 10, 2002 described a meeting between former U.S. Ambassador Theodore Kattouf and former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam:

The Ambassador interjected that the U.S. was not concerned about Hizballah's past resistance activities inside Lebanon. Although we strongly disagree with Hizballah's aims, we did not take issue with it playing a social and political role in Lebanon. But Hizballah was implicated in the 1996 Khobar Tower bombings in Saudi Arabia, something the ambassador knows firsthand, since he was the charge, and in bombings in Argentina in the early 90s. Beyond this, the U.S. would neither forget nor forgive Imad Mughniyeh and his associates for their attacks on U.S. personnel in Lebanon during the 1980s.

But a January 2002 cable seemed to indicate intelligence suggesting Mughniyah had already pulled back from involvement with Hezbollah in favor of Iran, stating:

French information indicated that Imad Mughniyeh and his external security organization had distanced themselves from Hizballah proper and were taking more and more of their direction from Tehran.

The documents also describe Mughniyah-related plots to attack French, American and Israeli targets in the Ivory Coast during the 1980s.

Click here to read the cables (PDF)

Labels: 9-11, FOIA, Hezbollah, Imad-Mughniyah, INTELFILES, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

U.S. Propaganda Video From 1980s Cheers Kids Being Indoctrinated In Jihad

The State Department made several documentaries about the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s. This clip, from "We Are Afghanistan," made in 1984, extols the virtues of children being indoctrinated for a life of jihad.

Ironically, some of these children are now likely adults in an Afghanistan wracked with insurgents targeting U.S. forces.

Many of the dozens of American jihadists who fought the Soviets researched the U.S. government's position on the mujahideen before going to Afghanistan. For more about these American jihadists, check out "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam" by J.M. Berger. To pre-order the book, click here.

For more videos related to terrorism, check out the new INTELWIRE YouTube channel. There will be additional content relating to American jihadists as the book's release date grows nearer.

Labels: Afghanistan, American-Jihadists, Jihad-Joe, Soviet-Union, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Declassified Cable From INTELWIRE Expands Wikileaks Revelation Of Iranian Arms Smuggling

One of the State Department cables released by Wikileaks this week claimed that the Iranian government has used the Red Crescent charity to smuggle arms to Hezbollah and the Balkans.

If you were wondering exactly what that means, you'll have to go beyond Wikileaks. A State Department cable obtained by INTELWIRE using the Freedom of Information Act describes an intercepted 1992 arms shipment from Iran to Bosnia in eye-popping detail.

According to the cable, the Croatian government intercepted a plane from Iran which was bound for Bosnia and inspected its contents. Croat President Franjo Tudjman called in his local U.S. consul for advice about what to do. The U.S. eventually advised him to send the flight back to Iran.

The plane was "fully loaded with arms," including a number of barrels believed to contain chemical or biological weapons. It was not the first Iranian shipment of arms to Bosnian Muslims either.

The Iranian and Bosnian governments had previously asked permission from Tudjman to ship arms through Zagreb. The last time, Tudjman had said no, so this time all the supplies in the plane was labeled as humanitarian aid from the Red Crescent.

The 20 to 40 mujahideen fighters on the plane were more difficult to conceal. It's important to note that these were probably not all (or even mostly) Iranians. Iranian nationals in Bosnia functioned more as trainers and intelligence agents, but Iran helped smuggle in fighters from around the Muslim world.

American military veterans were also flying into Bosnia to serve as trainers to the Bosnian mujahideen during the same period. Never-before-reported details of this program will be revealed in my forthcoming book on American jihadists, scheduled for release in spring 2011.

Read the whole cable

For thousands of pages of additional State Department cables, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, click here.

This document was obtained during the course of reporting Sarajevo Ricochet, a documentary about the Bosnia war, including new information about Srebrenica and about the activities of Islamic extremist networks in Bosnia during the war. For an excerpt from the documentary focused on illegal arms shipments from Iran to Bosnia, click here.

Labels: Bosnia, Iran, Red-Screscent, State-Department, Wikileaks

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Previously Classified Documents On Srebrenica Massacre And More

If you support government transparency, but don't support the indiscriminate release of classified information, forget Wikileaks and check out the documents below.

The PDF binder linked below contains 2,000 pages of previously classified State Department documents on the 1995 massacre at Srebrenica, considered a turning point in the Bosnian civil war.

The documents include real-time descriptions of the chaos at Srebrenica and U.N. efforts to manage refugees from the town, where Serbian forces killed thousands of Bosnian Muslims. The cables also describe delicate behind-the-scenes diplomacy around the attack and other sensitive issues, including the attitudes of Bosnian government officials, the conduct of U.N. peacekeepers and the alleged killing of a U.N. peacekeeper by a Bosnian soldier around the time of the attack.

All documents were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. The PDF is massive. I recommend saving it locally rather than trying to open it in your browser.

INTELWIRE Srebrenica Dossier

These documents were obtained during the course of reporting Sarajevo Ricochet, a documentary about the Bosnia war, including new information about Srebrenica and about the activities of Islamic extremist networks in Bosnia during the war. For an excerpt from the documentary focused on illegal arms shipments from Iran to Bosnia, click here.

INTELWIRE hosts a large collection of declassified State Department cables on a variety of important subjects related to global security and the war on terrorism. INTELWIRE documents include:

Benazir Bhutto assassination

Terrorism financing

Al Qaeda history

The Siege of Mecca

The assassination of Anwar Sadat

General Islamic extremism

Extremism in Egypt

INTELWIRE also features the biggest collection of FBI documents and State Department documents on September 11 available on the Web including documents cited in the end notes of the 9/11 Commission report. September 11 documents can be found here, here, here and here

Labels: Bosnia, Srebrenica, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

State Department Cables On Muwafaq Foundation

In light of the court decision this week excusing Yasin Al-Qadi from a terrorism financing case filed by victims of the September 11 attacks, here are a few documents I recently received from the State Department regarding the Muwafaq Foundation, Al-Qadi's charity.

State Department Cable, 10/4/1993, "The Impact of [Government of Sudan] Propaganda"

This cable broadly discusses Sudan's aggressive program of Islamization, and the role of several NGOS including Muwafaq in a fleeting reference.

State Department Cable, 9/21/1994, "Anatomy of an Islamist NGO"

This is a detailed account of the Muwafaq Foundation, except that the State Department has redacted derogatory information about the charity citing a "national security" exemption to the Freedom of Information Act. It's not clear to me what could possibly be so important in a 1994 document that it justifies a total redaction of the section dealing with Muwafaq's questionable activities, but I hope to find out after my appeal. The unredacted portion is derived from a meeting between a State Department political officer in Khartoum and several members of Muwafaq's leadership.

The document notes Muwafaq has projects in Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Lebanon. It also notes that Muwafaq has "representatives" in the United States.

State Department Cable, 10/15/2001, Terrorist Fundraising E.O. -- Yassin Al-Qadi

Shortly after the U.S. Treasury Department designated Yasin Al-Qadi and the Muwafaq Foundation as terrorist financiers in 2001, Al-Qadi requested a meeting with the U.S. consul in Jeddah. This secret memo shows that the meeting was scheduled but does not reflect whether it took place or what was discussed.

State Department Cable, 8/22/2006, Saudi Terrorist Financier Yassin Qadi Claims Victory After Turks Release His Assets

The title of this cable from the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh is fairly descriptive. It describes Al-Qadi's successes in getting his name cleared in Turkey and elsewhere. The cable notes that "Qadi's public claim that the [Saudi government] supports his legal efforts is spurious; the [Saudi government] froze his assets in the Kingdom."

Labels: INTELFILES, Muwafaq-Foundation, State-Department, Yasin-Al-Qadi

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews

9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews

9/11 Commission interview with Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State, and Jamie Borek, Assistant Legal Counsel, Department of State. Discussion of improvements, and areas in need of improvement, related to the State Department's handling of intelligence in the wake of September 11.

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews

9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews

9/11 Commission interview with Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State, and Jamie Borek, Assistant Legal Counsel, Department of State. Discussion of improvements, and areas in need of improvement, related to the State Department's handling of intelligence in the wake of September 11.

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission Memoranda on Extremism in Pakistan

In light of recent developments in Pakistan, it's useful and interesting to take a look at some of the interviews conducted in Pakistan by the 9/11 Commission, which spoke with State Department hands, Pakistani officials at various levels and local journalists.

What immediately grabs you about these accounts is the breathtaking state of denial among Pakistani officials. One wonders what they think now.

10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Retired Lt. Gen. Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province

"[T]he Governor strongly disputed the coalition perception of the situation. He flatly stated that terrorist groups could not have a base in the NWFP; it was 'impossible.' Madrassas were in cities, not the countryside. Weapons would have to be used for training, making noise that would give them away. That would be reported. Most of the population was not with the jihadis. These people were probably being harbored in Afghanistan."

10/26/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with U.S. State Department Country Team, Islamabad

"Asked what the current government wants to accomplish, beyond the defense and foreign policy sphere, emphasis was placed on economic stability, controlling corruption, sustaining some kind of democratic transition, and developing moderate Islam."

10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Ashraf Naser, Chief Secretary of Balochistan

"We told him that we had concerns about Balochistan, that many informed officials in both Afghanistan and Pakistan had told us that it is unsafe, insecure and that extremists are gaining the upper hand there. Naser disagreed vehemently with this characterization. 'Why don't you come to Quetta with me? He invited. Foreign journalists roam freely
there. I don't see a problem.' [...]

"Naser said that the U.S. had more or less brought the 9/11 attacks on itself. You left Afghanistan unattended, we told you that was a mistake. We knew what was happening
there. But the Pakistanis could not control the Taliban in Afghanistan.

"He asserted that the recent sectarian killings in Balochistan were part of an Afghan plot to destabilize the region. The suicide bombers were part of Taliban groups trained in Afghanistan, he said. These suicide bombers were Baloch from south of Quetta, they were trained by Indians in Afghanistan. 'The Northern Alliance is openly contemptuous of us.'"

10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Secretary Tasneem Noorani, Pakistani Ministry of Interior

"He indicated that he and the entire Ministry were in shock by the 9-11 attacks and were struck by the scale and scope of the attacks. They couldn't image that the attacks could be connected with Pakistan. The initial reaction was a total blank. They didn't know how to react.

"Only after the US began discussing Usama bin Laden did the Ministry become aware of UBL and that the region, Pakistan and Afghanistan, was somehow involved. UBL was not known in Pakistan. He is an eccentric Saudi and was not understood by most people. [...]

"The Secretary seemed completely surprised by evidence that KSM had been active in Karachi and that he celebrated the 9-11 attacks in there and was actually interviewed by a journalist in Karachi about the attack. This information was a surprise to the Secretary. He asked for proof. He didn't believe any accounts of journalists in this regard."

The U.S. consul in Karachi didn't fare much better before the Commission's questioning.

10/20/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Douglas C. Rohn, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Karachi

"The Consul did not have a very informed understanding of the type and sophistication of the threat in Karachi or the region. He had no estimate of the al Qai' da presence, though he recognized that they have long operated in the region. His insights into the terrorist threat, from his few months on the job, were very basic and didn't provide any new information ... 'we've been attacked here in Karachi, the bad guys are out there, I'm trying to keep American safe.'"

It wasn't all bad, however. There were a few people who seemed to know what they were talking about.

10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Arlene Ferrill, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Peshawar

"CG Ferrill commented on the NWFP government that arose out of the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2002. Eveyone had been surprised, including the victors, by the success of the six-party Islamic coalition, led by the JI (Qazi Hussain Ahmed) and JUI(Fezlur Rahman), Their rhetorical agenda calls for restoration of Sharia law and stresses anti-American themes. [Comment: An Islamic coalition also won power at the same time in Balochistan.] The popular climate in the NWFP is anti-American. In that sense, not much has changed in Peshawar since 9111. Though openly wearing guns has stopped in Peshawar, it continues in the tribal areas - as does the availability of a wide variety of arms in nearby bazaars."

10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with journalist Ahmed Rashid

"[Prior to 9/11], the US had a policy on terrorism, focused only on what they wanted with Bin Laden. But the Americans did not present Pakistan, then under sanctions, either with carrots or with sticks. Clinton had snubbed Pakistan with the way he had handled his visit, favoring India, in March 2000. To present carrots and/or sticks would have required a real geopolitical strategy toward Pakistan, not just toward terrorism."

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, MFR, Pakistan, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission Memoranda on Extremism in Pakistan

In light of recent developments in Pakistan, it's useful and interesting to take a look at some of the interviews conducted in Pakistan by the 9/11 Commission, which spoke with State Department hands, Pakistani officials at various levels and local journalists.

What immediately grabs you about these accounts is the breathtaking state of denial among Pakistani officials. One wonders what they think now.

10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Retired Lt. Gen. Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province

"[T]he Governor strongly disputed the coalition perception of the situation. He flatly stated that terrorist groups could not have a base in the NWFP; it was 'impossible.' Madrassas were in cities, not the countryside. Weapons would have to be used for training, making noise that would give them away. That would be reported. Most of the population was not with the jihadis. These people were probably being harbored in Afghanistan."

10/26/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with U.S. State Department Country Team, Islamabad

"Asked what the current government wants to accomplish, beyond the defense and foreign policy sphere, emphasis was placed on economic stability, controlling corruption, sustaining some kind of democratic transition, and developing moderate Islam."

10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Ashraf Naser, Chief Secretary of Balochistan

"We told him that we had concerns about Balochistan, that many informed officials in both Afghanistan and Pakistan had told us that it is unsafe, insecure and that extremists are gaining the upper hand there. Naser disagreed vehemently with this characterization. 'Why don't you come to Quetta with me? He invited. Foreign journalists roam freely
there. I don't see a problem.' [...]

"Naser said that the U.S. had more or less brought the 9/11 attacks on itself. You left Afghanistan unattended, we told you that was a mistake. We knew what was happening
there. But the Pakistanis could not control the Taliban in Afghanistan.

"He asserted that the recent sectarian killings in Balochistan were part of an Afghan plot to destabilize the region. The suicide bombers were part of Taliban groups trained in Afghanistan, he said. These suicide bombers were Baloch from south of Quetta, they were trained by Indians in Afghanistan. 'The Northern Alliance is openly contemptuous of us.'"

10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Secretary Tasneem Noorani, Pakistani Ministry of Interior

"He indicated that he and the entire Ministry were in shock by the 9-11 attacks and were struck by the scale and scope of the attacks. They couldn't image that the attacks could be connected with Pakistan. The initial reaction was a total blank. They didn't know how to react.

"Only after the US began discussing Usama bin Laden did the Ministry become aware of UBL and that the region, Pakistan and Afghanistan, was somehow involved. UBL was not known in Pakistan. He is an eccentric Saudi and was not understood by most people. [...]

"The Secretary seemed completely surprised by evidence that KSM had been active in Karachi and that he celebrated the 9-11 attacks in there and was actually interviewed by a journalist in Karachi about the attack. This information was a surprise to the Secretary. He asked for proof. He didn't believe any accounts of journalists in this regard."

The U.S. consul in Karachi didn't fare much better before the Commission's questioning.

10/20/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Douglas C. Rohn, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Karachi

"The Consul did not have a very informed understanding of the type and sophistication of the threat in Karachi or the region. He had no estimate of the al Qai' da presence, though he recognized that they have long operated in the region. His insights into the terrorist threat, from his few months on the job, were very basic and didn't provide any new information ... 'we've been attacked here in Karachi, the bad guys are out there, I'm trying to keep American safe.'"

It wasn't all bad, however. There were a few people who seemed to know what they were talking about.

10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Arlene Ferrill, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Peshawar

"CG Ferrill commented on the NWFP government that arose out of the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2002. Eveyone had been surprised, including the victors, by the success of the six-party Islamic coalition, led by the JI (Qazi Hussain Ahmed) and JUI(Fezlur Rahman), Their rhetorical agenda calls for restoration of Sharia law and stresses anti-American themes. [Comment: An Islamic coalition also won power at the same time in Balochistan.] The popular climate in the NWFP is anti-American. In that sense, not much has changed in Peshawar since 9111. Though openly wearing guns has stopped in Peshawar, it continues in the tribal areas - as does the availability of a wide variety of arms in nearby bazaars."

10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with journalist Ahmed Rashid

"[Prior to 9/11], the US had a policy on terrorism, focused only on what they wanted with Bin Laden. But the Americans did not present Pakistan, then under sanctions, either with carrots or with sticks. Clinton had snubbed Pakistan with the way he had handled his visit, favoring India, in March 2000. To present carrots and/or sticks would have required a real geopolitical strategy toward Pakistan, not just toward terrorism."

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, MFR, Pakistan, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

10/2/2001: Secret Post-9/11 Briefing To World Leaders

Shortly after 9/11, U.S. embassies around the world were instructed to deliver a top-secret briefing to world leaders on the attacks of September 11. The report was a snapshot of everything the U.S. knew about al Qaeda at the time, including highly sensitive and classified intelligence helping prove the case that Al Qaeda had carried out the attack. The briefing also implicated Al Qaeda for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 thwarted Bojinka plot. Embassies were instructed on Oct. 2, 2001, to deliver "oral briefings only and not [repeat] not leave the document" in hard copy form.

According to the briefing:

"In the run-up to September 11, Bin Ladin and his associates seemed to be anticipating what we could only identify as an important event or activity, possibly an attack, although location and target were not clear."

An Al Qaeda informant "positively identified several of the September 11 hijackers as known Bin Ladin associates from photo spreads and possibly recognized other additional hijackers as well."

"All source intelligence reporting indicates that Bin Ladin and senior lieutenants had advance knowledge of the operational planning and timing for the attacks. Specific warnings went out to selected Bin Ladin confidents in Afghanistan and elsewhere to move to safe havens in anticipation of an immediate U.S. response following the attacks."

The document lists several key figures involved in the 9/11 attack, but notably fails to identify the plot's mastermind and operational commander, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed -- despite several references to the 1995 Bojinka plot, in which Mohammed conspired with his nephew Ramzi Yousef to execute a massive attack using civilian airliners.

Click here to read the briefing document

Labels: 9-11, INTELFILES, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

10/2/2001: Secret Post-9/11 Briefing To World Leaders

Shortly after 9/11, U.S. embassies around the world were instructed to deliver a top-secret briefing to world leaders on the attacks of September 11. The report was a snapshot of everything the U.S. knew about al Qaeda at the time, including highly sensitive and classified intelligence helping prove the case that Al Qaeda had carried out the attack. The briefing also implicated Al Qaeda for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 thwarted Bojinka plot. Embassies were instructed on Oct. 2, 2001, to deliver "oral briefings only and not [repeat] not leave the document" in hard copy form.

According to the briefing:

"In the run-up to September 11, Bin Ladin and his associates seemed to be anticipating what we could only identify as an important event or activity, possibly an attack, although location and target were not clear."

An Al Qaeda informant "positively identified several of the September 11 hijackers as known Bin Ladin associates from photo spreads and possibly recognized other additional hijackers as well."

"All source intelligence reporting indicates that Bin Ladin and senior lieutenants had advance knowledge of the operational planning and timing for the attacks. Specific warnings went out to selected Bin Ladin confidents in Afghanistan and elsewhere to move to safe havens in anticipation of an immediate U.S. response following the attacks."

The document lists several key figures involved in the 9/11 attack, but notably fails to identify the plot's mastermind and operational commander, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed -- despite several references to the 1995 Bojinka plot, in which Mohammed conspired with his nephew Ramzi Yousef to execute a massive attack using civilian airliners.

Click here to read the briefing document

Labels: 9-11, INTELFILES, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

State Department Documents Cited in 9/11 Commission Report, Part 1 of 2

The following documents are State Department cables which were referenced in the footnotes of the 9/11 Commission Report. A second batch will be posted within the next few weeks.

5/21/1996: Communique from Sudan re: Osama bin Laden

Notification to U.S. government that Bin Laden and "Egyptian terrorist elements" have left the Sudan.

8/6/1996: Major Usama Bin Laden Asset Deregistered

Bin Laden's Taba Investments (Tabba For Investment) deregistered by Sudanese government. Four Bin Laden firms are also discussed -- Wadi-Alageeg Construction Company, Tabba For Investment, El-Thimar Al-Mobark Agricultural Company, and the Khartoum Tannery.

9/14/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban Official Abdul Hakim Mujahid

Taliban warned that harboring Osama bin Laden has put "the Taliban and the U.S. on a collision course." Taliban reported that they had "warned
him once again not to engage in political or press activities."

10/12/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban official Maulawi Wakil Ahmed

Suggests "the Taliban are wrestling with the Bin Ladin issue and that their heretofore hard-line stance on this issue may be in some, sort of flux."

2/16/1999: Secret Memo, The Saudi Binladin Group, Builders to the King

Claims company "has sought to make clear that it has no links with the Islamist fanatic (and half brother) Usama by publicly and unequivocally condemning his actions and taking the necessary legal steps to ensure that all connections have been severed."

10/8/1998: Designation of Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization

12/14/1999: Secret Memo, Saudis on US Warning to Taliban re: UBL

The Saudis agree that Bin Laden is a threat to the Kingdom.

Labels: INTELFILES, Osama-Bin-Laden, State-Department, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

State Department Documents Cited in 9/11 Commission Report, Part 1 of 2

The following documents are State Department cables which were referenced in the footnotes of the 9/11 Commission Report. A second batch will be posted within the next few weeks.

5/21/1996: Communique from Sudan re: Osama bin Laden

Notification to U.S. government that Bin Laden and "Egyptian terrorist elements" have left the Sudan.

8/6/1996: Major Usama Bin Laden Asset Deregistered

Bin Laden's Taba Investments (Tabba For Investment) deregistered by Sudanese government. Four Bin Laden firms are also discussed -- Wadi-Alageeg Construction Company, Tabba For Investment, El-Thimar Al-Mobark Agricultural Company, and the Khartoum Tannery.

9/14/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban Official Abdul Hakim Mujahid

Taliban warned that harboring Osama bin Laden has put "the Taliban and the U.S. on a collision course." Taliban reported that they had "warned
him once again not to engage in political or press activities."

10/12/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban official Maulawi Wakil Ahmed

Suggests "the Taliban are wrestling with the Bin Ladin issue and that their heretofore hard-line stance on this issue may be in some, sort of flux."

2/16/1999: Secret Memo, The Saudi Binladin Group, Builders to the King

Claims company "has sought to make clear that it has no links with the Islamist fanatic (and half brother) Usama by publicly and unequivocally condemning his actions and taking the necessary legal steps to ensure that all connections have been severed."

10/8/1998: Designation of Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization

12/14/1999: Secret Memo, Saudis on US Warning to Taliban re: UBL

The Saudis agree that Bin Laden is a threat to the Kingdom.

Labels: INTELFILES, Osama-Bin-Laden, State-Department, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, Memorandum For The Record, Commission Interviews

The following interview pertains to counterterrorism during the 1990s and Clinton Administration efforts against Al Qaeda:

1/7/2004, 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with Madeleine Albright

The following interviews were conducted by the 9/11 Commission and pertain to Airline Security:

11/18/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with American Airlines Captain Don Dillman

11/19/2003, 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with American Airlines employees

1/07/2004, 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with Timothy Ahern, American Airlines vice president of Safety, Security and Environmental

1/8/2004: 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with Gerard Arpey, former American Airlines executive vice president for Operations

1/8/2004: 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with Larry Wansley, American Airlines director of security

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Airline-Security, Albright, INTELFILES, MFR, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, Memorandum For The Record, Commission Interviews

The following interview pertains to counterterrorism during the 1990s and Clinton Administration efforts against Al Qaeda:

1/7/2004, 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with Madeleine Albright

The following interviews were conducted by the 9/11 Commission and pertain to Airline Security:

11/18/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with American Airlines Captain Don Dillman

11/19/2003, 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with American Airlines employees

1/07/2004, 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with Timothy Ahern, American Airlines vice president of Safety, Security and Environmental

1/8/2004: 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with Gerard Arpey, former American Airlines executive vice president for Operations

1/8/2004: 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the record, Interview with Larry Wansley, American Airlines director of security

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Airline-Security, Albright, INTELFILES, MFR, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

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