1999 FBI Summary of Information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

This 18-page PDF, heavily redacted, contains three different versions of an FBI summary of information concerning September 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed dated July 1999. Each version of the document is redacted differently. The document describes his membership during the 1980s in the Hizbul-Ittihad EI-Islami (Islamic Union Party), the Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf Group, and his employment by the government of Qatar during the early 1990s and alleged association with the Muslim Brotherhood.

7/8/1999: Summary of Information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Labels: Abdul-Hakim-Murad, Khalid-Shaikh-Mohammed, Ramzi-Yousef, Wali-Khan-Amin-Shah

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

What Is Al Qaeda, Part 3

This is the final batch of results from the "What is Al Qaeda" survey, conducted with major assistance from Clint Watts of SelectedWisdom.com.

Part 1: What is Al Qaeda (definition)

Part 2: Which groups are part of the U.S. war on Al Qaeda?

The third and final question in the survey asked about specific people and whether they are part of Al Qaeda. Click here to see the count for each category, or check out the percentages below.

Name	Yes	No	Don't know
Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi	29%	30%	41%
Anwar Awlaki	77%	6%	17%
Abdel Majid Zindani	13%	34%	53%
Ramzi Yousef	58%	20%	22%
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed	87%	6%	7%
Abu Zubaydah	69%	6%	24%
Omar Abdel Rahman	35%	36%	29%
Omar Hammami	29%	26%	45%
Abu Bakr Bashir	27%	34%	39%
Hambali	24%	25%	51%

The results for this section were very much influenced by lack of information. As with the previous results, I have broken out academic and government responders for closer scrutiny. Given below are the percentage of "yes" votes as compared to "no" votes only (i.e., "don't know" answers were not counted). Yellow blocks show votes with less than two-thirds consensus, red blocks highlight near 50-50 splits.

Name	Academics	Government
Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi	29%	59%
Anwar Awlaki	81%	96%
Abdel Majid Zindani	0%	22%
Ramzi Yousef	63%	64%
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed	90%	96%
Abu Zubaydah	88%	100%
Omar Abdel Rahman	26%	50%
Omar Hammami	20%	53%
Abu Bakr Bashir	20%	39%
Hambali	8%	60%

As you can see, government responders were much less likely to find consensus on these questions than academics, which is significant given that government employees are more directly responsible for implementing policies and making decisions about targeting. However, the sample size is so small (and the pool of government responders so diverse) that these figures should be used very cautiously when drawing conclusions of any kind.

That said, the results are quite interesting and rather confusing, often failing to apply the criteria for Al Qaeda affiliation outlined in Question One or specific groups identified in Question Two. So, for instance, the responses on Abu Zubaydah were quite strongly in favor of considering him part of Al Qaeda despite there being some confusion about this issue in the public record.

A majority of every professional group in the survey voted to include Ramzi Yousef in Al Qaeda, although the margins varied, with both government and academics failing to reach a two-thirds consensus. Relatively few people voted "don't know." While Yousef was known to have trained in Al Qaeda camps, the evidence that he acted at the direction of Al Qaeda is somewhat thin, and the evidence he was financed by Al Qaeda is significantly disputed. That said, there is enough evidence to make the argument and probably succeed in doing so, but it's hardly a slam dunk.

In contrast, the overall vote on Omar Abdel Rahman was sharply split and government voters went straight down the middle on the question. With some caveats, there is reasonably strong evidence that Rahman was signficantly financed by Osama bin Laden while he lived in America, and he effectively led the Al Kifah Center in Brooklyn, which was at least loosely affiliated with Al Qaeda, if not a full-blown "Al Qaeda outpost" as recent reports have mostly characterized it. You can find more on this in my book.

Here are a couple of charts showing a couple other interesting divergences in the data.





For both Omar Hammami and Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi, we saw wild swings in the data. I will probably try to assemble some thoughts on this later. For now, I just note it.

This is the final installment of the results. I am going to ponder these numbers for a while, trying not just to make sense of them but to draw some useful conclusions and talk about how they inform our national discussion about terrorism. In the meantime, feel free to drop in and discuss your thoughts with me on Facebook or Twitter.

Finally, many thanks again to Clint and SelectedWisdom.com for making the charts above and for making the overall survey happen. A lot of work went into both assembling the survey and making the results comprehensible, and it is much appreciated.

Check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Abdul-Majid-Zindani, Abu-Mansour-Al-Amriki, Abu-Zubaydah, Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Awlaki, Omar-Abdel-Rahman, Omar-Hammami, Ramzi-Yousef, Survey

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

State Department Put 'Political Pressure' On FBI To Deport Brother-in-Law Of Osama Bin Laden In 1995

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

"Pressure from the political portion of the State Department" contributed to the end of a 1995 FBI investigation into Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, who the FBI believed was a terrorist financier, according to a newly released document.

Read the document

The FBI teletype was written on May 11, 1995, just days after Khalifa was deported to Jordan after five months in U.S. custody.

Khalifa, a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden, was arrested in December 1994 by the INS after his visa was revoked. The revocation was predicated on terrorism charges filed against Khalifa in Jordan.

Khalifa was subsequently acquitted of those charges. He steadfastly denied any connection to terrorism until his murder in Madagascar in 2007.

Shortly after Khalifa's arrest during a business trip to San Francisco in December 1994, authorities in Manila broke up a terrorist cell led by World Trade Center bombing mastermind Ramzi Yousef, who had been planning to simultaneously bomb 11 U.S.-bound airliners over the Pacific. Assisting him in this plot was Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, future mastermind of the September 11 attacks.

Wali Khan Amin Shah, an associate of Yousef implicated in the airliner plot, was in contact with Khalifa during his U.S. trip. The FBI and CIA believed Khalifa also had direct contact with Ramzi Yousef, according to sources and documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. The FBI also believed Khalifa was connected to Omar Abdel Rahman, the radical sheikh whose followers in New York had helped carry out the World Trade Center bombing.

After spending some months fighting deportation to Jordan, where he was expected to stand trial for an alleged role in a series of cinema bombings, Khalifa agreed to be deported at the end of April 1995, shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing.

According to the FBI teletype, Khalifa was thought to have agreed to the deportation "his retrial in Jordan will result in his quick acquittal."

"Khalifah's deportation to Jordan, although conforming to the express intent of the U.S. Secretary of State, likely will not result in Khalifah receiving any punishment for his criminal and terrorist activities, and will more likely lead to his quick acquittal and departure from Jordan," the teletype stated.

The FBI had petitioned the State Department to delay the deportation in order to allow more time for investigation.

At the same time, the CIA had informed State that deporting Khalifa would likely result in him being freed, according to CIA analyst Michael Scheuer, who worked on the Khalifa investigation at the time and afterward.

"When it got to the State Department, all the State Department wanted to do was get it off our plate," Scheuer said.

Even the State Department's own embassy in Amman warned that deporting Khalifa would likely result in his release, according to cables obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

"Embassy continues to believe that Khalifah will be acquitted if tried in Jordan," read the last of these warnings, sent the same day that Khalifa was extradited.

In addition to information from the embassy, the FBI has sent a team to Jordan to liase with officials there. Jordanian officials expressed "indifference" about prosecuting Khalifa there and suggested the U.S. should consider its options for criminal charges, the May 11, FBI teletype states.

"[Prosecutors in] the Southern District of New York and the New York [FBI] office attempted, in every way, to have visa fraud charges presented against Khalifah in the Northern District of California," the teletype stated. "The pressure from the political portion of the State Department, as well as the problems that were evident in the case, assured that DOJ did not insist on a prosecution in California." The teletype does not state what the "evident" problems were, nor do other documents obtained by INTELWIRE make those problems clear.

"It is unfortunate that the time needed to possibly tie Khalifah to [name redacted, likely Ramzi Yousef] and to develop more serious terrorism charges on Khalifa could not be accomplished while Khalifah was in U.S. custody," the telegraph concludes, noting that a grand jury investigation against Khalifa had nevertheless been initiated.

The ongoing FBI investigation was later closed due to the unlikelihood of Khalifa ever returning to the U.S., according to other records.

Previously on INTELWIRE:

U.S., Interpol Tracked Khalifa In Days Before Madagascar Murder

Mohammed Jamal Khalifa: Life and Death Secrets

Labels: Bojinka, Jamal-Khalifa, Philippines, Ramzi-Yousef, Wali-Khan-Amin-Shah, World-Trade-Center-Bombing

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

1999-07-08: FBI, summary of information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

There are two versions of this document, which contain different information. The summary is a rare document indicating the FBI's interest in Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, prior to the September 11 attacks. KSM is considered the primary mastermind of the attacks. He was secretly indicted for his role in Ramzi Yousef's Bojinka plot in January 1996, but the FBI did not publicly acknowledge his existence until 1998.

It's interesting to note the pointless redactions made to these documents prior to their release by the FBI. For instance, the names of the other Bojinka plotters (Ramzi Yousef, Abdul Hakim Murad and Wali Khan Amin Shah) have been redacted even though they are well in the public domain after a highly visible trial. The redactions are a typical example of the FBI's reluctance to release information, even when there is no legal or common-sense reason to withhold.

1999-07-08: FBI, summary of information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

1999-07-08: FBI, summary of information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Labels: 9-11, Bojinka, INTELFILES, Khalid-Shaikh-Mohammed, KSM, Ramzi-Yousef

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

1999-07-08: FBI, summary of information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

There are two versions of this document, which contain different information. The summary is a rare document indicating the FBI's interest in Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, prior to the September 11 attacks. KSM is considered the primary mastermind of the attacks. He was secretly indicted for his role in Ramzi Yousef's Bojinka plot in January 1996, but the FBI did not publicly acknowledge his existence until 1998.

It's interesting to note the pointless redactions made to these documents prior to their release by the FBI. For instance, the names of the other Bojinka plotters (Ramzi Yousef, Abdul Hakim Murad and Wali Khan Amin Shah) have been redacted even though they are well in the public domain after a highly visible trial. The redactions are a typical example of the FBI's reluctance to release information, even when there is no legal or common-sense reason to withhold.

1999-07-08: FBI, summary of information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

1999-07-08: FBI, summary of information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Labels: 9-11, Bojinka, INTELFILES, Khalid-Shaikh-Mohammed, KSM, Ramzi-Yousef

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

1995-05-11: FBI FD-302, Abdul Hakim Murad

This mostly redacted document memorializes an April 14 interview with Ramzi Yousef's accomplice Abdul Hakim Murad. Arrested in January 1995 in the Philippines, Murad was a key player in the Bojinka plot and told authorities that Yousef had (in 1994 or 1995) hatched a scheme to hijack a commercial airliner and crash it into CIA headquarters.

As an aside, the timing of this interview is interesting, in that it takes place five days before the Oklahoma City bombing. On April 19, 1995, Murad told a prison guard that Yousef's "Liberation Army" was responsible for the attack, however INTELWIRE's efforts to document the FBI's follow-up investigation of that claim have thus far yielded nothing.

1995-05-11: FBI FD-302, record of interrogation, Abdul Hakim Murad

Labels: Abdul-Hakim-Murad, Bojinka, INTELFILES, Ramzi-Yousef

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

1995-05-11: FBI FD-302, Abdul Hakim Murad

This mostly redacted document memorializes an April 14 interview with Ramzi Yousef's accomplice Abdul Hakim Murad. Arrested in January 1995 in the Philippines, Murad was a key player in the Bojinka plot and told authorities that Yousef had (in 1994 or 1995) hatched a scheme to hijack a commercial airliner and crash it into CIA headquarters.

As an aside, the timing of this interview is interesting, in that it takes place five days before the Oklahoma City bombing. On April 19, 1995, Murad told a prison guard that Yousef's "Liberation Army" was responsible for the attack, however INTELWIRE's efforts to document the FBI's follow-up investigation of that claim have thus far yielded nothing.

1995-05-11: FBI FD-302, record of interrogation, Abdul Hakim Murad

Labels: Abdul-Hakim-Murad, Bojinka, INTELFILES, Ramzi-Yousef

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink