U.S. Propaganda Video From 1980s Cheers Kids Being Indoctrinated In Jihad

The State Department made several documentaries about the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s. This clip, from "We Are Afghanistan," made in 1984, extols the virtues of children being indoctrinated for a life of jihad.

Ironically, some of these children are now likely adults in an Afghanistan wracked with insurgents targeting U.S. forces.

Many of the dozens of American jihadists who fought the Soviets researched the U.S. government's position on the mujahideen before going to Afghanistan. For more about these American jihadists, check out "Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam" by J.M. Berger. To pre-order the book, click here.

For more videos related to terrorism, check out the new INTELWIRE YouTube channel. There will be additional content relating to American jihadists as the book's release date grows nearer.

Labels: Afghanistan, American-Jihadists, Jihad-Joe, Soviet-Union, State-Department

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Secret British Documents From 1980 Detail Origins Of Western Covert Aid To Afghan Mujahideen

The British National Archives recently released hundreds of pages of previously classified documents pertaining to Afghanistan, including early moves by the U.K. and the United States to provide covert aid to the Afghan mujahideen following the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.

According to the documents, dated from 1980, the U.S. proposed supporting Pakistani refugee camps being used as operating bases by the mujahideen. Some of these bases would later be used by Arab volunteers in the Soviet jihad, including Makhtab al Khidmat, the predecessor group to Al Qaeda.

The documents include suggestions that the mujahideen would need surface-to-air missiles, which would later be supplied by the CIA.

INTELWIRE has obtained the documents and posted them below. These are very large PDFs, so I recommend downloading them and viewing them locally rather than trying to open them in a browser window, or using Google's QuickView.

U.K. Afghanistan Documents, 1980, Vol. 1

U.K. Afghanistan Documents, 1980, Vol. 2

For more about the documents, see this story from the Telegraph.

Labels: Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, CIA, Covert-Action, INTELFILES, Makhtab-Al-Khidmat, Mujahideen, Soviet-Union

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

So If We DID Kill Bin Laden, What Next?

In my last post I speculated that U.S. drones or intelligence services might be closing in on Osama bin Laden. So what happens if we kill him?

UPDATE: We've Killed Bin Laden, What Happens Next?

It's not enough to strike a location and applaud. First off, we need verification and that means troops or CIA agents on the ground to make a positive identification. The reasons for this are obvious. The Pakistanis won't be happy, but they never are.

Second, we need to sterilize the site. We will obviously gather intelligence treasures from the scene, but we need to do more than that. The site should be scrubbed so thoroughly you can't tell anyone was there. Leave no bodies, leave no equipment, no evidence of an attack (inasmuch as possible).

There are a couple of reasons for doing this. In the aftermath of killing Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, U.S. messaging made significant mistakes. The most important of these was releasing a close-up photograph of Zarqawi's dead face. Those pictures were made into martyrdom fetishes online within hours of their release.

Such images are an essential part of the lifeblood of the jihadist movement. So if we hit a target we are highly confident is bin Laden, we should leave nothing to celebrate. We should also suppress photographs of bin Laden's body for as long as possible. Given our open society, they won't stay buried forever, but we should buy ourselves a lot of time, so that when the pictures eventually emerge, there is some distance from the actual event.

It's not just about the martyr pictures. Removing all bodies and all inventory from the scene will leave ambiguity for the jihadists. If they can't confirm bin Laden is dead, then we not only control the messaging, we also gain a slightly wider window to exploit any intelligence gained from the site.

This time is critical because killing bin Laden alone will not end Al Qaeda or even cripple it. Quite the opposite. In the short term, it will probably energize the base. But killing bin Laden and Zawahiri within a couple of days of each other would have a significant impact on both morale and operations.

Hitting bin Laden alone will have exponentially less impact on operations than killing both OBL and Zawahiri. If we got Yahya Al-Libi as well, we'd have a shot at truly paralyzing the organization for long enough that even the unenthusiastic Pakistanis might be willing to carve it up.

As Jarret Brachman famously observed, Al Qaeda has become a media operation with a terrorist component, rather than what it was before, a terrorist operation with a media component. There are plenty of qualified terrorists to take up Al Qaeda's "external operations." But as a media operation, it needs figureheads.

Take out AQ's three top stars, and who's going to step up? Mustafa Abu al-Yazid is already dead, and Gadahn doesn't have the intellectual weight or rhetorical passion to fill those big shoes. Certainly there will be no lack of people trying to fill the void, but bin Laden, Zawahiri and Al-Libi are the proven commodities. Knock out all three of them, and the marquee power of Al Qaeda's media operation goes from must-see-TV to basic cable.

Speaking of the Pakistanis, the likely impact of doubling down on these top-level kills is so significant that we should do whatever it takes to make it happen, whether the Pakistanis like it or not. If that means U.S. troops storming or even demolishing houses in Quetta, so be it. While this will create a significant diplomatic disaster, the benefits probably outweigh the costs. It's a calculated risk, but not a gamble. We can ameliorate the situation somewhat by making public statements or even pledges that these successes will allow us to scale back or even quit our current military activities inside Pakistan.

Finally, we should lower our expectations. Even a best case scenario where we capture or kill the trifecta of bin Laden, Zawahiri and Libi, Al Qaeda will continue for a very long time, both in Pakistan and elsewhere. A successful strike is not a solution to terrorism, but it would buy us much-needed flexibility in re-aligning our foreign policy in the region and around the world away from the current single-minded focus, which comes at the expense of many other priorities.

Labels: Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Osama-Bin-Laden, Pakistan, Yahya-Al-Libbi

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Wikileaks Document: Afghan Intelligence Said In June 2007 That Osama Bin Laden Died In Peshawar Hospital

Updated 7/26/2010, 2:30 p.m. Eastern

Don't assume this is correct (I am assuming it is not), but a single-source intelligence report from the Afghanistan National Directorate of Security reported in June 2007 that Osama bin Laden had died in a Peshawar hospital.

According to an intelligence report leaked by Wikileaks:

NDS is also reporting that UBL had been transported to Peshawar hospital in Pakistan for treatment, where he has died. NDS stressed that this was a single source report and had not been verified.

Interestingly, there is virtually no other information about Osama bin Laden or Ayman Al Zawahiri to be found in the files, at least not by name. (There are a few more references to bin Laden in the remaining 15,000 or so records which Wikileaks has not yet issued but which select news organizations have viewed.)

One finds only the barest scraps of intelligence; nothing that points to bin Laden or Zawahiri being located in Afghanistan (no surprise there), and nothing that points to any degree of operational control over Afghan forces by either man. There are less than five references to each man in 76,000 records.

Compare that to almost 400 references to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (an Al Qaeda ally) and his network of fighters, and at least 85 references to Jaliluddin Haqqani (a Taliban Ally) and his network of fighters. There are 70 references to high-value targets -- including a handful of named Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders.

There are fewer than 200 references to Al Qaeda. Compare that to 6,000-ish references to the Taliban. Most references to enemy forces refer to ACM (Anti-Coalition Militia) or INS (insurgents), but the comparison between Al Qaeda and Taliban references is very interesting and perhaps telling. I've been one to argue that the estimate of 50 to 100 Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan is too low. Does this call that into question? It's hard to say. There are a number of factors that could skew this sample. But this is certainly one of the most important data points to date.

(Here's a contrarian point of view citing some documents I haven't seen in my download from the Wikileaks site and others which I feel are being overrepresented in the article.)

Importantly, there are more than 200 references to Iran -- more than there are to Al Qaeda, although dozens are in longish diplomatic cables. Most non-diplomacy citations were in reference to weapons and dozens of reports of IED components which were manufactured in Iran. Additionally, there are references to smuggling routes for both trained fighters and weapons coming from Iran into Afghanistan. One record describes an alleged terrorist facilitator moving Al Qaeda personnel and other militants through Afghanistan to Iran.

Other tidbits:

November 2006: AQ (NFI) trained 30 women (NFI) to execute suicide attacks against all foreigners in AFGHANISTAN. The women trained at a base located in MIRALI/MIRAMSHAH/ PAKISTAN (NFI); they are Chechens, Uzbeks, Arabs and Pakistanis. Seven of them are now located in KABUL (NFI) and they will execute suicide attacks against CF/ISAF (NFI).

Speaking of bombs, there were around 14,000 reports of IED encounters, which is an extremely worrisome number. Even allowing for the numerous false alarms, we're talking about IED production at a staggering level. With so many incidents, Darwin tells us that IED makers are learning a lot about what works and what doesn't, and the fittest who survive the war will be extraordinarily dangerous.

Fortunately, thus far, the IED production capacity has been pretty focused on the actual war/insurgency. But eventually we're going to be gone, or at least less engaged, and the survivors will turn their eyes in a systematic way to training foreigners or traveling abroad to ply their skills. We've been lucky that we haven't had a second Ramzi Yousef yet -- a super-competent bomb builder with both ambition and ancillary skills such as language and disguise. But we won't be lucky forever.

One of the memos records a non-combat meeting in November 2006 attended by military personnel during which a supposedly pro-government fatwa was read on the permissibility of killing Muslims.

a). First if some one kills Muslims, he should be revenged for

b). If a person is married and do have illegal sexual affairs with some one else, then he should be punished to death for that.

c). the third thing is if a Muslim convert to other religions, then he/she should be punished to death.

Labels: Afghanistan, Osama-Bin-Laden, Wikileaks

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

National Geographic Explorer: Talibanistan

National Geographic Explorer presents Talibanistan, a documentary on the activities of the Taliban along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. INTELWIRE's parent company, the Multifaceted Media Group, contributed footage of insurgents to the program. The episode airs Tuesday, June 8, at 10 p.m. Eastern. Natgeo's episode description is as follows:

For eight years the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have bogged down US and NATO troops in Afghanistan-all the while seizing territory and creating chaos in nuclear-armed Pakistan. In mid October, under pressure from the US, Pakistan announced that it would launch a military campaign designed to destroy the Taliban, The Taliban responded with a series of brazen attacks against the Pakistani Army, the police, and civilians, leaving the US in doubt over Pakistans ability to secure its nuclear weapons, and its own ability to fight the agile Taliban in Afghanistan. National Geographic Explorer was in Pakistan and Afghanistan during these explosive days documenting the fight on the ground and in the skies above this territory controlled by the Taliban, known as "Talibanistan." Explorer asks the question: who is winning this war and is this Obama's Vietnam or will he be the first to pacify Afghanistan?

For more information about how your production can commission research and license terrorist and insurgent footage from INTELWIRE and MMG, click here.

Labels: Afghanistan, Multifaceted-Media-Group, National-Geographic, Pakistan, Stock-Footage, Taliban, Weblog

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Abu Yahya Al-Libi: All Americans Must Be Killed Even If They Capitulate

Top Al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya Al-Libi is out with a new, and particularly grim, tract comparing America to the Bani Quraidah, a Jewish tribe that once came into conflict with Mohammed, resulting in all the adult males being killed, and the women and children being taken as slaves, according to a mix of hadith and Quranic sources.

The takeaway from this 20-page work is rather specific and quite possibly a signpost to trouble ahead. Al-Libi is arguing:

1) The harshest punishment is justified for those who ally themselves with the enemies of Islam, even if those people do not commit overt acts against Muslims.

2) That punishment, in the case of the Quraidah, was that all of the adult males were killed and all women and children taken as slaves. Al-Libi goes out of his way to point out that this punishment was meted out after the Quraidah surrendered.

3) The United States meets the same criteria for judgment as the Quraidah.

The expansion of the conflict here is in keeping with Al Qaeda's practices, although I don't recall seeing it stated so bluntly and justified so elaborately before.

Basically, Al-Libi is saying that every adult male American ought to be killed, whether or not they submit to the judgment of Muslims (meaning Al Qaeda, of course), and whether or not they have specifically taken up arms against Muslims and whether or not they continue to be at war with Muslims.

Or, to use his words, they are to be killed "not just as a punishment for the crime which they have committed in the past" but "to cut off the very substance of their evil." He specifically includes prisoners taken on the battlefield in this category, although he takes pains to say that his point is much broader.

Al-Libi makes a few references to the White House outreach to Muslims and efforts at conciliation in Afghanistan which make me think this piece is designed to shore up resistance to the rumblings from Karzai government and elsewhere about trying to work out some sort of conditional accommodation with tribal and Taliban factions.

The argument here is a shift from Osama bin Laden's earlier declarations of war against the U.S., which were largely predicated on specific foreign policy offenses. Al-Libi is saying that America has crossed a threshold and should be fought, not for what it does, but for what it is, and that no amount of capitulation is enough to end the killing.

Although this represents a serious escalation in some ways, especially as far as actions carried out by the committed AQ core, I think it could be an indicator that Al-Libi's radical constituency in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world (including his homeland of Libya) is getting tired of fighting and thinking -- however preliminarily -- about what kind of peace they might be willing to accept.

Labels: Abu-Yahya-Al-Libi, Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

June 2001: U.S. Warned Of Impending Terrorist Attack Coming From Afghanistan

New 9/11 documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act reveal: Less than three months before September 11, Secretary of State Colin Powell warned the Taliban that American intelligence had "high confidence" that "Afghan-based and other operatives are now planning on carrying out attacks against Americans." Powell's warning was conveyed to the Taliban by U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William B. Milam, who specifically discussed Osama bin Laden with the Taliban's representative Abdul Salam Zaeef.

Full Story

6/27/2001: State Dept. cable, threats to U.S. by Bin Laden

6/29/2001: State Dept. cable, threats to U.S. by Bin Laden

7/5/2001: State Dept. cable, meeting with Saudi Prince Abdullah

Labels: 9-11, Afghanistan, INTELFILES, Osama-Bin-Laden, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

June 2001: U.S. Warned Of Impending Terrorist Attack Coming From Afghanistan

New 9/11 documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act reveal: Less than three months before September 11, Secretary of State Colin Powell warned the Taliban that American intelligence had "high confidence" that "Afghan-based and other operatives are now planning on carrying out attacks against Americans." Powell's warning was conveyed to the Taliban by U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William B. Milam, who specifically discussed Osama bin Laden with the Taliban's representative Abdul Salam Zaeef.

Full Story

6/27/2001: State Dept. cable, threats to U.S. by Bin Laden

6/29/2001: State Dept. cable, threats to U.S. by Bin Laden

7/5/2001: State Dept. cable, meeting with Saudi Prince Abdullah

Labels: 9-11, Afghanistan, INTELFILES, Osama-Bin-Laden, Taliban

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

American Civilians Killed in Iraq, Afghanistan, January 2001 to December 2007

INTELWIRE filed a FOIA request for any records concerning non-military American citizens killed in Iraq and Afghanistan from January 1, 2001 to December 2007. The State Department said it found nine documents, consisting of 17 pages, which are linked below. The State Department said it was not withholding any documents, although some of the released documents were redacted.

Despite the State Department's claim that these are the only documents it could locate, none of the documents refer to American citizen Nicholas Berg, the most famous American civilian casualty in Iraq, who was killed by Al Qaeda in Iraq head Abu Musab Al Zarqawi.

Due to this glaring inconsistency, INTELWIRE believes this request has not received an adequate search nor a satisfactory response. An appeal is in process. In the meantime, the released documents may be viewed below.

American civilians killed in Iraq, Afghanistan, 1/2001 to 12/2007

One point of special interest in the released documents concerned Hector Patino, of San Antonio, Texas, who was killed in an apparent friendly fire incident in January 2007. Family members have raised questions about the official account of Patino's killing.

Reports stated Patino was driving a truck when Australian coalition military guards ordered him to stop in the vicinity of a checkpoint. He did not stop, for reasons unknown, and the soldiers shot and killed him.

The document released to INTELWIRE has one key difference from the official report. According to a State Department cable dated Jan. 17, 2007, "Australian and U.S. military guards ... shot and killed Patino."

As an early report, the cable may simply have erred in stating that U.S. soldiers were involved in the incident. INTELWIRE makes no special claims about the veracity of either account, but offers the document for those who may wish to investigate further.

1/17/2007: State Department cable, death of Hector Patino

Labels: Afghanistan, American-Jihadists, Iraq

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink